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Abstract
Nahhas' rise to the leadership of the Wafd and the national 
movement reflected the rise of a new social force in Egyptian society 
and politics, the urban, middle-class professionals, especially the 
lawyers* This group, which first adopted the ideology of the Watanx 
Party under the leadership of Mustafa Kamil at the turn of the century, 
would soon shift its ideological orientation towards the ideology of 
the Umma Party controlled by its rural landowner supporters, and join 
forces under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul and the newly-created Wafd 
Party.
Nahhas was soon to clash with the landowners, and his political 
career would be marked inside the Party by a continuous struggle of his 
wing for the domination of the Party, partly achieved in 1927 by his 
election, and then by the defection of the rival wing in 1932. The
policy of the Party under the leadership of Nahhas towards the British
and the Palace reflected the inner balance of power between the two 
wings. The landowners being defeated by the lawyers in the elections 
brought about by the 1923 Constitution, would abandon their Umma
ant-autocratic principles, while Nahhas, the ex-Watanx adherent, would 
implement the Umma's concept of co-operation with the British to
achieve gradual independence, while at the same time curtailing the 
power of the Palace for a more constitutional representative
government. In this light we can understand the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian
treaty and the Palace incident of 4 February 1942.
It was with the rise of a new urban middle class after World War 
II and the decline of Nahhas as a representative of this group by
bringing into the leadership ranks of the Wafd a landowner, Siraj 
al-Dxn,,. that the social base on which he depended moved to other
political groups which finally succeeded in bringing down the whole of 
Nahhas1 regime in 1952.
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THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES 
THAT OTHERS MIGHT LIVE
Introduction
For more than thirty years, the political life of Egypt was 
characterized by a contesting "game" of power among three rival 
groups. First of these were the British, who held a special position in 
the country despite the fact that Egypt was granted independence in 
1922. Yet, four main issues, "the four reserved points", allowed 
Britain to retain troops and considerable influence in the country, if 
not the strongest influence. The second was the Monarchy, that had
ruled Egypt since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and were of
yj ^
Albanian origin. It by its invitation that the British first
I V
intervened in 1882, on their behalf, to face a hostile uprising led by 
some sections of Egyptian officers. Though the power of the Palace was 
much curtailed by the British presence, it was still a major force to 
be reckoned with and very much a part of the ruling elite. The third 
comprised the leaders of the nationalist liberal movement, which 
emerged after World War One. It constituted what was to be known as
the "Egyptian Delegation", or in its Arabic usage, the "Wafd", that
formally demanded independence from Britain. This political movement 
became the most popular and dominating force among the masses at large.
The Wafd was presided over by two leaders, Saad Zaghlul and 
Mustafa al-Nahhas, 1918-27 and 1927-53 respectively. For both of them 
an independent Egypt free of British domination, and a constitutional 
government which curtailed the power of the Monarchy were their dual 
aims. They had the task of confronting both the British and the 
Monarchy. Alliances were often drawn between two of the three forces, 
only to be changed when circumstances required it.
For a student of politics, confining politics to the study of 
power for the moment, that was an ideal scene of a Zero-Sum Game played
by three actors, and an ideal situation for a case study.
8
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The emphasis here will be on one of the players, the Wafd, and the 
purpose of this study is to come to an understanding of how and why the 
'•Wafd" acted the way it did between the years of 1918 and 1353.
A detailed study of the "Wafd" at large, would be beyond the scope 
and length of this thesis. Instead, we will focus on the leader of the 
"Wafd", who not only represented the Wafd, but also enjoyed immense 
powers inside it. To the extent that one studies the character of its 
leaders, Saad or Nahhas, you are also studying the policies, social 
base, leadership, and ideas of that movement. On the other hand, one 
must not fall under the mistaken impression that this was a personal 
movement, but only that the personality of the leader could be used as 
a means for the study and understanding of the Wafd.
Nahhas was chosen for this study for two reasons. One is the 
availability of a vast literature concerning the first leader of the
Wafd, Saad Zaghlul, in contrast to the scanty material available about 
Nahhas, especially after 1952. Except for two minor books^ and an 
article^ explaining the reasons of the neglect of such a personality, 
I was not able to trace any other source. The article, for instance, 
states that because of the collision between the new regime which 
emerged after 1952 and the Wafd, Nahhas' name was omitted as official 
policy. Also, most Egyptian historians have not been Wafdists, and 
some of them were known for their anti-Wafd sentiments. Two examples 
are Ahmad Shafiq, the "Palace historian" as he was known, and 'Abd 
al-Rahman al-Rafi'i who was a pro-Watani, and therefore not wholly 
unbiased against Nahhas. That was evident when he described the return
1 . Mihni Gorgi wa Yusuf 'Abdu Sir A'zamit Hadarat Sahib al-Dawla 
al-Ra'is al-Galil Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha Matbafit al-Iqtisad Cairo 
1936. 'Abbass Hafiz Mustafa al-Nahhas Al-Zama wa al-Za'aim
Matba'it Misr Cairo 1936.
2. See 'Abd al-'Azim Ramadan, "Mustafa al-Nahhas al-Zaaim Allezi
r * * -
Nasiyahou al-Mouarkum" Al-Katib Vol. 162 September 1974, 
pp. 77-82.
of the Wafd to power after the 1950 elections as the "return of 
absolute rule."
The second reason is the near total ignorance which exists about 
the character of Nahhas. Some explanation is owed to my generation 
(born after 1952) of Nahhas* role in Egyptian politics. He was the 
leader of the largest political party (see appendix 1 for the table of 
different elections), and for a very considerable time commanded the
popular support of half of those who voted in recent Egyptian political 
history; that is from the time of his election as leader of the Wafd in
September 1927 to the time of the dissolution of all political parties
in Egypt in March 1952. Thus, for twenty-five years Nahhas was the
leader of a great section of the population in Egypt, and enjoyed a
popularity unparalleled by any other leader. But was he also a
charismatic leader?
Finally, as a case study of a charismatic national liberal 
leadership it attempts to answer the following questions;
1) What was Nahhas * perception of his goal (independence and
defence of the Constitution), and of his main opponents, the
British and the Palace?
2) How did Nahhas go about achieving his goals, his ideology and 
strategy, and how did he actually implement them, that is, 
what were his policies and tactics?
3) What was the social base of Nahhas' charismatic leadership?
For the purpose of this study, a chronological order of events
will be followed: the ascendency of Nahhas over Egyptian political
life, his rise to the leadership of the Wafd, his assumption of power 
as Prime Minister of Egypt seven times, his dealings with the British 
and the Monarchy, such as the Treaty of 1936 with Britain, and the 
famous Palace incident of 4 February 1942, and finally the events which 
led to the overthrow of the whole system by the army's intervention on 
23 July 1952 and Nahhas' personal eclipse into political oblivion. The 
thesis will focus on Nahhas as a political leader in dealing with
political matters as defined in the areas mentioned. Wider matters of 
economic and social policy and the ideas of Nahhas as leader of the 
"Wafd" will be touched upon only when deemed necessary for the purpose 
of the argument presented in this work. Generally though, public 
policies of Nahhas1 cabinets and other social and economic measures are 
not discussed.
A wide range of sources was used. Primary sources were, of 
course, the first to be consulted. For English sources, all material 
was available without any difficulty either in the Public Record Office 
at Kew in London for the general correspondence (political) between the 
Foreign Office in London and the Residency in Cairo, Egypt. Another 
source was the Middle Eastern Centre of St. Antony’s College at Oxford 
for personal papers such as the Diaries of Miles Lampson, Lord Killearn 
(British High Commissioner, Ambassador in Egypt 1934-1946). Access to 
Egyptian sources was more problematic. First, not all the material 
needed was readily available, as for example, minutes of cabinet 
meetings, and minutes of the Wafd's party meetings. Secondly, access 
to certain documents came under the fifty-year rule. This made certain 
files in the Egyptian Public Record Office (Dar al-Watha'iq 
al-Qawmiyya) unattainable. Fortunately enough access to the 'Abdin 
Palace Archives was comparatively easier. Interviews with ordinary 
ex-Wafdists gave me a clear picture of the atmosphere that prevailed 
before 1952. Some interviews were held with prominent Wafdists who 
were easy to reach. Their remarks, however, dealt with very general 
matters. A degree of caution on the part of these interviewees was due 
perhaps to the possibility of the re-emergence of the Wafd (it
re-emerged under the name of the New Wafd led by Fuad Siraj al-Din in 
1978 and once more in 1983 to the dismay of the authorities which had 
to act swiftly to suppress it both times). Also a number of people 
claimed Nahhas’ diaries actually existed. Such was the claim of Diya'
al-Din Bibars in his article "Readings in Nahhas' D i a r i e s " . 3  Yet both 
Fuad Siraj al-Din (Secretary of the Wafd then) and Mr. 'Abd al-Aziz 
al-Nahhas (Nahhas Pasha's nephew) denied any knowledge of a diary or 
diaries. More illuminating was the time spent in Samanoud, Nahhas's 
birthplace and constituency. Naturally all necessary published 
materials in Arabic and English periodicals, books, and PhD theses were 
consulted.
In January 1984, the New Wafd was once more legalized by the court 
as an active political party. It was revived under the leadership of 
Fuad Siraj al-Din, and the memory of Nahhas was evoked once more. It 
contested parliamentary elections, and under the present system it won 
58 seats out of 448 seats in Parliament or 12 per cent of the popular 
vote.
§-■
3. Bibars, Dya' al-Din Safhat Maghula min Mudhakirat al-Nahhas 
Al-Isbi'a al-'Arabi Beirut 3 February 1975.
Chapter One 
The Rise of Nahhas
A* Nahhas Background
Mustafa al-Nahhas was born on 15 June 1879 in the town of * *
Samanoud, in the province of Gharbiya. His father Sheikh Muhammad 
al-Nahhas, a timber merchant, was noted for his honesty and integrity. 
It seems that his father had some religious education, but was not a 
graduate of the Azhar. Although well-off, he was not a rich merchant. 
He owned some property, stores and buildings, but not agricultural 
land. All that is known of Mustafa’s mother was that she was a pious
woman. Mustafa had also brothers and sisters. As any child of hisf «
background in that environment, Mustafa learned the Qur'an by heart and 
started praying at an early age, seven or ten in different reports. He 
went to the local Quranic school, a Kuttab, where he learned to read 
and write and the elementary principles of mathematics.1
When Mustafa became eleven years old, his father, Sheikh Muhammad, 
took him to the local telegraph office to learn the job. It is 
interesting to note that Sheikh Muhammad thought of that career for his 
son rather than to bring him into the family business. To the 
astonishment of everybody, the eleven year old child was able to 
memorize the telegraph code in only three days. On hearing this, a 
high-ranking official who was passing by, paid a visit to Sheikh 
Muhammad and convinced him that his son's talents should not be4 -
wasted. On his advice, Mustafa moved to Cairo for the first time to
i »
enter the Nasiraiyah Primary school. He was enrolled in the second 
grade, and was the first of all his classmates in all the subjects.
1. Gorgi, pp. 5-12.
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Later he entered the Khediwiaya Secondary school where he paid tuition 
fees from which he was subsequently exempted on the basis of his high 
scholastic record. An incident which occurred at that time provides a 
clue to Mustafa's personality. On one of his inspection tours to the 
school, Lord Kitchener, the British High Commissioner, pointed out to 
Mustafa the advantages of entering the army. Mustafa, proudly and 
defiantly, answered that he was exempted from tuition not due to 
poverty or need, but because of his achievements in class. Eventually, 
at the age of seventeen, in the year 1896, Mustafa entered the School 
of Law.2 Four years later, in the year 1900, he graduated at the age 
of twenty-one, at the top of his class. The custom at that time was
that graduates of the Law School would be appointed as clerks in the 
Judiciary with a salary of five pounds a month. Mustafa urged his
colleagues to boycott these appointments. When he was summoned by a
high official to explain his attitude, he demanded an immediate rise in 
the salary to fifteen pounds. A compromise was reached, and ten pounds 
was agreed on, and he became an assistant examining magistrate. 
However, he himself refused to be appointed and preferred to work as a
lawyer, in order "to be a free man" as he put it.^
Nahhas, after refusing to join the government, got his first job
with Muhammad Farid (1868-1919), who was to succeed Mustafa Kamil as 
leader of the Watani Party. He did not work as a junior partner still 
under training, but insisted on taking on several cases in court. Soon 
after that he left Farid to become a full partner of a famous lawyer in
Mansoura. He was to share everything in his office, and had his name
2. 'Abbas, Hafiz, Mustafa al-Nahhas al-Za'ama wa al-Z'aime, Matbaat 
Misr Cairo 1936, pp. 249-269,
3. Gorgi, pp. 14-17.
printed on every document next to the other man's name*
Nahhas worked as a lawyer for four years. By the end of this 
time, in 1904, 'Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, head of the courts department at 
the Ministry of Justice offered Nahhas the position of a judge, which 
he accepted only after the former visited his father and persuaded him 
to convince his son to accept it, Nahhas did not reject his father's 
advice. He was twenty-five years old, and was to continue to be a 
judge for sixteen years, when he was expelled for joining the Wafd in 
1919.4 Nahhas would later remember his youth and describe it by 
saying that he had studied law and the principles of justice and 
equality, the freedom of individuals and nations• He worked as a 
lawyer and judge and democracy became his interest. And as a young man 
he was attracted by two personalities, Mustafa Kamil and Saad Zaghlul. 
He interpreted Mustafa Kamil's connection with Khedive 'Abbas Helmi, 
the representative of the legal authority, as an attempt to dissociate 
the legal authority from the hands of the British. That was the reason 
for his support for the Watani Party and his many friendships among its 
men
One could say that by that time Nahhas* personality was already 
shaped and that a picture of him had emerged as someone who was 
religious, did not miss a prayer, never smoked or drank alcohol. A
bachelor, but responsible for the family of his sister whose two sons 
lived with him and to whom he was like a father, he was an honest
lawyer who never took a case unless he was quite sure the accused was
innocent. His first appointment as a judge was in Qina and Aswan where
^ ^
he stayed there for six years, 1903-1908, Then he spent the following 
nine years in the Delta, Cairo, and Tanta, the town of his last
4, Gorgi, p. 12. Hafiz p. 228.
5. Salah al-Din, al-Shahid, Dhikrayati fi 1Ahdin Dar al-Ma'arif Fi
Misr Cairo, 1976, p. 21.
appointment where he was given the title of Bey. In all these years he 
met Saad Zaghlul only twice.®
B. Early Contacts with Saad Zaghlul and the Composition 
of the First Wafd
Nahhas was deeply moved by President Wilson’s fourteen points 
after the end of the Great War. The American President had stated that 
small nations had the right to determine their destiny. This was music 
to the ears of Nahhas after what he had seen of the British during that
war. For him the British were responsible for the much hated system of 
conscription, forcing Egyptians to provide a labour force in the war on 
her side, and was to be blamed for plundering the land.? a judge in 
Tanta at that time, Nahhas used to visit Cairo very often in order to 
meet with some friends in the office of a well-known lawyer, Ahmad Bey 
'Abd al-Latif. Members of this group were influenced by the ideas of 
the Watani Party. After hearing Wilson's fourteen points, they began 
to think of ways and means by which Egypt's voice would be heard 
internationally.8 They thought of contacting Saad Zaghlul Vice
President of the Legislative Assembly.^ There are two interesting 
points here. First, that the political conscience of the politicized 
Egyptians favoured action to promote Egypt's national case abroad. 
There was more than one group which thought of that course of action. 
The second observation was that Nahhas and his friends, who supported 
the Watanx Party, thought of Zaghlul as the appropriate leader and 
nobody else. It seems that Zaghlul was already on the verge of 
capturing, or had actually captured, the imagination of the Egyptians
6. 'All Salama, Ma la(Wa'arifuhu al-Nass'an al Zaim Mustafa al-Nahhas 
Matbaat Sigil al-'Arab Cairo 1980, pp. 35-39.
7. Al-Shahid, p. 22.
8. Hafiz, pp. 304, 305.
9. Al-Balagh, 15 November 1927.
as their leader•
One member of Nahhas1 group of friends was 'Alx Mahir, who was
head of the Department at the Ministry of Justice, and who would play
an increasingly political role afterwards as one of the main
adversaries of Nahhas. He knew 'Abd al-'Azxz Fahmx, member of the
Legislative Assembly and a close associate of Zaghlul. Nahhas and his
cohorts asked 'Alx Mahir to contact 'Abd al-'Azxz Fahmx, and put their
case to him with a view to introducing them to Zaghlul, Mahir failed
in his mission, and on reporting this to Nahhas, the latter got angry
and decided to meet 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmx himself. Nahhas with some
friends did meet Fahmy in his house, and after a long discussion the
latter asked "What would come out of this movement if it was
suppressed?", meaning if Zaghlul, Fahmx and others were arrested. To
1 0this Nahhas answered "You go and we take your place". By then, 'Abd 
al-'Azxz Fahmx was convinced of their seriousness and told them of the 
intention of organizing a delegation under Zaghlul to speak in the name 
of Egypt, but asked them to keep the matter secret.
Although Nahhas had met Zaghlul several times before in his 
capacity as a judge, their relationship did not extend beyond this 
formal or official level. When the Watani Party differed with Zaghlul 
on the number and the names of the people who were to represent it in 
the Egyptian Wafd, Nahhas and Dr. Hafiz 'Afifi were chosen as the 
party's representatives. Hardliners who Zaghlul thought would ruin his 
chances in any negotiations were excluded from the delegation. Stories 
conflict here on who nominated them. One suggests that it was Amin 
Yusuf Bey who was married to Zaghlul's niece who did so. Amin was a 
former member of the Watani Party, and he recommended Nahhas to Zaghlul 
as a possible candidate for Wafd membership. Amin invited Nahhas to
10. Ibid.
11. Hafiz, p. 305.
join the Wafd during a conversation in Groppi's (a European cafe in 
central Cairo), and Nahhas agreed after Zaghlul had promised to provide 
financial assistance so that Nahhas would be able to continue 
supporting his sister and her family.1  ^ Another story was that 'Abd 
al-'Azxz Fahmi recommended him,1® which sounds more credible. The 
reason for choosing Nahhas and 'Afifx besides what was just mentioned, 
was that both were very sociable among the educated youth and would 
contribute to the propaganda work that was entailed,14 Al-'Aqqad 
thought Zaghlul intended to add others to the delegation in order to 
balance those whom the British called "moderates".1® So on 20th 
November 1918, the Wafd, which already comprised seven members, was 
joined by Nahhas and Hafiz 'Afifi.1®
In the meantimne, Prince Omar Tousoun, of the royal family, was 
forming another delegation, and one of the reasons why Zaghlul opposed 
it and decided to form his own, was the composition of Tousoun's 
delegation. It was drawn mostly from either the Turkish elements or 
the old school of politicians and officials, such as Muhammad Said, the 
former Prime Minister. Thus the issue of Egyptians vis-a-vis Turks was 
revived once more after it had lain dormant since the days of Orabi's 
revolt in 1881-1882.1? This issue of who represents Egypt would 
become Saad's, then Nahhas', slogan in leading the nation.
12. Janice Joles Terry, The Wafd 1919—1952s Cornerstone of Egyptian 
Political Power Third World Centre London 1982, p. 84. When 
Nahhas joined the Wafd in Paris, he was given a monthly salary for 
his role as secretary of the Wafd.
13. 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmx, Hadhihi Hayatx Dar al-Hilal Cairo 1963, 
p. 94.
14. Muhammad 'Alx 'Alluba, Mudhakirat Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya 
Cairo, p. 56.
15. 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, Saad Zhaglul Sira wa Tahiya Maktabat 
al-»Anglo al-Misrriyya Cairo 1936, p. 257.
16. Selxm Muhammad Kamil, Thaurat Sanat 1919 Kama 'Aishtaha wa 
'Araftaha Kitab al-Yum Cairo 1975, p. 58.
17. Hafiz Mahmud al-Ma'arik fi'l Sahafah wa'l Siyasah wa'I Fikr bain 
1919-1952 Kitab al-Jumhuriya Cairo 1969, p. 153, Fahmx pp. 72-84.
C. Egypt at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century
Egypt, at that time, was autonomous under Ottoman Turkish 
sovereignty, and the reins of rule were in the hands of the Albanian 
family of Muhammad 'All. During the second half of the nineteenth 
century there were two developments. First, was the emergence of
landowners after Khedive Said decreed the right to private ownership of 
land, and second, the penetration of foreign capital and personnel via 
the Capitulations given by the Ottoman Empire to the Western European 
powers. Landowners were not completely assured of their rights until 
the end of the century, and by 1875 the Mixed Courts of the 
Capitulatory system were established as a result of the previous
concessions.1®
With the advent of the British a new situation was created, what 
would later be known as the dualism between the "legal authority" on 
the one hand and the "actual authority" on the other. The former was 
the Khedive who derived his legitimacy from Turkey, which still held 
sovereignty over Egypt. The latter was the British High Commissioner 
backed by the British army of occupation. Once the very friendly
ruling dynasty and aristocracy who had invited British support were 
able to quell the threat of rebellion, they wanted their previous 
privileges restored and sustained. The British, knowing quite well 
that these same advantages were the causes of rebellion, sought a new 
ally and began to distance themselves from them. The British found
their new ally in the landowners, and each found in the other his ideal 
partner. Not only was there a racial, economic, and political cleavage 
between the Palace, the aristocracy, and the new landowners, but also 
contempt and mistrust on the part of the former for the latter. For
/ — - ■ -- \
18. See Memories de Nubar Pacha, edited by Mirit Boutros Ghali,
Librairie du Liban, Beirut, 1983.
the new landowners, Britain was a protector against the Palace and 
aristocracy, and a benefactor, through her irrigation schemes and 
willingness to import the main export cash crop, cotton.1^
Another rising social group was the urban middle class. This 
class is much more difficult to trace, and was much more diversified. 
It included city dwellers and students of various schools and 
institutions, such as the al-Azhar in Cairo. Yet a third was the 
working class, although not in the modern sense of a proletariat, but 
much more in the sense of artisans organized in guilds. The merchants, 
a very old group but not quite a "bourgeoisie", but more of the bazaar 
type, were also prominent. Last but not least, were the professionals, 
and more important the official class, or "bureaucrats".
It was from that class of government officials that the challenge 
to the royal dynasty came. The ones who would lead that class were the 
most organized and developed section, the army. They were small in 
number, and not developed or modernized enough to challenge any 
European party, but they were to lead the restless urban middle class 
which was eager for political power since the ulama * tried to dominate 
the country in the beginning of the century. They were of mainly rural 
background; people had moved to a city like Cairo or Alexandria, They 
were educated, became neither peasants nor artisans and, deprived of a 
career and land or social position, were seeking a place in the 
establishment. Starting a business was out of the question because of 
the competition with the foreigners who enjoyed several privileges 
under the Capitulations giving them an advantage over any Egyptian 
entering the field.
It was from this group of urban middle-class professionals that 
Nahhas came, and it was that group which was to lead the national
19. Muhammad Zaki 'Abd al-Qadir, Mihnat a 1-Dustut: 1923-1952 Maktabat
MadbulT Cairo 1956, pp. 17, 19, 22.
movement throughout the British occupation of Egypt. Having nothing to 
lose, but much to gain, they were resentful and asking for equal 
rights. For undisputed political power was in the hands of the Palace' 
and aristocracy, until the first challenge came in 1881-1882. Both 
landowners and urban middle class would continue to challenge the 
Palace and compete among themselves, as will be discussed later. Thus 
this embryonic urban middle class lost its first round in 1881-82, the 
army option was checked, and those new graduates had to accept 
government jobs. Not being members of the establishment, and having no 
common interest with the British, as did the landowners, they 
constituted an independent force of their own. In addition, they felt 
that their opportunities either in business, or in government were 
hindered by foreigners in general and by the British in particular. 
Consequently they became the most militant nationalists against the 
British. They were characterized by two main features. First, they 
were mostly lawyers, or men of the law? secondly, Mustafa Kamil's 
nationalist temperament expressed their demands and aspirations. As 
lawyers they were representative of the rising new urban middle class, 
although one is hesitant to call them middle or petty bourgeois or any 
of these categories. Yet the point that one wants to make is that the 
lawyers were the rising social group. Several factors enhanced their 
upward mobility which ultimately made them dominate political life in 
general, and the national movement as represented later in the Wafd 
Party in particular. This does not exclude members of urban social 
classes, such as government officials, teachers, and landowners. A 
common denominator was the legal training background, even among 
government bureaucrats and landowners.
Two major developments helped in the emergence of the lawyers as 
the leaders of the society. The first was the exclusion of any other 
rival groups such as the ulama' or the Army Officers. Secondly, the
system of education of law and the legal profession itself.20 As for 
the ulama1, they were, the traditional religious mentors of the people 
as they were the enlightened and learned section of the population: 
they combined the prestige of knowledge and religion. They were 
occasionally the mediators between the people and the ruling Mamluks 
before 1798. They led the resistance against the French campaign of 
1798-1801, and it was they who finally legitimized the rule of Muhammad
'All over Egypt in 1805. But it was in Muhammad 'All's reign that
their role declined either intentionally by him for the purposes of 
policy and by the new institutions he introduced for the modernization 
of the state.21
The size of the army, led also to their decline and gave way to 
any new group among them which could assume the role of leadership.
Neither the ulama' who were weakened by Mohammad Al$, nor the army that 
was defeated and reorganized under British auspices, was any longer 
attractive to the new generation. A large proportion of the latter
headed towards the state schools were the future lay in a new 
state-secular order. Of these schools, the School of Law was the most 
important and played a prominent role in the political development of 
Egypt.22 And in a society in which the rights of property had been 
recently legitimized, coupled with the influx of foreigners and capital 
under the protection of the. Capitulations, the role of lawyers was 
becoming increasingly important and prestigious. In the School of Law, 
they learned that law is equal for all. Mustafa Kamil described it as 
the school for writing, oratory, and the ascertainment of the rights of
20. Ziadeh, Farahat, Lawyers, the rule of law and liberalism in Modern
Egypt, Stanford University, California, 1968, p. 62.
21 . 'Abd al-Khalik Lashin, Saad Zhaglul wa Dawruhu fi al-Siyasah
al-Misriya Maktabat Madbuli Cairo 1975, p. 165.
22. Ziadeh, p. 62,
individuals and nations.2®
The School of Law at that time was a kind of Faculty of Law and 
Arts, For students were studying many other subjects besides law. 
These included Arabic literature, logic, disputation, grammar, prose, 
rhetoric, syntax, prosody? etc.24 So, by 1906, 390 out of 400
students of the school were followers of Mustafa Kamil, and Nahhas was 
in their forefront.2®
D. The Political Scene as it Developed from 1900
As already noted, two new social groups were emerging, the 
landowners with their natural hostility towards the Turkish aristocracy 
led by the Khedive; and the new generation of urban-educated Egyptians, 
best described as the ef fendi class. This development led to new 
political alliances and new forms of power struggle. The British as 
saviours of the throne were regarded by the new Khedive ’Abbas Helml, 
in power since 1892, as an occupying force curtailing his own power. 
He tried to utilize a rising popular movement to strengthen his own 
position against the British. On the other side the British were 
gradually alienating the new effendi class, thus bringing them into 
open confrontation and driving it into an alliance with the new 
Khedive.
For these effendis, government service was their main avenue of 
employment, and that was diminishing as the number of British employees 
was increasing. For example, the number of Egyptian employees in high 
posts had decreased from 27 per cent in 1907 to 23 per cent by 1920, 
which meant that Egyptians had almost only one quarter of the high
23. Ibid.
24. Ahma_d Lutfi al-Sayyid, Qisat Hayati Dar al-Hilal Cairo 1962, 
p. 25.
25. Ibid. p. 65.
posts. At the same time the percentage of British employees had 
increased in some of these jobs from 42 per cent to 60 per cent. The 
Egyptians occupied 86 percent of the jobs with pensions and received 70 
per cent of the wages, while the British occupied 14 per cent of the 
jobs with pensions and received 30 per cent of the wages.2® 
Consequently, these effendis could not be but anti-occupation, soon
came to be the most vociferous critics of the British, under a new 
leadership in the person of the lawyer, Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908).
While the debate over the Taba®? incident was still going on, 
something else occurred which gave Mustafa Kamil and his anti-British 
allies a ' new impetus. This was the Dinshiway incident, and it 
constituted a watershed. In 1906, British officers hunting in the 
vicinity of Dinshiway village, shot a woman by mistake. After a 
skirmish with the villagers, one of the officers died from sun stroke. 
A trial was held, four villagers were hanged, and several others 
punished. It came at a time when British domination over Egypt, and 
Cromer's personal ascendancy and never seemed more secure after 
concluding the Entente Cordiale (1904) with Prance (when the two 
countries agreed to recognize each other's special position in Egypt 
and Morocco, respectively, in return for non-interference in each 
other's domain). But the "veiled protectorate" had weaknesses. Cromer 
was both out of touch and out of sympathy with the new generation of 
Egyptians. The occupation had become to all intents and purposes 
permanent, and the consequent growth of the British official
26. Muhammad Kamil Selim, Sira Saad fi Uruba Kitab al-Yum Cairo 1975, 
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27. In 1906 Turkish troops occupied Taba, a point eight miles west of 
Agate. Britain on behalf of the Egyptian Government protested on 
the bases of Egyptian administrative responsibility over the Sinai 
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Party as the protectors of the Egyptianess of Taba, and the Watani 
Party who saw in the Umma Party's stand as pro-British and an 
anti-Islamic Union position.
establishment created frustration among educated Egyptians, whose 
resentment became increasingly articulate. The British, however, saw 
themselves as the benefactors of the Egyptian peasantry, whom they had 
delivered from the corvee and the lash. The Dinshiway incident showed 
them in another light.2® There is no doubt that two of the immediate
results Cf that incident were the retirement of Cromer the following
year and the emergence of Mustafa Kamil as a triumphant national 
leader •
E. The Emergence of Political Parties in 1907
This year saw the birth of the two political parties which had
already been preceded by their newspapers. The first was the Umma
Party, speaking for the landowners. The landowners who benefited from
' t-
the British presence, were by no means less patriotic. On the 1 ,
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contrary, they were more imaginative and probably helped more in the
development of the national consciousness of the Egyptian nation than ,
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their counterparts. However they were mistakenly thought to be on the 
British side and against the national sentiment which was still
predominantly Muslim, i.e., Ottoman. For them, a new situation was the 
answer - the return to Ottoman sovereignty was quite against their
interests for it would strengthen the Palace and the aristocracy. The 
answer lay in a nation-state, an independent Egypt, even if that meant 
playing into the hands of the British for the moment. Politically the 
notion was disastrous: it amounted to treason, but they were
Western-trained intellectuals and philosophers, not politicians. For 
them, siding with Ottoman Turkey, even if it was only a tactical move 
aimed against the British, whom they acknowledged as an occupying
force, was not in the long-term interest of Egypt. The famous incident
28. J.C.B. Richmond, Egypt 1798 - 1952 Her Advance Towards a Modern 
Identity Methuen London 1977, p. 497.
of Taba in 1906 was the turning point. By admitting Ottoman
sovereignty over it, Egypt would loose it for ever, even if it meant 
siding with the British at that particular juncture, because they were 
in Egypt temporarily, and they would leave one day, however distant 
that day might be. As for their view of the relationship which they 
thought should be adopted vis-a-vis the British, this is best
illustrated in an article written by Ahmad Lutfi al Sayyid29 in their
cs-<\,
newspaper gU-Jarida^:
our policy towards the British wouldn't go beyond two
options: either that of stubborness and hostility, or that
of a peaceful attitude but not of surrender. There is no 
doubt that the policy of enmity is grave, for how can an 
enemy expect from his foe any change in his condition? Thus, 
there is no option left but that of a peaceful attitude
marked by a reciprocal goodwill.®^
The same author wrote in. his autobiography about how the party's
newspaper was first established:
I had an interview with Muhamma_d Mahmud®2 concerning the
issue of Aqaba and what Egypt in its political situation
should do, such as establish a free Egyptian newspaper, which 
would speak in the name of Egypt alone, without being biased 
towards Turkey or either to the legal or' actual authority in 
the country. And we agreed that this newspaper should be 
owned by a company of notables who have a real stake in the 
country, whom Lord Cromer and others from the British 
described as being content with the occupation, silent over 
the rights of Egypt. And that the opposition movement to the 
occupation is conducted by people who had no stake in the 
country such as the young Effendis and the Turkish 
Pashas.1 ®®
As for the programme of the Party, its introduction stated that 
complete independence could not be obtained just by talking, but that 
there were prerequisites to independence, and these prerequisites are 
objectives which must be sought. There were several points of which
29. A liberal intellectual and the ideologist of the Umma Party.
30. Issued by Umma Party in 1907 and edited by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid.
s.
31* 'Abd al-Qadir, p. 34.
32. A graduate of Oxford, ex-provincial mudir.
33. Al-Sayyid, p. 44.
the most important were: first, to use their efforts and money to
encourage general education and the projects which would help to 
promote their aims in progress and civilization; second, to concentrate 
their efforts on obtaining their natural right to participate with the 
government in issuing laws and public projects through expanding the 
functions of the Local Councils and the General Assembly, until they 
gradually reached the Chamber of Deputies which suited their political 
conditions.^ There were no other words mentioned about independence 
or democracy.
As Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid recalled in his autobiography, the party 
was established on 21 December 1907 after the appearance of its 
newspaper. Mahmud Sulayman (Muhammad Mahmud's father) was chosen as 
President, Hassan 'Abd al-Raziq and 'All Sh'arawi (the colleague of 
Saad on 13 November 1918) as deputies, and Ahtmad Lutfi al-Sayyid as
General Secretary. Lutfi commented that some of the newspapers saw in 
the party's demands for complete independence an opportunity to attack 
it and accuse it of betraying the Ottoman Porte, the legal sovereign 
over Egypt at that time. In 1910 the Umma Party laid down a project 
for a constitution, and considered presenting it to the Khedive as a 
petition from the people of the country. This petition was written and 
the people started signing it.^ Lastly, to illustrate the Umma's 
Party attitude towards the British and the Palace, which was to be 
later adopted by the members of the Wafd Party as will be shown, no
A * ^ Abetter words can be found than those of al-Hilbawx in his memoirs, 
when he wrote,
34. Yunan Labib Rizq, al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyah QabI Thaurat 1952, 
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case.
The policy of that party [Umma] aimed at observing the two 
authorities, the native and the foreign, and write on each 
one without any bias. The British, whatever defects they had 
in their colonial policy, were accustomed to hearing 
criticism and being shown the mistakes of their policy 
without showing dfiy enmity to the critic. As for the 
Egyptian authority, especially the palace men, it did not 
enjoy that quality and that tolerance towards any criticism 
said at the time,37
These were liberal-democratic men who believed in the British liberal
system and believed that it should be adopted also in Egypt,
Before commenting on the Watani Party and its programme, some
preliminary statements must be made. The interests of the Khedive
('Abbas Helmi XX) did not conflict with those of the Ottoman Empire,
for both of them were trying to regain their lost influence and, since
the big landowners in general were linked to the British occupation, 
the Khedive had no option, but to appeal to the people. And since the 
bulk of the masses were represented by the youth in the schools, a link
always existed between him and those students, thus explaining the
who was supported by Abbas Helmi 
quick ascendency of Mustafa Kamil and his accession to the rank of
Pasha.
*
The Watani Party was established in 1907, the year in which the 
new British Consul, Eldon Gorst, arrived and embarked upon his 
reconciliation policy with the Palace, The party demanded democracy 
and evacuation (independence),3® for it was not wise to ask for the
evacuation of the British forces and the abolition of Ottoman
sovereignty over Egypt at the same time. Antagonizing Turkey at that
time would only have led her to side with Britain and concede her
sovereignty, an aim Britain never ceased to pursue. On 27 December
1907, the general congress of the Party gathered in the building of the
37. Al-Hilbawi, Ibrahim, Mudhakirat Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya, 
p. >-83.
38. Fawzi Girgis, Dirasat fi Tarikh Misr mundh al-'Asr al-Mamluki 
Matba'at al-Dar al-Misriyya Cairo 1958, p. 121.
newspaper al-Liwa,39 and Mustafa Kamil gave a speech in which he 
defined the programme of the party as follows: To grant Egypt home
rule according to the Treaty of London of 1840 and the guarantees of 
the Imperial Firmans which Britain promised to respect officially; to 
establish a constitutional government by which the government would be 
responsible to a parliament enjoying the necessary power like other 
parliaments in Europe? and to strengthen the cordial relations between 
Egypt and Turkey, and also to win Turkey on their side and convince her t 
of the rightness of their national aspirations.4° Another source,' 
however, had a different list of priorities: the most important was
the first point, the independence of Egypt and the Sudan, a complete 
independence without any foreign protection or mandate or any other 
restriction. The second point was the establishment of a
constitutional government in the country in which sovereignty belonged 
to the nation, and the ruling institution was to be responsible to a 
chamber of deputies with complete authority. The sixth point was to 
spread education throughout the country on a national basis so that the 
poor could benefit from it, and to establish institutes of science and 
to open night schools for workers. And the tenth point referred to the 
strengthening of cordial relations and promoting mutual trust between 
Egypt and other countries.41 These were the most important of the ten 
points in Mustafa Kamil’s programme? there was no mention of the Sultan
or Turkey.
It was in this party that Nahhas' sentiments found expression. 
That could be understood in the context of Nahhas' own social and 
educational background. The young Nahhas was a true believer of the
39. Issued by Mustafa Kamil in 1900.
40. "Wathaiq Tarikhiya An al-Ahzab Wa al-Tanzimat al-Siyassiya fi Misr",
February 1965, p.155.
41. Rizqr_« P* 95.
Watani Party as he was a member of the effendi class* Although he did 
not participate in any direct political activity at that time, he kept 
in touch with the Watani Party and had' many friends there. However, 
nothing indicated that he had any sort of relationship with Mustafa 
Kamil or later Muhammad Farid, although he worked in the latter's law 
office for a short time after his graduation. Nahhas contacted the 
higher schools club and became a deputy t h e r e . ciufc> members 
consisting of students and graduates was established in 1905 as a 
social gathering for the educated young people and intellectuals. It 
was inspired by the Watani Party and became a forum for Watani Party 
propaganda throughout the first decade of the century among the 
students, and played an important role in the outbreak of the 1919
revolution.
In 1913, a Legislative Council was formed and it was in that
council that a new group, which could be best described as 
"constitutional nationalists", emerged from among the lawyers and
notables under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul. It was not long before 
the discussions were led by the lawyers alone.
What was interesting about Saad Zaghlul was his cosmopolitanism, 
in the sense of the different influences he had been exposed to and 
different circles he was attached to. His father was the mayor of a 
village in the Gharbiyya district with a landed property of two hundred 
feddans. He was born in the mid-nineteenth century. After attending 
the village Kuttab he went to al-Azhar, where he became a disciple of 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani4^ and Muhammad ' A b d u 4 ^  whom he later helped
42. Mujiammad Farid 'Abd al-Magid Hashish, Hizb al-Wafd 1936-1952, 
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in editing al-Waga'i al-Misriyya (the official newspaper of the 
government). He witnessed the defeat of the Urabi revolution, and was 
alleged to have formed a revenge society for which he was jailed for a 
short period. Until then he had a traditional rural middle-class 
upbringing and career.
The change started when he became a lawyer, which was still a new 
profession and one regarded with scepticism, because of the 
introduction of the mixed courts under the Capitulations and the 
gradual phasing out of the Sharia courts as the .only judicial 
system in the country.46 He was elected as Counsellor in the Court of 
Appeal in 1892, studied French law and received his B.A. in 1897. The 
other major change which happened in his life was joining the 
establishment, first through the Salon of Princess Sheuikar, then by 
marrying the daughter of Mustafa Fahmi (the Prime Minister from 1891 to 
1893, 1895 to 1908) in 1895. In 1906, he became Minister of Education, 
and subsequently joined the ill-fated cabinet of Butrus Ghali as 
Minister of Education and later Justice. He had to side with the 
government when the issue of prolonging the contract of the Suez Canal 
was discussed in the Legislative Council. In April 1912 he resigned 
his post after relations between himself and the Khedive reached an 
impasse.
Zaghlul was a candidate in two of Cairo's four constituencies, 
Boulaq and Sayida Zeinab, and won despite the opposition of Kitchener, 
the British Consul-General.4^ Most members of the Legislative Council 
agreed to elect him as their Deputy Speaker, since the President and 
one of the two deputies were appointed by the government, which meant
46. See Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950 J.N.D. Anderson, pp. 209-230 
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in fact choosing him as their leader. Their reasons were that he was
both disregarded by the Khedive and the British; the former had ousted
him from the cabinet and the latter did not back him against the
Khedive. (A very important note here: one of the main features of
Egyptian political life is that people sympathized and identified with
those being prosecuted by both authorities. This would later apply to
the Wafd, and especially Nahhas when he became its leader, but was
often denied his right to form a cabinet either by the British or the
King.) It was said that as minister, Zaghlul defied the Khedive, who
thought that Zaghlul would not have done that unless he was sure of his
position because of his family relationship with the ex-prime minister
(Mustafa Fahmi), his close friendships with the British, since Lord « *
Cromer had appointed him minister and praised him in his annual report
to his government.4®
In his diary Zaghlul wrote,
As for the Watani Party, I am not one of their men, and I am 
the first man that party attacked and injured. And if I had 
a tendency towards parties, I would have joined the Umma 
Party in which many of my friends were members. Or I would 
have looked to the leadership of the Watani Party before it 
had become a failure and its glory had gone and its men were 
dispersed. There was no need for me to seek a special 
position *4^
That was Saad Zaghlul, of 1915, who later led the national movement. 
Nahhas was to become his most loyal adherent.
F. World War I and its Consequences
Although Egypt did not enter the war, the people, and particularly 
the peasants, nevertheless suffered from its effects. The declaration 
of martial law and the suspension of the Legislative Assembly curbed
48. 'Alluba, p. 33.
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the activities of the middle-class nationalists,50 'Alluba^1 in his 
diary described how from the beginning of the war, the British took 
control of every public utility in the country and confiscated the 
crops and animals. Peasants were taken by force to serve as a labour 
force in battlefields under the guise of volunteers. As a result, the 
resentment of the people against the British reached a level at which 
they were hoping for the victory of Germany and her allies, including 
Turkey in this bloody war.32 Nahhas was no exception? Dr, Haykal53 
described him as pro-German during the war, and said that he always 
carried with him a map to be able to follow what was happening in 
Europe. He was also so delighted with the rumour that the Turks had 
crossed the Suez Canal, that a friend of his had to take him there to 
convince him otherwise. The major development was the declaration by 
Britain of the Protectorate over Egypt on the eve of the declaration of 
war in August 1914, and the ousting of Khedive 'Abbas Helmi, who was in 
Turkey at that time. Hussein Kamil was appointed a Sultan. He was 
succeeded by Sultan (King) Fuad in 1917.
By the end of the war the Watani Party was in an awkward position. 
Its president, Muhammad Farid, was exiled in Europe and died there in 
1919. At the same time, the party found the political environment had
changed. Its old policy depended on three pillars. The first was not
to recognize the legitimacy of the occupation, and thus the 
Protectorate, and to work for internationalizing the Egyptian case. 
The second was to uphold the idea of the Islamic community, and to look 
to the Ottoman Caliphate as the centre of that entity. The third,
50. Richmond, History of Egypt, p. 458.
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especially during the war, was not to recognize anyone- but Khedive 
'Abbas Helmi as the legal - sovereign of the country. That was for two 
reasons: (1) because of the improvement of the relationship between
the Party and the Khedive during the war when the leadership of the 
party and the ex-Khedive 'Abbas found themselves in the same camp; and 
(2) because it refused to recognize the rule of Sultan Hussein Kamil 
and later Fuad I, since that implied the recognition of the 
Protectorate which had resulted in unseating the ex-Khedive.
All these principal foundations on which the party's ideology and
political stands were based collapsed. First, there was the collapse
of the Ottoman empire and the Caliphate, and second, the presence of
Sultan Fuad on the Egyptian throne was an unchallenged reality and 
fact. Last but not least, all other major European countries had
accepted and recognized the British Protectorate over E g y p t . T h i s  
explains why the Umma Party emerged alone in the political scene after 
the war without any competition from the Watani Party. Not only was 
the Watani Party ideologically defeated as a result of the change in 
the political environment, but also physically it was almost 
eliminated, with the death of its founder-leader Mustafa Kamil and the4 •
absence of his successor in Europe and the detention of its most active 
members during the war. The stage was therefore set for Saad Zaghlul 
and the Wafd, many of whose members were mainly from the Umma Party, to 
take over the leadership of the National Movement. It was no surprise 
therefore that the Delegation (Wafd) was comprised mainly of Umma Party 
members or sympathizers.
The formation of the Egyptian Wafd was the final blow suffered by 
the Watani Party which had failed to make its own "National Wafd" the 
official spokesman of the national movement. What is interesting in 
the context of this thesis, is the composition of the Wafd itself and
54. Rizq, pp. 75-76.
the place of Nahhas in it, how he joined it, and the basis on which it 
was formed, in terms of its programme, internal organization, and its 
strategy and tactics.
G. The Formation of the Wafd
Of the seventeen members, including Nahhas and Zaghlul, Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid was from the class of large landowners, a lawyer by 
profession (class of 1894) who became editor of the al-Jarida, the 
mouthpiece of the Umma Party from 1907 to 1914.88 'Abd al-'Aziz 
Fahmi, was also a practicing lawyer, after leaving his job as Legal 
Consellor in the Wafd administration, and in 1913 was elected to the 
Legislative Assembly.88 'Ali Sh'arawi, a notable and big landowner, 
and deputy of the Umma Party, was elected to the Legislative Assembly 
in 1914.^7 Muhammad Mahmud, son of Muhammad Sulaiman Pasha (President 
of the Umma Party), had graduated from Oxford and had been governor of 
Buheira province.88 'Abd al-Latif al-Makabati, had been a Watani 
Party sympathizer and had been detained during the Great War.88 
Muhammad 'Ali 'Alluba, was a lawyer, a prominent member of the Watani 
party, and member of the Legislative Assembly.88 Thus, besides 
Zaghlul, another five in the delegation were members of the Legislative 
Assembly, two were members of the Watani party, two were members of the 
Umma party, and another two were linked to it - Muhammad Mahmud through
his father, and Saad Zaghlul by intellectual inclination and political
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preference. All were members of the establishment, one way or another,
V
either through land ownership, or j\holder of senior government
positions.
The rest of the group did not differ much. Hafiz 'Afifi was a 
physician who sympathized with the Watani Party;61 Nahhas, was a 
lawyer and a judge.62 Of the nine mentioned so far, five at least had 
legal training: Hamad al-*Basil was a member of the Legislative
Assembly;62 Ismail Sidki took a law degree in 1894, was Minister of 
Agriculture in 1914 and later of Waqf;6^ Mahmud Abu al-Nasr, a 
notable, graduated from Dar el 'Ulum, but later obtained a law degree
from Lyon University, practised law and became President of the Bar 
Association. He was a sympathizer of the Watani Party.66 Sinnut
Hanna, from a wealthy Coptic family in Assyoujt, was supporter of the 
Watani Party, who was elected to the legislative assembly in 1914;66
George Khayyat was another wealthy Copt from Assyut;6  ^ Wassif Ghali, 
second son of Butrus Ghali, ex-prime minister, studied in Prance;66
and 'Abd al-Khaliq Madkur, a wealthy merchant, was a member of the 
Legislative Assembly.69 Hussein Wassif was also member of the 1914 
a s s e m b l y 6
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As can be seen, a number of them were already wealthy Egyptians or 
members of the Legislative Assembly in 1914. Their total number was 
seventeen, nine of whom were members of the 1914 Assembly, and at least 
eight had legal backgrounds, if they were not practising lawyers. As 
for the political composition of the Wafd, most of its members were 
either from the Umma Party, or from the upper stratum of landowners who 
believed in sharing power with the British, and were opposed to the 
extremist and uncompromising militant policies of the Watani Party of 
direct confrontation and immediate evacuation. But there was a rising 
urban middle class, the "effendi class", of lawyers, or state 
employees, with legal training or background. These formed the nucleus 
of the Wafd, they collected donations and urged people to sign
petitions, and later were to lead the masses and become their natural
71leaders. Nahhas represented this _ new social group in the Wafd.'1 As 
will be shown later, it was these people who formed the second layer of 
the Wafd from whence came the notorious "Three Musketeers", Makram 
Ebeid, Ahmad Mahir and Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi. Along with Nahhas 
they would form an unbreakable "gang of four" which would dominate the 
Wafd and Egyptian party politics for more than a decade. But their 
power was not as yet appreciated by the rest of the Wafd members; it
was detected early on by Zaghlul, who used them to his best advantage.
The law which regulated the Wafd was composed of twenty-six 
articles. Four of these articles were very important indeed - Numbers 
2, 3, 4, and 5. Article 2 defined the objective of the Wafd to be to 
attain the complete independence of Egypt by legitimate and peaceful 
means. The third article stipulated that the Delegation represents the 
Egyptian people. The fourth article stated that the delegation shall 
be disbanded once independence was achieved. No member of the 
Delegation shall be allowed to redefine the mission assigned to the
71 . Ibid. p. 126.
Delegation, according to the fifth Article.
This spells out the aim of the Delegation, which was independence 
through peaceful, legal ways by an elected body (Articles 2 and 3). As 
for the organization of the Delegation and the various functions of its 
members, the following Articles dealt with the ones relating to this 
thesis:
7 - Whenever necessary a member may be expelled on a resolution 
passed by at least three-fourths of the Delegation. A member 
may resign whenever he so wishes without having a right to 
seek a refund of the amount of contribution he made to it.
10 - Decisions shall be taken by simple majority. In case of the 
equal division of ’votes the opinion of the group along with 
which the President votes shall be preferred (i.e. the
President had the decisive vote).
(These rules would never be followed. The president had the 
authority to overrule and to do so unimpeded.)
13 - The President shall represent the Delegation, preside over
its meetings, look after its organization and supervise the
work of committees, officials, the secretariat and the
treasury.
14 - The Secretary shall be responsible for the documentation of
the Delegation. He shall look after the archives, minutes
and other papers of the Delegation, except those concerning
the accounts.
19 - In addition to the minutes, the Secretary shall maintain a 
register in which he shall make daily entries of all 
important events, communications and activities. The 
register shall be consulted by the President every day.
21 - Each member shall bear his own expenses of travel and stay. 
He shall not demand anything except whatever he shall spend 
in connection with the mission of the Delegation, nor shall 
he spend anything from the Delegation's Fund except in order 
to serve its cause.
26 - The Delegation shall appoint a committee called the Central 
Committee of the Egyptian Delegation, and shall select its 
members from distinguished and enthusiastic persons. It 
shall be responsible for collecting donations on behalf of 
the Delegation and for communicating to the Delegation 
whatever may be important within the scope of its 
responsibility.^^
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Subsequently, the Central Committee proved to be of crucial importance, 
since it became the backbone of the Wafd, providing it with all the 
necessary information, and doing all the' hard work in Egypt. Mahir and 
Nokrashi were members of the Committee, a vital body in winning the 
support of the grassroots for the Wafd and in favour of Nahhas later. 
The offices of president and general secretary were held by Saad 
Zaghlul and Mustafa al-Nahhas respectively.
It is necessary to consider Zaghlul's political thinking for three 
reasons: (1) because he was the leader of the Wafd, with all that that
implies; (2) because Nahhas, as the faithful disciple of Zaghlul, would 
be greatly influenced by him (needless to say, both of them shared a 
common background in their rural origin and their legal and judicial 
careers. Their views were often similar, if not identical. Zaghlul 
was closer to the younger generation of Nahhas in thought and view.
Nahhas on the other hand had inherited some of the fears and 
traditional thinking of Zaghlul's generation); (3) because this 
similarity of views and common approach led to the first split in the
ranks of the Wafd, from which emerged a more homogeneous Wafd as a
party rather than the earlier heterogeneous coalition of notables and 
high government officials which was active during the 1919 revolt. The 
latter had united people with different tendencies and interests at the 
time, but later each distinctive group went its own way.-
. Saad Zaghlul approached politics the way a lawyer or judge 
approaches a legal court. The issue was resolved according to 
justice. His method in defending his case was that of logic and 
complete frankness. Whoever had right on his side should recover it
completely. And the aggressor, should pay back his victim. Thus there
was nov room for compromise, manoeuvre, or negotiation. (It is 
interesting to note what Saad said to Macdonald in their negotiations 
of 1924 when they came to an impasse, "Then it is a matter of force,
and not of Justice?!!") When the Wafd protested about the Peace 
Conference's decision to acknowledge Britain's position in Egypt, it 
stated, "There is no honest judge in the world who would find one 
single reason for accepting what the Conference had decided concerning 
Egypt". Another indication of Saad's legal mentality which dominated 
him, is how he saw his position vis a vis the British and the people in 
Egypt. In an extract of his negotiations with Lord Milner in London on 
21 July 1920, Saad said: "We cannot accept the continuation of the
occupation as it contradicts our mandate and contradicts independence." 
Milner: "It was you who formulated it?" Saad: "So be it, but now it
is a contract between us and the nation which we can neither modify nor
70
deviate from"•
Zaghlul's faith in the force of liberal democracy in Europe, and 
its ultimate domination over any other force was to be shattered in 
Paris. He believed that the people in general would shun ill repute 
and would be keen to distance themselves from whatever injustice might 
be attributed to them.*^ He sincerely believed that it was the moral 
code of justice which governs the law, binds the nation and motivates
its governments. And this would condemn any immoral act by their 
government against other nations such as Egypt.
As for the more practical side of his thinking, there were his 
demands on 13 November 1918 when, together with 'Ali Sh'arawi and 'Abd 
al-'Aziz Fahmi, he met with the British High Commissioner, Wingate. He 
stated that should Britain help them in gaining their complete 
independence, they would give her a reasonable guarantee without 
allowing any country to interfere with their independence or Britain's 
interests. They would give Britain a guarantee to insure its route to
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India, which was the Suez Canal, by giving her priority over others and
supply her with soldiers in case of necessity as a treaty would imply.
And that they would go to London if necessary, to speak with the
British government alone, and speak to none but them either in Egypt or 
outside Egypt.^5
It should be noted that it was Zaghlul who suggested a treaty, so
that all later developments including the 1936 treaty emanated from his
initial line of thought. All the time there was no notion of going to
Paris. As Dr. Haykal explained in his Memoirs, it was the 
intransigence of the British, which made the Wafd change their policy. 
As for his stand over the Capitulations, Saad asserted "As regards the 
interests of the resident Europeans, whose number does not exceed
150,000, we say that their interests are guaranteed by the 
capitulations and mixed courts together with the Caisse de la Dette". 
Al-'Aqqad had characterized Saad's mentality as that of a realistic
conservative, because he held firm to the rules, and if he attacked
"oppressors", that was not revolutionary of him, but only because he
held firmly to the rules.
In order to highlight further the role of the lawyers in the
revolution, and the reasons which made them the most outspoken critics 
of the occupation, no better example could be found than that of 
Zaghlul!s speech at the Egyptian Society of Law, Economics, and
Political Legislation. The intention (as prepared in 1917) was to 
change the existing legal system to a system more amenable to British 
interests-, which meant changing over to the English legal system, 
although the lawyers were trained according to the French system.
Nothing more could have alienated the lawyers than that. Zaghlul
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defended the existing legal system by saying, "The Egyptian criminal
law, taken from the French law, has been implemented for a long time.
Thus it is part of our legal heritage, running in the country like
blood in the body!"77 This was not only his own personal opinion, but
that of a whole segment of the professional urban middle class against
a perceived danger which was threatening their livelihood. It was not
surprising, therefore, to find the lawyers in the forefront of the
March 1919 upheaval when it erupted after the arrest and deportation of
Saad and his three colleagues, Muhammad Mahmud, Ismail Sidki, and Hamad
al-Basel. Two reports may be cited here in order to support the thesis
that March 1919 was a "lawyers revolt" and a "lawyers' movement". The
first report is by a British subject, resident for many years in the
provinces, dated 4 July 1919. It says
Nearly all the native lawyers are nationalists (they number 
possibly 200,000 including judges, ushers, experts, etc). 
Sir William Brunyate7® is, I think, responsible for a good 
deal of the bad feeling aroused against the British rule 
among them, caused by his suggestion to make English the 
predominant language of the Courts. This suggestion if 
carried out would mean that as very few of the native lawyers 
know English, their occupation would be gone, as they are now 
too old to begin to learn the English language. This partly 
accounts for the active part they had taken "in the late
disorders.79
The other report (dated September 1919) was from "a number of
senior missionaries working in Egypt".
The lawyer class, a very influential and important one, was 
alienated by what they regarded as sudden and ill-considered 
changes in the legal system of the country, changes which
would seriously and unjustifiably damage their professional 
interests. The English official, in whose hands the matter 
rested, was universally believed to have behaved with
arbitrary inconsiderateness and extraordinary rudeness, which 
has been universally and intensely resented. This class as a
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whole went over to the nationalists, and lent them the 
dangerous assistance of their brains and pens.80
Thus it was no surprise that the "General Strike Committee" was
* ftldirected by Wafdist lawyers m  the Justice Department.01
!
H. Nahhas as a Student Organizer
It is interesting to note here the role played by the students,
and most important, by "Nadi el-Madares el-'Ulya"; or Club of Higher
Schools, for all sources agree that it was the students who had started
the rebellion, and it was they who were its mainstay. The reason often
cited is the role of the Watani Party earlier on in involving them in
politics, thus preparing the way for the revolution. The
above-mentioned club was founded by the Watani Party, and it played a
oo
key organizational role during those days of 1918. Also, one could 
argue that the students who had nothing to lose, besides an uncertain 
future, and felt no further dismay in their position than the lawyers. 
The increasing attacks on the British civilian personnel working in the 
Egyptian government was justified as helping to clear the way for 
E9Yptian employment; at least this was the reason given by one of the
QO
attackers.
One scholar wrote that Nahhas organized the students round the
Wafd and thanks to his efforts he turned them from a form of pressure
group to a potent i n s t r u m e n t . ® 4  But no other source states clearly
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that he had organized students in 1919 in his capacity as deputy of the 
Club, or as a result of his past links with them.86 There is no doubt 
though, the Club had played a role in his political education and 
formation, as it was well known that he was a supporter of the Watani
Party and joined the Wafd as one of its representatives • But the role
Nahhas played in the revolution was that of organizing the strike of 
the lawyers (understandably, since that was his field of work) and 
government employees (the nearest to his profession, in one sense, as a 
judge employed by the state he was an employee, and for another reason 
which will be mentioned later). As for the lawyers' strike, Hilbawi 
wrote that it was organized by both Nahhas and 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi. It 
was agreed that lawyers would decline deputations which had been 
assigned to them in the cases they were supposed to defend. A fellow 
lawyer would attend demanding the adjournment of the cases until the 
clients could find other lawyers.86
Nahhas had also to get in touch with the Committee of Government 
officials in Cairo, and co-ordinate revolutionary activities with 
them. He had to travel between Cairo and Tanta, where his post was, 
hiding in his sleeves pamphlets and leaflets to be distributed among 
the people. Also with him were 'Abd al-Salamy Fahmi Gomaa and Muhammad 
Nagib al-Gharabli,8  ^ They were members in the Lawyers' Committee of
Tanta and would play a prominent role in the Wafd later. An account of
an eyewitness who saw Nahhas at that time described him as full of 
enthusiasm, and as one who took the whole situation as a challenge 
which he welcomed and enjoyed, rather than a confrontation which should
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be avoided.8® His enthusiasm became so well known that later Saad 
Zaghlul used Nahhas' name as a code (when he was in exile for the 
second time) indicating that general morale was high in Egypt.®® 
Eventually Nahhas was dismissed from his job as a judge in Tanta and 
became secretary of the party until his return to Cairo from Paris in 
December 1919,®° when he opened his own law office.®^
For the Wafd, the unanimity of the Egyptian people in supporting 
it was an essential matter, and it managed to achieve this by its own
skill and the convergence of some historical factors. The aim behind
that was to incorporate everybody in the national movement, in other 
words, to nationalize, or monopolize, the national movement. Anybody 
outside the Wafd would be considered as being outside the mainstream of 
Egyptian Nationalism. Thus the state apparatus, as an Egyptian
apparatus, had no option but to follow suit (the strike of the 
employees) in order to separate itself from British policy. What made 
this more significant was the fact that the composition of the state
apparatus tended towards conservatism and the status quo. Its upper
echelon, at least, belonged historically to the establishment. It was 
not easy, therefore, to force its support for the Wafd unless the 
latter had monopolized the national movement, otherwise it would had 
formed another Egyptian political force to associate with, or at least 
have adopted a neutral political stand. Had a dissident group emerged, 
competing with the Wafd as the leader of nationalism and Egyptianism, 
the British could have used it in implementing their policy. That was 
why the Wafd insisted on not being a party, since a party represented a
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segment of the population, but a delegation or deputation with a 
mandate to represent-all of the Egyptian people. And that was why Saad 
Zaghlul was keen to keep the Wafd programme as broad and simple as 
possible, focusing only on two items, independence and democracy, 
considering them to be the bond which held all Egyptians together.®2
The later split in the ranks of the Wafd can be understood along 
these lines. The new leaders of the Wafd, emerging from the rising 
urban middle-class effendis who sought political power and a greater 
share in the state apparatus, feared the coalescence as a substitute to 
them of other moderate elements, satisfied with the status quo and
certainly much more amenable to British policy than they were. Thus 
the split of 1921, between those who supported ’Adli and those who
supported Zaghlul, was not due simply to the disagreement over who
would preside over the official delegation, but over who would inherit 
political power and enjoy the fruits of the revolution - the old
aristocracy and the big landowners who had dominated Egyptian politics 
for the previous one hundred years, or the rising middle class which 
became more vigorous and daring despite its failure once before in 
1882. It was the continuation of the battle over who should preside 
over the legislative assembly in the absence of the appointed 
president, the elected or appointed deputy.
I• The First Split: Traditional versus New Elements
This split did not occur immediately. It took from 1918, when the 
Wafd was first formed in November of that year, to April and June 1921, 
when the split was obvious and official. Even the cleavages were not 
clear-cut as they developed. It was not the lawyer against the 
landowner, for among the landowners too there was a split, since they
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were the ones who benefited most, in whatever camp they placed 
themselves. After complete political domination and a monopoly of 
power for a century, the aristocracy and the Palace were on the 
decline, fighting to preserve whatever they could, on their own or 
through an alliance with either the British or the strong competing big 
landowners. On the other side was the professional middle class, 
completely hostile to the British, Palace, the aristocracy, and big 
landowners, but not yet strong enough to dominate the society at large, 
or compete alone without any allies against their enemies. In between
these two extremes, the landowners, who were also competing with the 
Palace and aristocracy for a greater share of power, but who were not 
ready to alienate the British under whom they gained most. They were 
the winners at the moment, but also the most disillusioned. Some 
segments were contented with what they had achieved, and were ready to 
play the role assigned to them by the British of inheriting or at least 
sharing in power,®3 Some others, however, were influenced by the 
events of 1919 and understood their significance and, as a result 
became more radical by demanding complete independence, and allied 
themselves with the professional middle class, who they realized was a 
rising social and political force to be reckoned with.
This process could be seen taking shape from the first day, when 
'All Sh'arawi advised the students who came to visit him after the 
deportation of Zaghlul and his friends to remain calm and not 
complicate matters further. At the same time Zaghlul did not believe 
that the people of Egypt could rise against the British or do 
anything. This was clearly evident from the secret plan of the Wafd 
which was to accept the protectorate and ask only for self-government 
in case,, the British refused their demand of complete independence,
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which they expected. But things began to change, and the people moved, 
an unexpected factor which had not been forseen. The first reaction 
was fear, and on 24 March, two weeks after the arrest of Zaghlul and 
the beginning of the disturbances, the same Wafd officers who were 
collecting petitions from the people supporting them to ask for 
independence on behalf of Egypt, were now asking the people to stop 
their anti-British activities.®4 But the trend was stronger than 
anticipated, bringing about the release of Zaghlul and his friends, and
allowing the rest of the Wafd to join them and go to the Peace 
Conference in Paris. Zaghlul appreciated the change in the Egyptian 
situation, and understood that he owed his release to this new popular
QC
factor, but not everybody shared his opinion.
A look at the composition of the Wafd at that juncture explains 
that development. At the start, the original seven, three of whom met 
Wingate on 13 November, acted on the basis of the ideas of the old Umma 
Party, and therefore their objectives did not exceed that of 
self-rule. Eventually, as the circumstances developed, new elements 
joined the Wafd mostly from the intelligentsia, merchants, and medium 
landowners, and naturally differences arose between the original old 
group and the expanded group of followers. A closer look at the 
central committee offers a partial explanation: it comprised
forty-three members, thirty-six of whom were large landowners, 83.31
Q
percent,^/ <rhe president was Mahmud Pasha Sulaiman, ex-President of 
the Umma Party and father of Muhammad Mahmud, while Ibrahim Sa’id was
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his deputy. It also included Fathallah Barakat Pasha, ’Abd al-Rahman 
Fahmi Bey, Morcos Hanna Bey and many others from the Legislative 
Assembly notables, lawyers, doctors, engineers, merchants, and 
farmers.98 This broad coalition, which represented the Wafd at home, 
ran parallel to the Wafd in Paris, with Mahmud Sulaiman against 
Fathallah Barakat, and Muhammad Mahmud against Saad Zaghlul, father and 
son on one side, uncle and nephew on the other. Although all were big 
landowners, with the exception of Zaghlul, whose lands were less 
extensive, one side decided to continue the struggle and stick to the 
letter of the -deputations, while the other, with less imagination, 
stuck to the letter of the original plan.
The first major open split occurred over Milner's proposals - 
whether to accept them or not. Some members of the Wafd thought that
they should abandon their present policy of demanding Egypt's 
independence at the Versailles Peace Conference• They thought they 
should follow the plan laid down by the Umma Party members before the 
revolution of 1919, which was to seek self-rule through direct
negotiations with the British.
On 9 December 1919, Zaghlul sent a letter to Lord Curzon, the
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, saying
The whole world knows that Egypt has been ready, since the
armistice, to go more than halfway to meet the demands of
Great Britain concerning the Suez Canal and other minor
interests. When the Wafd met with Milner, the draft proposal 
they presented accepted a treaty between the two countries, a 
British military presence in Egypt, a British financial 
advisor, and another for the judiciary, and the right for 
Britain to interfere in Egypt's foreign policy. The moderate 
demands reflected the prevailing mentality of the pre-1919 
Umma Party's notion of gradual constitutional independence. 
So the proposals were not that different from the ones 
presented during the war, including those put forward by Saad 
Zaghlul himself, Ahmad Lutfi el-Saydd, and 'Abd al-Aziz
?  QQ *■ " >
. Fahmf. y
98. 'Alluba, p. 86.
99,. Lashin, p. 286*
t c i  uu«s ~  j y
Zaghlul, however, was undergoing some kind of mental and 
psychological transformation, for it was he who gradually took a harder 
line. Thus, when they finally reached an agreement with Milner for a 
treaty between Egypt and Britain in London in 1920, Zaghlul persuaded 
his colleagues to test public opinion in Egypt first before agreeing to 
it. Wafd emissaries from Paris came to Cairo where they were joined by 
three local members of the Wafd. In a letter to Mustafa al-Nahhas, 
Wissa Wassif and Hafiz 'Afifi dated 22 August 1920, Zaghlul expressed 
his disapproval of the suggested treaty because it implied a veiled 
protectorate over Egypt. It included, he wrote, many aspects of the 
wartime protectorate, such as the continuing presence of a British 
military force in Egypt, intervention in the legislation concerning 
foreigners and their judiciary, interference in the financial and 
judicial apparatus through British employees, the special position of 
the British envoy, the restriction on Egypt's rights in signing 
treaties, and the fact that Britain, not Egypt, would conduct the 
treaties concerning the abolition of the Capitulations with other
nations•^
Nahhas, who was in Egypt while Saad was in Europe, was supposed to 
present the terms of the treaty negotiated and agreed upon between Saad 
and Milner to the people in a neutral way. Most other members of the 
Wafd were in favour of the treaty and thus presented it in a favourable
manner. Nahhas, after receiving Zaghlul's above-mentioned letter, 
presented the treaty to the people in a strictly neutral manner. After 
the seven members of the Wafd (four who came from Europe and three from 
Cairo) had assessed public opinion in Egypt, they returned to Saad and 
his colleagues of the Wafd in Paris. Nahhas was able to persuade his 
colleagues first to write a minute of what they faced in Egypt; 
secondly, and most important, he was able to convince his colleagues
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who were in favour of the treaty, that the remarks and observations 
expressed by the people on the treaty, were not just "wishes" as they 
saw them, but "reservations", which meant that the treaty could not be 
accepted unless changed.101 Thus one could see that Nahhas was taking 
an increasingly active role in the affairs of the Wafd, not just as a 
close adherent to Zaghlul, but as a personality on whom Saad could 
depend in dismantling the policies of his adversaries • This silent 
struggle between Saad and Nahhas on one side, and the other members of 
the Wafd who favoured accepting Milner's proposals on the other. The
A *
question of the treaty came to a head when Nahhas and Ahmad Nagib, 
correspondent of the al-Akhbar1 ^  in Paris, telegraphed to his 
newspaper that 'Adli was obstructing the way of the W a f d . 103 On 21 
January 1921, Nahhas telegraphed once more to Amin al-Rafi'i that 
"'Adli was a catastrophe for the W a f d " , 104 At the same time Nagib and 
Nahhas telegraphed to the local committee accusing 'Adli of splitting 
with Zaghlul and protesting against his course of action. This was 
followed by a campaign in the al-Akhbar newspaper, against 'Adli.105 
When Nahhas was asked by other members of the Wafd to explain his 
action, his answer was that they were secret telegrams to direct the 
policy of the newspaper. But later 'All Mahir said that Saad had 
directed Nahhas to take this action.106 Saad later denied any 
knowledge of these telegrams (he could have telegraphed nullifying the
101. Hafiz, pp. 325-320.
102. Al-Akhbar was founded in 1920, edited by Amin al-Rafi'i of the 
Watani Party, and pro-Saad at the beginning, pp. 142-143.
103. Yusuf al-Nahhas, Dhikrayat Saad, 'Abd al-'Aziz, Mahir wa Rifaqh fi 
Thaurat 1919 Cairo 1952, p. 46.
104. 'Abd al-'Azim Muhammad Ibrahim Tatawwur al-Harakah al-Wataniyya fi 
Misr min Sanat 1918 ila Sanat 1936, 1937-1948 2 Vols. Dar al-Katib 
al-'Arali Cairo 1968. Ramadan, p. 307.
105. FO 371-4981 E14451/6/16 From Lord Allenby to Earl Cuzon (No. 
111), Cairo 19 November 1920.
106. Fahml, p . 109.
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previous ones, but he did not, which indicates his knowledge of them, 
or at least that he consented to them)* In the same month 'Abd 
al-'Aziz Fahmi, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Muhammad 'All 'Alluba, Muhammad
Mahmud, Hamad al-Basil returned to Egypt, and Saad telegraphed to the 
«
Central Committee saying that some people {meaning the aforementioned) 
were ready to enter negotiations without any conditions, so beware of 
them.107
Whether Zaghlul had directed Nahhas to send these telegrams 
against 'Adli or not remains an open question, but surely Nahhas was in 
line with Zaghlul's policy and was responsible for the campaign against 
'Adli. Of all the fifteen members of the Wafd at that time, only four
. „ , A
stayed with Saad Zaghlul. They were Mustafa al-Nahhas, Smnut Hanna,
Wissa Wassif and Wassif G h a l i.108 2^.1 others had defected by June
1921. Of those who stayed with Zaghlul, three out of the four were
Christians, while among the defectors only one out of ten was a 
Christian. Among the pro-Zaghlulists Nahhas had been identified as the
representative of the rising urban middle class of effendi lawyers.
One could also argue that the Copts represented the urban middle 
class since a large portion of the lawyers were Copts^^ and a large 
number of the government officials were Copts. One of the reasons 
given by the British for the siding of the Copts with the Muslims in
the National Movement against the British, was the policy adopted by
them (British) to employ Syrian and Lebanese Christians in the Egyptian 
government's service, thus alienating large sections of the Copts. So
it was no surprise that Copts not only joined the Wafd, but also sided
with Zaghlul and Nahhas. Wissa Wassif was the President of the Bar
107. al-Nahhas, p. 47.
108. FO 371-6313 E9612/431/16 Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of 
Kedleston (No. 707) 12 August 1921.
109. Barbra Lynn Carter; 'Communalism in Egyptian Politics: The 
Experience of the Copts, 1918-1952' S.O.A.S., University of London 
1983, p. 90,
Association for mixed courts;110 Sinnut Hanna, another Copt, besides 
being a friend of Mustafa Kamil, was also a member of the Legislative 
Assembly of 1914, and sided with Zaghlul in the debate over who should 
preside? George Khayat, a prominent Copt, who sided with the moderates, 
was a Protestant and a wealthy notable in Assyiut?111 and Wassif Ghali 
was a Coptic lawyer who may have been trying to overcome his father's 
murder as a suspected traitor•
The Egyptian historians Ramadan and Lashin have tried to explain 
Saad's behaviour by suggesting that Saad's legal mind perceived a 
contract between himself and the people. No other person, therefore, 
had the right to represent them.112
Saad was also transformed by the revolution, it was the 
revolution, that is, the people, who set him free from the hands of the 
British, and he strongly believed in the power of the people due to his 
own personal experience. It was an experience which Adly did not 
share, hence his incomprehension of the power of the m a s s e s . H ^  
Zaghlul realized that his power base depended on the masses, and that 
the masses only supported him for his uncompromising attitude towards 
the national issue.114
It is interesting to note here the view of Nahhas on the question 
of resolving differences of opinion between the president of the Wafd 
and a member of the Wafd. Zaghlul wrote in his diary that on 14 
November 1920, he presented a motion to the Wafd that any member who 
differed in opinion with the President in a dramatic and unresolved way 
would be expelled, otherwise he would hinder the President's and his 
own work. Nahhas, who was his closest associate at that time, objected
110. Selim Thaurat 1919, p. 170.
111. Ibid. p. 152.
112. Ramadan, p. 314.
113. Ibid. p. 303.
114. Lashin, pp. 288-289.
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because it meant "despotism".116 This would be denied by Nahhas later 
when he becomes the President of the Wafd* Nahhas was no longer that 
young judge who joined the Wafd in 1919, about whom a .report by the 
Ministry of Interior in May 1920 remarked in front of his name as being 
of "No special prominence",116 in July 1920 he would be appointed 
temporary secretary of the Central Committee of the Wafd in Cairo in 
place of 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, who was arrested. The British described 
him as an "extreme nationalist".117 After he joined Saad in Paris to 
present to him the opinion of the people on Milner's proposals with the 
role he played,118 he accompanied him to London in October 1920 with 
'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi and 'All Mahir,118 In July the following year, 
1921, Zaghlul thought of publishing a newspaper entitled the "Wafd" and 
Sinnut Hanna asked Tharwat, who was Interior Minister at the time, for
a licence, with the intention that Nahhas would be responsible for it,
Tharwat refused.120 Saad in the meantime was depending more and more
on Nahhas and both were getting closer to each other. It was said that
Zaghlul judged Nahhas as stubborn, hasty, and lacking in manners but
that Saad admired Nahhas' talent for getting things done
efficiently.121 Qn another occasion, Zaghlul was quoted as having
said that Nahhas was
a man with a white heart, a steady principle, tends to talk a 
lot but has a sense of humour? he is active and imaginative;
he loses his temper quickly, but does not change with the
115. Lashin, p. 319, Quoting Diary of Saad, No. 39, p. 2371.
116. FO 371 E5311/1641/16 From Mr. Ingram to Mr. Murray, 26 May 1920.
117. FO 371 E9281/93/16 Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon
(No. 808), 19 July 1920.
118. As indicated on p. 35.
119. Ramadan Vol. 1, p. 299.
120. Lashin, p. 340, Saad's Diary, No. 50, pp. 2859-2860.
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circumstances? a nationalist, poor, extremely intelligent, 
faithful, who has a special place in my heart.122
So it was-not strange that Nahhas should be arrested with Zaghlul when
the latter was arrested for the second time. None of the three others
who were arrested with him the first time, Muhammad Mahmud, Hamd
al-Basel, and Ismail Sidqi, were with him on the second occasion. The
leadership of the national movement had gone to another group, and
they, Mahmud, Basel and Sidqi, were, by now, the moderates.
Zaghlul, together with Nahhas, and Makram, a lawyer and a
government official, Sennut Hanna, Fathallah Barakat, and his brother
'Attef Barakat, Director of the School of Sharia Judges,122 were
exiled from Egypt by December 1921. As can be seen from the
composition of this group, only Fathallah Barakat differed dramatically
in his social and educational background from the rest of the group.
For he was both a rich landowner and without any high education who did
not speak any foreign language.
The effect of exile on Nahhas was twofold. First being exiled 
with Zaghlul naturally added to his prestige and reputation as an
ardent nationalist? second, he struck up his friendship with Makram 
Ebeid which was to have a tremendous impact on his political life. 
For instance, when Makram contracted malaria, it was Nahhas who stayed 
with him in the hospital and nursed him.124 Nahhas not only 
established a close relationship with Makram, but also with the rest of 
the group, except for Fathallah. It is interesting to note how they 
lived with each other. Nahhas, Hanna, Makram and Zaghlul took up 
residence in one house, and they joked that Zaghlul assigned Nahhas 
with the housekeeping as he was interested in cleanliness. Meanwhile,
122. Selim, Thauret 1919, p. 12.
123. Selim, Thaurat 1919, p. 154.
124. Hafiz, p. 339. Mustafa el-Feki, Makram ’Ubayd: A Coptic Leader
,j-^7^he^Eg^tian National Movement S.O.A.S. University of London
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the Barakat brothers lived in a second house nearby.125 it ^ g  not 
surprising that in the future Nahhas would have very strong relations 
with Zaghlul, Makram, Hanna, but not with the Barakat brothers.
Before exile, Nahhas had already expressed his feelings about Saad 
when the latter wanted to go the the United States to campaign for 
Egypt during the Peace Conference in 1919 and he opposed the project on 
the grounds that Muhammad Mahmud would occupy the presidency of the 
Wafd while Zaghlul was absent.126 This relationship was deepened in 
exile, and after their return a police report in 1925 recorded that 
Saad's closest adherents were Makram and Nahhas.127 This must be• i
contrasted to the relationship with the Barakat brothers which was 
always tense and far from cordial. Nahhas would later accuse them 
during the elections in 1924 of pocketing election money with both 
hands. This is not to mention Fathallah's rivalry with Nahhas over
the leadership of the Wafd. Sinnut Hanna, on the other hand, would 
sacrifice his life when saving that of Nahhas later in 1931.
J. The February Declaration of 1922 and the Challenge to the Wafd from 
the Liberal Constitutionalist Party
The conflict between the two factions of the national movement, 
the so-called extremists under Saad Zaghlul and the moderates who 
formed their own party, was whether or not to accept Milner's 
proposals. When these proposals were rejected by the people, thanks to 
the efforts of Nahhas, both the British and the "moderates11, now called 
the Liberal Constitutionalists, agreed that the best way to strengthen
125. Terry, p. 142.
126. Terry, p. 115.
v
127. Mahafiz 'Abdin, Taqarir al Ahzab-Maktab Wazir al-Dakhliya 19 July 
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29 December 1924.
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the latter's position in the country and weaken that of Saad, Nahhas 
and others, was to grant Egypt some concessions which would satisfy the 
minimum demands of the national movement without jeopardising British 
interests in Egypt. Thus Tharwat accepted the premiership and the 
exile of Zaghlul in order to facilitate what was later known as the 
Declaration of 28 February 1922, by which the British Protectorate over 
Egypt was abolished and Egypt was granted its independence, provided 
Britain reserved for itself four points. These were to be known as the 
four reservations: imperial communications, the defence of Egypt, the
protection of minorities, and the Sudan.
For the Wafd, this declaration did not differ from Milner's
proposals, since it meant the recognition of the four reserved points
which contradicted their aim of complete independence. Before the
declaration was made, the Wafd was demanding the abolition of the
Protectorate and the evacuation of the British troops from Egypt. In 
return, the party offered to accept a British garrison in Egypt in
exchange for independence, as can be seen in Saad's counterproposals to 
Milner on 17 July 1920.129 Thus, the Wafd's objective was not 
fulfilled, because independence without evacuation was meaningless, and 
it was due to the Wafd's pressure on the British that they were able to 
achieve even this nominal independence. The party felt that with 
further pressure on the occupying power, it could squeeze more 
concessions out of it.
The other reason the Wafd refused to recognize the 28 February 
Declaration of Egypt was that they realized that the mood of the people 
was still very much affected by the events of the 1919 uprising, and 
that the general atmosphere did not favour the moderates. If they 
wanted to retain their national leadership they should not think in 
terms of what the British could give, like the Liberal
129. Al-Bishri, p. 168-169.
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Constitutionalists, but of what the people wanted, even if the British 
were not ready to concede much. Moreover, they had nothing to lose by 
insisting on their demand for complete independence. First, the 
present stage of "independence" would not be affected, second, they 
could outbid their exponents in any future elections, since it was 
understood that a parliamentary system was to follow that 
"independen ce".
As things went on, the defectors, now called the Liberal 
Constitutionalists, played into their foes' hands. For the British, 
the Declaration of 28 February 1922 was the most they could concede at 
that point in time; and they conceded it with two objectives in mind. 
The first was to give the Liberal Constitutionalists, or the moderates, 
some gains which could boost their standing against the extremists, the 
Wafd, thus satisfying and at the same time curtailing the objectives of 
the national movement within the terms of the Declaration• The second 
was that the moderates, by outbidding the extremists, whose policy was 
portrayed as leading nowhere, would win the next elections and formally 
legalize the Declaration of February 1922 with its four reserved 
points. Thus for the Wafd the struggle against the British was not 
only a national struggle against an external enemy, but also an
internal struggle against a domestic enemy in the elections. For he
who would take power, would decide the future of the British presence
in Egypt.130 Thus Allenby, the British High Commissioner, found 
himself compelled to identify the Residency with the 'Adli-Tharwat
faction of Egyptian politicians, and consequently alienated their
rivals, including the King.121
130. Ibid.. pp. 66-67.
131. Elie Kedourie, The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution, Political 
and Social Change in Modern Egypt, P.M. Holt (ed.), London 1968, 
p. 354.
A Commission to draw up a constitution was appointed consisting of 
thirty members. Two or three members of the Wafd were asked to join, 
but they refused on the grounds that their representation was not 
commensurate with their size and that an elected constituent assembly 
should promulgate the c o n s t i t u t i o n ,122 zaghlul's and the Wafd's stand 
can easily be understood: on the one hand they were rejecting a body
created by their opponents, on the other they were confident of 
controlling an elected constituent assembly.
This led Rushdi, the President of the Commission, to give some 
powers to the King so that if it came to a contest between the Liberal 
Constitutionalists and the Wafd, as happened between 'Adli and Zaghlul 
in the spring of 1921, a monarch with some effective constitutional 
power could exert his influence in the Liberal's favour.133 The 
Constitution that was promulgated gave the monarch the right to 
dissolve Parliament (article 38), adjourn its meetings (Article 39), 
issue decrees in the absence of Parliament (Article 77), and appoint 
and dismiss ministers (Article 49).13^ Moreover, anyone wishing to 
stand in the elections had to pay a deposit of £E150*136 Thus the 
political system was designed in such a way as to hinder the Wafd from 
the start, and the Wafd with its legal approach to power and politics 
had no choice but to work through that framework. The result, as will 
be seen in the following chapters, was the crippling of the Wafd by the 
King.
132. Ramadan, p. 373.
133. Kedourie, p. 354*
134. Shuhdi 'Atiya al-Shafai Tatawwuar al-Harakah al-Wataniyya fi Misr
1882-1956 Manshurat Salah al-Din Jerusalem n.d., pp. 55, 56.
135. Ramadan, p. 393.
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K. The Consequences of the 1923 Constitution:
The Wafd abides by the Rules
Strangely enough, the enmity between those two rival factions, 
with the deal struck between the Liberal Constitutionalists and the 
Residency— the former to deliver the goods and the latter to support 
them into power— brought a temporary alliance between the King and the 
Wafd. It was a short-lived one which was not to be repeated except in 
the early 1950s. The reasons for this alliance were conditional upon 
the circumstances of the day. As already noted, the Liberal 
Constitutionalists, the supposed inheritors of the Umma party, threw 
their lot with the British in order to achieve their dream of sharing 
power with the monarchy. This alarmed the King who traditionally looked 
at them with suspicion.
Although the ideologies of the Wafd and their Liberal opponents
were not all that different, at least to the extent that both were for
a negotiated approach to the national question and for a constitutional 
government, yet the Wafd had a sweeping victory. This can be 
attributed to three factors: the charisma of the leader of the Wafd,
the role of the King, and the social background of both parties. The 
Wafd did not comprise big landowners, but was made up mainly of an 
aspiring middle class of urban lawyers, and depended more on
organization. On the eve of the elections, a British report noted that
the Wafd was the only political party organized for the electoral 
struggle, while the Liberals seemed not to have attempted any
organization at all. The same report described how the Wafd used a 
students1 electioneering committee, and how supporters were urged to 
register, but all the Liberals did was to wait until delegates for 
every twenty people were elected as the electoral law stipulated under 
a two-stage election procedure, and then went to these delegates to win 
their support. It was already too late since the Wafd supporters were
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elected as delegates in the first p l a c e . 1 36 The total percentage of 
people who were registered to vote was 58.04 per cent.^^
Zaghlul had his first long talk with King Fuad, in which he aired 
his opinion about it the next day to Delany, Reuter's correspondent in 
Cairo. "X knew of course the King would be difficult, but I did not 
find him impossible, he told Delany. It is quite beyond my power to do 
anything with him, I am not a revolutionary, but we need a strong arm 
to help us." Delany asked if he meant the strong arm of Great Britain, 
and Zaghlul nodded his head in a g r e e m e n t ,138 Thus the policy of the 
Wafd was henceforth shaped along more or less the same lines of the 
Liberals, but with a popular flavour and a real sense of political
sensitivity towards the people as a whole.
Nahhas was sworn in as Minister of Communications, with other
A ^
persons like Nagib al-Gharabli and Wassif Ghali. The three were 
effendis and lawyers, which added a popular flavour to the cabinet. 
Fathallah Barakat and Morcos Hanna were also i n c l u d e d . W h a t  was 
significant about the new Wafd government was that the monopoly of the 
old establishment had been broken and the middle class was now sharing 
power for the first time, but naturally the old order had still some 
members like Muhammad Said, Ahmad Mazlum and Tewfiq Nessim, who had 
been instrumental in healing the rift between Zaghlul and the King.1^  
The most serious incident during this government's tenure was the 
resignation of Saad in protest to the King's attitude towards it. In 
the row between the King and the government over the right to appoint
136. FO 371-8974 E10253/351/16 (No. 691) Mr. Scott, 5 October 1923.
137. FO 371-8963 E10383/10/16 (No. 710) Mr. Scott, 14 October 1923.
See also Appendix 1.
138. Gerald Delany, Saad Zaghlul, Middle East Centre, Oxford, p. 3.
139. 'Abd al-Qadir, p. 57.
140. 'Azabawi, p. 230.
members of the Senate, Saad was supported by Baron du Bouch, Public 
Prosecutor of the Mixed Courts, who acted as a mediator,141 But then 
another row erupted when Hassan Nash1 at, the deputy of the Royal
Chamberlain, was decorated by the King, without the knowledge of the
cabinet, or its approval. Inspired by the King, Tewfiq Nessim resigned 
on 15 November.142
Once again Nahhas played a vital role in the affairs of the party 
and the government when he advised Saad to resign if his demands were 
not m e t .143 ^  same gaad tendered his resignation to the
Parliament for health reasons, but let it be known that it was really 
prompted by the "intrigues" of the P a l a c e . 1 44 ^t the same time he
went to the King for a private audience at which he insisted that the
King should not bestow ranks or titles or appoint Palace employees
without the government's approval.^45 Meanwhile, the Parliament took 
a vote of confidence in Saad's government and a parliamentary
delegation went to meet the King. For two days the students, led by 
Hassan Yasin, demonstrated outside the Palace shouting "Saad or the 
Revolution",14^ a show of force on behalf of the Wafd. Eventually the 
King had to concede, and bitter relations between the two prevailed
from then on, since it was also the policy of the Wafd to safeguard
what possible and limited gains they had achieved in the new 
constitutional and parliamentary system.
This peculiar approach of the Wafd in its struggle against the
141. Ramadan, p. 373,
142. Ibid. pp. 235-237. Al-Kashkul 9 January 1925, p. 12. Lashin, 
pp. 417-418.
143. Rose al-Yusuf, 6 October 1927 No 100 p. 6. Hafiz, p. 356.
144. Lashin, pp. 417-418.
145. 'Azabawi, pp. 235-337.
146. Lashin, pp. 417-418. 'Azabawi, pp. 235-237.
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Palace was to be tested more than once later, when Zaghlul resigned 
after the assassination of the Sirdar, in the hope that history would 
repeat i t s e l f .147 saad was to learn his lesson and pay a visit of 
respect to the new High Commissioner for the first t i m e , 1 4s while 
Nahhas along with others assumed the responsibility of defending Ahmad 
Mahir and Nokrashi in what was to be one of the most exciting court 
cases of the t i m e . 1 49 There is no doubt that the bonds of friendship 
between the three were strengthened, especially with the vital part 
played by Nahhas in bringing about their release, and his courage in 
accusing the authorities of plotting to assassinate them.13°
By 1925 Nahhas was regarded by the British as "Zaghlul's most 
prominent associate in Egypt"151 and the one responsible for the 
success of the extreme faction in the Wafd, due to his activity and 
influence among the students. In addition, he acted as a watchdog 
among his colleagues for the protection of Zaghlul's interests.152
L. The Struggle between the Urban and Rural elements inside the Wafd
For the purpose of this study, the years between Saad's 
resignation and the formation of 'Adli's second cabinet are not dealt 
with. What is important here was the role of Fathallah Barakat whom 
Muhammad Mahmud had approached about a coalition government. According 
to 'Abbas Hafiz, Saad did not approve of this contest until after he 
had consulted Nahhas who agreed to the idea.153 Fathallah, as will be
147. Mahafiz 'Abdin Taqarir 'An al-Ahzab Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawnufiyya
p. 1 .
148. Ramadan, p. 602.
149. Hafiz, pp. 364, 365.
150. Fatma al-Yusuf, Dhikrayat Dar Rose al-Yusuf Cairo 1954 p. 106. 
Difa'a al-Nahhas 'An Mahir wa al-Nokrash£ p. 262.
151. FO 371-10906 E4003/431/16 Albenby to Curzon 24 March 1925.
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seen later, was to represent, the more moderate landowners' wing in the 
Wafd, whereas Nahhas represented the more radical lawyers' wing* Both 
personalities would fight for the leadership of the Wafd in 1927, and 
over the general policy of the party in 1932, a contest which reflected 
their social differences•
Some argue that an extreme faction inside the Wafd had already 
been formed, and it was this faction which brought the downfall of 
'Adli’s government, and enabled Nahhas to succeed Saad Zaghlul as 
leader of the Wafd. That extreme faction may well have been none other
than the lawyers' wing.
One can find ample proof for this contention. The British opposed 
the inclusion of Nahhas in 'Adlx's cabinet: "The only name in his
['Adli] original list to which I took radical exception was that of 
Nahhas."154
'Adli thought that Barakat, Zaghlul's nephew, would be a useful
means of exerting pressure on the latter, and was therefore included in
the cabinet. So, while Barakat was seen as someone who could be used
as a moderating influence on Zaghlul, the inclusion of Nahhas in the
cabinet was vetoed by the British. There is no doubt that the Wafdist
militants were unhappy about the banning of Zaghlul from the
premiership, and if they could not have it otherwise, the only
alternative was to embarrass the government.
Nahhas as vice president in the chamber encouraged the 
deputies by his own example to be as irrelevant as they
wished to the point of discussion • While Zaghlul was
avoiding sensitive topics like the Sudan.155
And it seems that all the signs of a possible conflict between those
elements in the Wafd and 'Adli were visible at the time, for the
154. FOv 407-11583 J1540/25/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain
(No. 228) 8 June 1926.
155. FO 407-11584 J2142/25/16 Henderson to Chamberlain (No. 509) 24
July 1926.
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the session tried in vain to persuade 'Adli that the defeat of the 
motion did not mean a vote of no confidence in his government.162 Now 
a militant wing had proved its existence, and it was rumoured that its
leaders were Nokrashi and Ahmad M a h i r .163 
• * ——
Throughout the nights of 21 and 22 April, the Wafd held meetings 
in the House of the Nation (Bayt al-Umma) under Zaghlul's presidency. 
There were two factions: one wanted to pursue the policy of hostility
towards the British, whereas the majority, backed by Zaghlul, did not. 
On the other side of the political divide Tharwat agreed to form 
another cabinet, but on the following conditions:
1• Deputies should not attack him sharply;
2. Discussions concerning new legislation for Mayors and the Army be 
postponed;
3. Any provocative questions concerning Anglo-Egyptian relations be 
eschewed, and
4. Government ministers should not be pressed into any act which 
would lead to a conflict between the government and the British 
High Commissioner.
Zaghlul only just managed to get the approval of the Wafd after 
assuring them that it was only a temporary agreement and that the 
programme of the Wafd would remain intact.164 He was clearly losing 
his grip over the party, due partly to illness and partly to the 
intransigence of the militant wing. He became seriously ill and died 
on 23 August 1927. His death marked the end of an era, and whatever
conflicts or contradictions were kept in abeyance by the sheer force of 
his charismatic presence, they now came rushing to the surface.
162. Ibid.
163. Rose. al-Yusuf 5 May 1927, p. 4, Issue 78.
164. Yunan Lubib Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-Misriyya al-Ahram Cairo 
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possibility of 'Adli's resignation was discussed between the British 
High Commissioner and the King only one month after the formation of 
the government. The British High Commissioner reported to his 
government that
In an audience with King Fuad at Alexandria on the 27th, 
possible candidates for premiership if 'Adli resigned were
discussed. Wafd would insist on Saad Zaghlul, if not 
accepted another Wafdist would be chosen, the King was
reported to have said. Morcos Hanna, Fathallah Barakat on 
Nahhas, Barakat is the most intriguing and dangerous.156
The militant elements inside the Wafd were already accelerating 
their campaign and ignoring the lesson of 1924, which it was believed
was only an act of momentary anger by the British, They argued that 
E9ypt would not obtain anything unless it used violence as it did in 
the period between 1919 and 1922.16  ^ This view was becoming widespread 
among the deputies, and they began to criticize the government,
especially the fact that the British High Commissioner performed his 
duties without presenting his credentials to the King.156 Another
source of embarrassment to 'Adli was the issue of the Army, He had no
wish for the new legislation regarding the Army to be put through 
Parliament and asked Zaghlul to help him delay it, whether the British 
agreed or not.156 The final blow came when fifteen members of
Parliament suggested a motion to thank the government for its
assistance to Bank Misr. 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa objected and the 
motion was defeated.160 'Adli considered the defeat of the motion as 
a vote of No Confidence and resigned,161 Nahhas who was presiding over
156. FO 407-11584 J2218/25/16 Henderson to Chamberlain (No. 523) 31 
July 1926.
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M. The Emergence of Nahhas and his Election as Leader of the Wafd
With the death of' Zaghlul in August 1927, a power struggle over
the leadership of the Wafd was imminent. For the extremist faction
inside the Wafd, which had brought about the resignation of Adli's
cabinet, it was a new opportunity for a show of force. This time they
were not looking for anything less than the position of the successor
of Zaghlul, and their candidate was Nahhas. In fact, at the beginning
no one took him seriously, as can be seen from the report
Barakat and Tharwat are possible successors, King could 
benefit, extremists could rally around Abd al-Hamid Bey 
Said. Nahhas is a candidate for popular favour but is 
discounted as he is mentally unbalanced. Barakat is a 
past-master of organization and intrigue, enjoys something of 
Zaghlul’s success with simple folk but without appeal to 
cultured or decent-minded people, he is unpopular with 
Parliament and not in very good odour with the country at
large.1
It is possible that at first Nahhas was not one of the contenders, 
since it seems that Madame Zaghlul (Saad's widow) had her own
A +
ambitions, but was obstructed by Barakat who "used Saad's study room 
and behaved as his successor sitting on his chair. There was also a 
dispute over inheritance."1®® An article had already been published 
about how Madame Zaghlul occupied her husband's place when he was
exiled in 1921, and then spoke of electing her as an honorary President 
of the Wafd.16^ Fathallah Barakat's opposition alienated her, but 
Nahhas who was in favour of her co-operation, unofficial or otherwise,
won the support of Madame Zaghlul. 'Aljr al-Shamsi was a possible 
candidate, but he favoured Nahhas.1®8 The situation developed as
165. FO 407-205 J2450/8/16 Henderson to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
500), 27 August 1927.
166. Jacques Berque, Egypt; Imperialism and Revolution Translated by
Jean. Stewart, Faber and Faber London 1972 p. 395.
167. Kawfrjb al-Sharq 17 September 1927.
168. FO 371-12359 J27301/8/16 Mr. Henderson to Mr. Patrick Cairo, 24 
S eptember 1927.
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follows: "Fathallah Barakat. Mustafa al-Nahhas and Wissa Wassif were♦ r * »
to comprise an executive committee of three with Madame Zaghlul as 
"Honorary President". Extreme elements preferred Nahhas and relations 
between Madame Zaghlul and Fathallah Barakat were strained. When 
Nahhas alighted from the train in Cairo many deputies ran and kissed 
his hands as an acknowledgment of his leadership. The King's Ittihad 
Party, seeing in Nahhas's election an early parliamentary crisis and an 
obstacle to their return to power, published an article in their paper 
Al-Ittihad1^9 supporting the claims of Fathallah Barakat. But this 
only identified Barakat as the palace's choice. Madame Zaghlul 
approved Nahhas with the reservation that everything published by the 
Wafd must be approved by her. On election day, Nokrashi, Saad 
Zaghlul's parliamentary secretary al-Grudeili (convicted in the ’Abd 
al-Rahman Fahmi trial), and Sheikh al-Gezini organized between 200 and 
300 students outside the House of the Nation shouting "Long Live De 
Valera of Egypt". Nokrashi also buttonholed each member as he came in 
with the words "Don't forget Nahhas with his past record." Fakhry 'Abd 
al-Nur, despite having sworn a life-time devotion to Fathallah Barakat, 
changed his mind, and Madame Zaghlul was talked out of being president 
on the principle that negotiations with England would be difficult for 
her.170
What Wafdist sources stress was that Nahhas accepted the 
leadership reluctantly and only upon Madame Zaghlul's insistence.1"^1 
There is no doubt that his abstention at the beginning from the 
leadership election led to the collision between Madame Zaghlul and
169. Issued in 1925 as the organ of the Ithihadists party which was 
pro-King.
170. FO1 407-205 J2715/8/16 Henderson to Chamberlain (No. 554), 24
September 1927.
171. Hafiz, p. 379.
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Barakat, thus winning her to his side, and strengthened the campaign of 
Nokrashi on his behalf. But other factors also came into play, 
confirming the view that the "extremists" had a real stake in Nahhas's 
election. For it seems that the prevailing idea was that of electing 
Barakat, in view of his relationship with Saad and his wealth which 
could help him in his new position. It was the older and bigger 
landowners who supported him. But the majority, who were the young 
intelligentsia and middle class, like 'Ali al-Shamsi Pasha, Wissa 
Wassif, and Morcos Hanna, saw that the reasons for electing Barakat 
were the same reasons not to elect him. Besides, he was not educated 
and he knew no foreign languages to help him in his contacts with 
foreign representatives. He was considered to be a snob to boot. It 
has also been rumoured that Fakhry 'Abd al-Nur and Makram Ebeid played 
a role in electing Nahhas.172 The Copts, too, sided with Nahhas the 
lawyer against Barakat the landowner as they did with Saad in 1921 
against 'Adli.
Rose al-Yusuf confirmed the presence of a debate over the choice 
of Nahhas as a leader and commented that he was chosen because he was 
nearer to their hearts than Barakat, whom they feared for his strong 
personality.172 Two other factors had contributed in the election of 
Nahhas, the first being his position as Party Secretary, the second his 
personality as contrasted to that of Barakat. As for the first factor, 
there is no doubt that as Party Secretary he was able to get in contact
with everybody in the Party. It was his job. By doing so, he knew and 
was known by everybody, an advantage his rival did not have. People
naturally elect the face they are acquainted with.17^ The other
172. Hashsish, p. 90. Interview with Ibrahim Farag, Dr. Muhamma_d Salah 
al-^Din 24/4/1968, Haykal Vol. 1, p. 279.
173. Rose al-Yusuf 1 September 1927 (No. 95) p. 5.
174. Another example, although remote but similar is that of Stalin and 
Trotsky. Look at the experiment of some psychologists which prove 
this theory in Leadership C.A. Gibb (ed.), Penguin Books, 1969.
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factor is th§ personality in a group. In each group with a purpose, 
they elect the man under whom this group functions, who could lead it 
to its objective, and get the job done. Usually there is a 
task-oriented man, who might be a genius, but with no human touch, like 
Barakat, and another one with good human relations but not as good in 
his task-orientation. This could have been Shamsi Pasha. Then there 
is a middle-of-the-road man, who is not brilliant at either, but has 
enough qualifications for both. Surely this was Nahhas?
Chapter Two
The Golden Age of the Wafd under Nahhas, 1927-1936
It is worthwhile noting how both Wafdist and anti-Wafdist papers
1commented on Nahhas' election. The Wafdist Rose al-Yusuf wrote:
There is no one among those who have been nominated as 
President who is more pure and honest than Mustafa el 
Nahhas. His history is known, and his positive actions with 
Mustafa Kamil and then Saad Zaghlul are well known to
everybody. Mustafa is above that very honest, very difficult 
to shake from what he considers to be right and just, very 
frank, and as they say, his words are from his heart. But 
they also say that he is very hasty, and the word which the 
political circles use to describe it is impulsiveness. Thus 
r they say, it is not impossible that the conflicts between
himself and the government and the Wafd itself would 
increase. But we think that the Nahhas of tomorrow would be
different from the Nahhas of yesterday. The heavy burdens of
the Presidency which have been put on his shoulders, will 
contain his impulsiveness. The grave responsibilities he has 
taken on, would make him think twice before he speaks!
On the other side al-Khashkul  ^ printed a cartoon of Nahhas sitting on
a big chair with a frock coat which was too large for him.^
The choice of Makram Ebeid as Secretary-General was in line with 
Zaghlul's policy of including Copts in order to strengthen national 
unity. Thus, Wissa Wassif, a Copt, was chosen as the Speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies, and Wassif Butrus Ghali, another Copt, became
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both Makram and Nahhas were exiled in the
* sSeychelles, and both had been fiercely loyal to Zaghlul. It was not,
1. A literary weekly in 1925 which then turned to politics and 
pro-Wafd {'Abd al-Latif Hamza Qissat al-Sahafah al-1Arahiyah fi 
Misr Matba'at al-Marif Baghdad 1967, p. 16),
2. al-Yusuf, pp. 111-112.
3. A satirical weekly magazine published in 1921 as independent, then 
turned anti-Wafd (Hamza, p. 114).
4. FO 407-205 J2867/8/16 Henderson to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
576), 6 October 1927,
5. el-Feki, pp. 104-105.
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therefore, odd that Makram should support Nahhas, for surely, Makram's
background placed him on the side of Nahhas, and he personified the
role played by the Copts in supporting Zaghlul against the moderates.
Moreover, Makram's cultural and educational background was important.
He was a government employee with legal experience; he sided with Maher
and Nokrashi, and joined the urban professional politicians of the
Wafd, rather than the landowners. As an Egyptian scholar has written:
The political adroitness of Makram Ebeid, his ability as a 
negotiator, his facility in foreign languages and his 
experience in dealing with European political style because 
of his visits to London and Paris on political missions as a 
man of propaganda and a party spokesman were to complement 
the character of Nahhas who was well known as a man of 
honesty and dignity, but who was not qualified as a statesman 
or as a clever negotiator and was not in direct touch with 
foreign cultures.^
The interview Nahhas gave to al-Ahram^ on the eve of his
election, indicated his policies. When asked about the Wafd's internal
policies, he said
The domestic policies of the Wafd aim at safeguarding the 
constitution, and consolidating the coalition. As shown by 
the published Party Manifesto the protection of the 
constitution against those who may wish to override it will 
be our first priority. Since we regard it as the first 
achievement of our struggle we must consolidate it. And we 
consider it a practical means to consolidate the authority of 
the people and a means by which we could gain our true, 
complete independence. This does not mean that we are 
abandoning our demands for complete independence, which is 
our main aim and our avowed commitment.
When Nahhas was asked if he would trust the strength of the coalition,
he answered that the present coalition among the Egyptian parties was
stronger than ever. As for his plans on external issues, Nahhas stated
that the Wafd's foreign policy would aim at a friendly relationship
between the Egyptian people and other nations. of the world including
the British. He pointed to the Party manifesto which stated that
6. Ibid.
7* An independent daily published since 1875 by two Lebanese Selim 
and Bishara Taqla (Hamza, pp. 43, 66).
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Egypt's relationship with Britain was one of friendship. He was then 
asked whether it was feasible to reach an agreement with the British. 
Nahhas replied that they would like to have an agreement with Britain 
based on the respect of mutual rights and the lawful interests of 
others which d i d  not conflict with their i n d e p e n d e n c e . 1 2
Reading this interview, it was obvious that Nahhas was as mild 
with the British as he was tough with the Palace. He sent conciliatory 
signals to the British, assuring them of the respect of their interests 
in Egypt, in an attempt to moderate his image as an extremist. At the 
same time, warning signals were sent to the Palace when he spoke about 
his first priority, which was protecting the constitution, which had 
been, as he indicated, undermined once before. But as Nahhas himself 
showed in his interview, the Constitution was not only the first prize 
of the Wafd's struggle, but also the means by which to achieve 
independence. For not cnly had they to protect what they had already 
gained, lest it be lost - and this was possible after the experience of 
1925 - but also the Wafd, and Nahhas had already confined themselves to 
a certain structure from which they could not withdraw. This comprised 
the second and third articles of the Wafd law for seeking Independence 
by legal means, that is, the Constitution, for it was that Constitution 
which legalized them in the first place as the representative of the 
nation as against the Turko-Egyptian aristocratic establishment of the 
Umma, the Liberal Constitutional Party and others. Without the 
Constitution independence became meaningless, as it would not be 
negotiated by representatives of the nation, and thus its outcome not 
shared by the people. As Zaghlul described it, it would be tantamount 
to George V negotiating with George V.8 And so the whole struggle 
deviated^ from its original course of fighting the British to achieve
M  fic C " /fX *62* tV
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independence in 1919, and developed into fighting the Egyptian Monarch
in order to protect the Constitution which was a necessary condition in
order to fight the British for independence. Nahhas was caught in the
trap of the Constitution.
The occasion came on 3 October, forty days after Zaghlul's death.
The Wafd still considered the country to be in a state of mourning and
a memorial meeting was held by the Students' Committee on 5 October,
while the Wafd held another important memorial gathering on the 7th.
Al-Balagh9 (the Wafdist organ) saw in the King's celebration of his
accession to the throne on the 9th a deliberate affront to the
country's mourning.10 A campaign against the King was launched and
Tharwat asked Nahhas to suppress it. Nahhas said he would do so, but
1 1was unable to fulfil his promise.' Tension between the two
adversaries was apparent when no representative of the King attended 
the 7 October ceremony, and all Wafdist notables and deputies boycotted 
the King's celebration of 9 October, except the ministers. The 
Parliament building was not decorated.1  ^ At the same time the King 
replied to Nahhas' congratulatory telegram for the accession ceremony 
by addressing him personally, ignoring his position as President of the 
Wafd, even though Nahhas had sent his telegram to the King in his 
capacity as President of the Wafd. Tewfiq Nessim, Royal Chamberlain, 
had also sent a telegram to Nahhas as president of the memorial 
committee and not as President of the Wafd, apologizing for not being
9. Issued by 'Abd al-Qadir Hamza in 1923, defected in 1932 (Hamza, 
pp. 140-141).
10. Rifat Al-Said, Mustafa al-Nahhas al-Siyasi wa al-Zaaim wa 
al-Munadil, Dar al-Thagafa al-Jadidah Cairo 1976 p. 56.
11. FO 407-205 J2872/8/16 Henderson to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
585), 7 October 1927.
12. FO 407-205 J2936/8/16 Henderson to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
600), 15 October 1927.
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able to attend the memorial ceremony.13 The reply came swiftly;
Nahhas in his speech on 17 November upon his election as Speaker of the
Chamber said,
I demand in the name of you all, and my name, of the 
constitutional government to which we gave our trust, to 
fulfill its promise which the constitutional affairs 
committee referred to in its report on the 2nd of August 1926 
concerning the decrees promulgated by the executive 
authorities during the suspension of Parliament and approved 
by the two chambers which state that: To prevent the
recurrence of issuing such decrees they must be prompt as 
per the law referred to in Article 68 of the Constitution,
which also includes an article regarding the punishment of
any government minister in the future who desires to issue 
such decrees by law. And it is agreed that the government 
will present to the chamber as quickly as possible the 
drawing up of such a law.14
According to a British report, however,
Nahhas support to Tharwat, although not informed of details 
of negotiations, (which he was conducting with Chamberlain in 
what was later known as the Tharwat-Chamberlain negotiations) 
might either be a seal for settlement or that such blind 
support they could easily withdraw car less knowledge means 
less responsibility.1^
But
Tharwat showed drafts of the treaty to 'Adlx, other Liberals
* 1and one Wafdist, Barakat.10 At the same time it was 
reported that the Wafd was regretting having elected Nahhas, 
■and that his visit to Alexandria in order to persuade 
Muhammad Sa'id to join the Wafd, boycott the arrival of the 
King, but he failed.
Only Nokrashi and Makram Ebeid visited him, while Fakhry 'Abd al-Nur
had begun a campaign against him.
The executive committee dominated by the so-called extremists 
favoured rejecting a Tharwat treaty as Labour had won municipal 
elections in England and they hoped to get a better agreement from
13. Rose al-Yusuf, 20 October 1927, No. 102, p. 6.
14. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab, 17 November 1927, p. 9.
15. FO 407-205 J2944/8/16.
16. FO 407-205 J3026/8/16.
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them.17 Nahhas, in fact, was facing a battle on two fronts. On one
side there were the sceptics inside the Party who had been opposed to 
Nahhas' election from the beginning. When Nahhas was elected, al-Ahram 
wrote that, according to its correspondent in London, an article was 
published in the African World newspaper in which its writer claimed 
that he knew from two well-informed sources that the more reasonable 
elements inside the Wafd found themselves in a muddle as a result of 
participating with Nahhas in raising him to glory. "But they say and 
believe that Nahhas will soon be shaken thus giving them a strong
excuse to get rid of him. But they cannot expel him without giving him 
every opportunity to prove his disability."18 This was already 
proving to be the case. An account of his handling of Parliament
showed him to be an inept leader, especially when compared to his 
predecessor, Zaghlul. Nahhas lacked firmness and direction in dealing 
with the deputies, allowing Parliament to degenerate into a sorry show 
of partisan obstruction. He was too much influenced by the men who had 
furthered his candidacy as leader of the Wafd to be able to control 
them.1 ^
On the other hand, there was the coalition, in which it was
generally understood that if he was to be elected Tharwat would resign, 
and the coalition with the other main rival party, the Liberal 
Constitutionals, would come to an end. One can hardly deny the 
possibility of that being also the aim of the extremists, especially 
after taking into account an earlier incident in which they were 
responsible for the fall of 'Adli's cabinet, of finally forming a 
purely Wafdist government. The tense relation between the two parties
17. FO 407-205 J3215/8/16.
18. Al-Ahram, 25 September 1927.
19. al-Sayyid-Marsott, p. 115.
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was reflected in an exchange of acrimonious articles which was sparked
off by the Liberal students who wanted to give a tea-party in honour of
Tharwat which the Wafdists opposed. On 20 December 1927, al-Siyassa20
{organ of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party) published an article
entitled "We want a sincere coalition founded on frankness." It
amounted to a reprimand of Nahhas and the Wafd for claiming the
undivided allegiance of the official student organization, and indeed
for taking students from their studies into politics, and challenged
Nahhas to remind some of his friends of the loyalty to a coalition
Premier which the coalition implied. Nahhas told al-Ahram he was on
the best of terms with the Premier and that the al-Siyassa article
would not disturb relations between the two parties in the coalition.
01He told A1 -Moqattam^ that the coalition had never been stronger and 
that his relations with Tharwat were cordial. He denied anyone the 
right to interfere in the affairs of the Wafd or in its relations with 
the students.^ Yet the undeclared twisting of arms between the two 
partners continued despite talk of how strong the coalition was. For 
Nahhas and his extremist clique (as described by the British report) 
wanted to get rid of Fathallah Barakat who was kept by Tharwat as a 
pro-treaty element in the Wafd. Thus, in a meeting of the Liberal 
Constitutionalists the article in al-Siyassa was not attacked, but a 
declaration of the desire for the maintenance of the coalition was 
issued. Nahhas refused this and demanded that the Party refute the
article* Tharwat later made several concessions in Parliament in order
20. Published in 1922 edited by Dr. Muhammad Hussein Haykal (Hamza, 
pp. 141-142),
21 . A pro-British daily first issued in 1888 owned by Yacub Saruf and 
Fairs Nimr (Hamza, pp. 96-97).
22. Al-Ahram, 25 September 1927.
to win Nahhas over to the treaty.23
Another point of tension was the new Assembly Law. Nahhas and
Tharwat agreed on what should not pass except for one „point, the right 
» • *
of the police to take preventive action in stopping demonstrations 
before they began, or for guiding and directing them. Tharwat knew 
that if he opposed these laws his government would fall and the treaty 
negotiations would collapse.24 Eventually the cabinet was divided 
between supporters of Tharwat, such as Fathallah Barakat, Osman
A # ^
Muharam, Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli, G'afar Wall, and those of Nahhas, 
like Zaki Abu al-Saud, Ahmad Khashaba, Morcos Hanna, and 'All 
al-Shamsi, according to the Watanist newspaper al-Akfrbar ,23 It was 
obvious that Tharwat*s cabinet had only a few more days of life left. 
When the correspondent of al-Ahram asked Nahhas about British 
insistence to stay in Cairo he answered “Then there is no chance for an 
agreement." Previously he said that he had no details or information 
concerning Tharwat's negotiations as these were secret. The
expected finally happened, for it was impossible for the militant 
faction in the Wafd Party to remain under the leadership of a minority 
party. Being certain that as a majority they could always get better 
terms from the British, the proposed treaty was categorically rejected 
and Tharwat's government was brought down.
23. FO 407-206 J200/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
12), 6 January 1928.
24. FO 407-206 J270/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
46), 19 January 1928.
25. FO 407-206 J289/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
26), 5-11 January 1928.
26. FO ^ 407-206 J377/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
53), 19 January 1928.
A. The First Nahhas Government
The King then invited Nahhas to consult him on who should be the
next Prime Minister, and whether the new government should again be a
coalition or purely Wafdist. Nahhas replied that the government would
continue as a coalition but that the Prime Minister should be a
Wafdist.27/28 With a majority in the Parliament, Nahhas showed his
spirit of national co-operation by including Liberal Constitutional
Party members in his cabinet.38 And on 16 March 1928, Nahhas formed
his first government. It included, besides himself as premier and
Minister of Interior, G'afar Wali for War and Marine, Wassif Ghali for
Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli for Waqfs, 'Ali al-Shamsi
for Education, Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba for Justice, Muhammad Mahmud for
Finance, Ibrahim Fahmy Bey for Public Works, Muhammad Safwat for
Agriculture and Makram Ebeid Effendi for Transport.30 At the
insistence of Muhammad Mahmud, three of the Wafdist ministers in the # —* •
previous cabinet were excluded: Fathallah Barakat, Morcos Hanna, and
Osman Muharam. Zaki Abu al-Saud was also excluded at the King's wish, 
and Khashaba replaced him, while Makram Ebeid took Khashaba's place.
27. FO 407-206 J917/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
166), 13 March 1928.
28. It was reported at that time that when Tharwat showed Nahhas the 
draft treaty he had negotiated with Austin Chamberlain, British 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nahhas commented on it saying that 
the only place for that draft was in the water-closet.
29. P.J. Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 
2nd 1980 p. 284.
30. Fuad Karam al-Nizarat wa al-Wirzarat al-Misriyya p. 312 al-Waqaa 
al Misriya No. 25, p. 192.
31. Rizq, Tarikh al Wirzarat, p. 314.
FO 407-206 J1126/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain
(No. 265) 23 March 1928.
J?0 407-206 J1546/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain
(No. 275) 9 May 1928.
F0 407-206 J1934/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain
(No. 324) 23 June 1928.
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In his first speech in Parliament Nahhas declared
It is a matter of sorrow that these negotiations 
(Tharwat-Chamberlain) did not lead to a proper basis for 
negotiations between the Egyptian and British governments, 
but we are sure that the mutual interests of both countries 
would ensure a solution that achieves our independence and 
safeguards the British government over its interests which do 
not affect our independence.33 
In his audience with the King, Nahhas said that the Assembly Law
would not proceed.33 The law was regarded with suspicion by both the
King and the British as endangering public order. An article which
prohibited the police from breaking public demonstrations was regarded
as a constraint on the police, thus encouraging civil disorder, and
there was no way either the British or the King would accept the
passing of the law, upon which the fate of Nahhas' first cabinet
depended. He tried to win over the British on other matters, and when
he visited Lord Lloyd,34 the latter expressed his displeasure should
Ahmad Mahir be elected Vice President of the Chamber. Nahhas answered
that this could not happen at the last minute. Yet it happened.38 In
all his visits to the British Residency he expressed friendliness to
Great Britain without, however, going beyond vague generalities. As
the British noticed, the Wafd's attitude was to avoid open conflict
with them.38 But it seems that that could not be avoided. When
Nahhas met Lord Lloyd on 6 April, he explained why he could not
withdraw the Law of Assembly after both Chambers had voted it: he
could only postpone it for a time while other laws were discussed,
32. Madabit Majlis al Nuwwab, 19 March 1928, p. 552.
33. FO 407-206 J953/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
173), 16 March 1928.
34. A conservative member at Parliament then Governor of Bombay 
(Marlow 288).
35. FO 1407-206 J1012/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
182), 21 March 1928.
36. FO 407-206 J1126/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
265), 23 March 1928.
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before presenting it to Parliament.37 &,t the same time, the King met
Nahhas on the morning of 29 April and asked him to shelve the law for a 
year or resign. Nahhas answered that it could be shelved only until 
November and that he had no intention of resigning.88
It seems that Nahhas had underestimated his rivals1 power and 
overestimated his own and was carried away by the euphoria of his 
fellow militant Wafdists who had finally won the battle of regaining 
the premiership, and not only that, but with their man, Nahhas, as 
premier. Nahhas asked Mr. Delaney, Reuter's representative in Cairo, to 
go to London and inquire if he himself could go to England that summer 
to negotiate the evacuation of British troops, while keeping some 
garrisons in certain parts of the country for a limited period under 
discussion.88 He did not care what other provisions were inserted in 
the treaty, but he did not wish it to cover the Capitulations.^8 
Meanwhile, he proceeded with the Assemblies Law until he was able to 
reach a compromise with the British to postpone the discussion of the 
Law. This gave him a breathing space, but the problem was only 
postponed. The British, the King, and Nahhas had to act sooner or 
later. Nahhas even thanked the British for their conduct during what 
had become known as the “Assembly Law Crisis" and was questioned in 
Parliament about it. He had to defend himself by saying that was 
because of the spirit in which the British Government had met his 
peaceful intentions, namely not to carry out its threat, although he 
did not agree with the British point of view, and commit himself in
37. FO 407-206 J1187/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
208), 7 April 1928.
38. FO 407-206 J1409/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
253), 29 April 1928.
39. FO 407-206 J1856/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No. 
311), 15 June 1928.
40. It is worth noticing here that Nahhas stand on that issue was
different from that of Zaghlul who accepted them, and that Nahhas
iroul93Iteep his stand on that issue until he finally got rid of it
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a written document that the Assembly Law would not be ever discussed in 
Parliament.^1 At the time the British High Commissioner reported on 
that crisis, Nahhas made no effort to establish cordial relations with 
him, but the reverse, and did not invite the High Commissioner to the 
official celebration of the King’s birthday. However, Nahhas' use of 
Reuter's correspondent as an intermediary between himself and London, 
his ignoring of the official letter of the appointment of a new 
Judicial Advisor, and his refusal to sign the Financial Advisor's 
contract, had serious results on British trade, etc.^2
It was soon assumed that the two Liberal Constitutional ministers
were going to r e s i g n , 43 and Nahhas responded by saying that he would
not hesitate to substitute them with Wafdist ministers.^ When the 
affair of Sayf al-Din became public,^ Nahhas received a telegram from 
London, in which its sender revealed that he had met with a British 
high official who made it clear that unless Nahhas withdrew the 
Assembly Law, he would be kicked out of office. ° Following the 
resignation of the three ministers, two Liberal Constitutionalists and 
a Wafdist, Nahhas received a letter dismissing him on 25 June 1928, in 
which it was stated: "That since the coalition on the basis of which
the government had been established, had been severely broken, we saw
fit to dismiss you. We thank you and your ministerial colleagues for
©
41. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab, 14 May 1928, p. 978.
42. FO 407-206 J1987/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
508), 22 June 1928.
43. Marcel Colomb Tatawwur Misr 1924-1950 Tarjamit Zoheir al-Shayib
Maktabit Saad Ra'ft 1972 Cairo p. 87.
44. Mahafiz 'Abdin Hizb al-Wafd Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya. 16 June 
1928.
45. Nahhas as lawyer of Princes Sheuikar, ex-wife of King Fuad and
sister of Prince Sayf al-Din agreed to take the case of her
brother against King Fuad for the mismanagement of the latter of
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your services for the country.” This was Nahhas' first and shortest 
government, and one could understand why he later mistrusted coalition 
governments. On the other hand, as Dr. Ramadan remarks, "Since Nahhas 
was able to get out of the crisis without withdrawing the Assembly Law 
from Parliament as Britain asked, and without acknowledging the 28th of 
February Declaration, he had strengthened his position both as leader 
of the party and with public opinion."47
Undoubtedly Nahhas was regarded by many at that time as a hero and 
sympathized with him. By not capitulating to British pressure over the 
Law of Assembly and to the King over the law regarding the prosecution 
of ministers, he appeared as a hero.
Nahhas' dismissal saved him from a critical situation which could 
have turned into an embarrassment for him. He had shelved the Assembly 
Law bill for the time being, but on the opening of the new session of 
the Parliament, he had to make the difficult choice of either risking 
another crisis and confrontation with the British and the King with 
unforeseen consequences, or capitulating in the eyes of the public. 
The latter choice would deal a severe blow to his new status as leader 
of the Wafd which he was trying to strengthen inside the Wafd, despite 
internal party criticism. The dismissal not only saved him from all 
these problems, but gave the impression, at least to the public, that 
he was punished for not yielding to British demands. What more credit 
would a national leader desire than the credit of the uncompromising 
champion of the people's cause? So Nahhas proved to be faithful to 
Zaghlul's uncompromising policies, and his charisma was gradually 
taking shape. As an Egyptian scholar wrote later, there was no doubt 
about Nahhas' honesty and integrity* Nahhas knew quite well that no
AQ
person could lead the Egyptian people if his ethics were questioned.
47. Ramadan, Vol. 1, p. 674.
The acquittal of Nahhas in the Seif al-Din case, also added to his
prestige. Hassan Sabri4^ remarked to Mr. Smart^O that everyone knew
that Nahhas was an imbecile, but that he had a general reputation for 
honesty. The government tried to destroy this reputation, but failed. 
The case did for him what exile in Malta had done for Zaghlul. "It
made him appear in the eyes of the mob as a patriotic victim of an
anti-national and oppressive government, and his vindication by the 
court was his consecration as a popular hero."^
What followed was to become the pattern of Wafd policies under 
Nahhas' leadership at least for most of that time* First, following 
Zaghlul's practice, he sent Makram Ebeid to London to agitate against 
Muhammad Mahmuds' negotiations there in 1929, Makram had done the same 
against 'Adll in 1921 .^2 This would not be the only parallel with a 
previous policy. Secondly, it was rumoured that Nahhas was dominated 
by a stronger character, that of Makram, and an article in al-Siyassa 
on 8 September 1929, and a report by the British on 12 November 1929, 
both bore the same i m p l i c a t i o n , ^  that Nahhas seemed to be dominated 
by another figure, and that the policies of Nahhas, that is, the Wafd, 
would be attributed to that figure, or his influence on him.
The Wafd under Nahhas, however, would act according to the 
following general policy. The British could not negotiate a treaty 
unaccepted by the party with the largest mass following. For the 
British sought the legitimacy and durability (implementation, in other
49. A Wafdist who later joined Sidqi then became Prime Minister in 
1940.
50. Oriental Secretary.
51. FO 407-208 J592/5/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain (No.
165), 23 February 1929.
52. El-Feki, p. 106.
53. Ibid., p. 112. F0 371/13849 Sir P. Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson, 
12 November 1929.
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words) of the anticipated settlement. A small party without mass 
support could not insure or guarantee that. In other words, it was 
only the Wafd which commanded the loyalty of the vast majority of the 
masses, and without the Wafd's support, no settlement would secure the 
approval of the people. . This made the Wafd the key to any British 
settlement with Egypt, and the British had no choice but to abandon any 
other party negotiating in the name of Egypt, as it did not represent 
Egypt. That was Makram's message in London. Behind that argument lay 
the old dispute which erupted between Zaghlul and 'Adli over which 
social and political force should lead Egypt to independence. The 
landowners, as represented mainly in the Liberal Constitutional Party, 
now under the leadership of Muhammad Mahmud, or the urban-middle class, 
as represented mainly in the Wafd now under the leadership of Nahhas. 
In other words, only the Wafd could deliver the goods, that is, a 
treaty with Britain. This policy with its inherent contradiction 
passed unnoticed, although not by the majority of the people. On the 
departure of Makram to London, al-Khashkul published a caricature of 
two Egyptians engaged in the following conversation.
First person: This means that Nahhas is demanding from the
British to form a government.
Second person: And he says he wants to get the British out, as if
he is saying give me the stick with which to hit 
54you.
The Wafd in a very skilful way deprived Muhammad Mahmud of the 
success he hoped to gain by his negotiated treaty, and turned the issue 
from that of the treaty to that of the suspended constitutional life in 
Egypt- And the message was quite clear to London: the Wafd would not
endorse any treaty as long as it was out of p o w e r . T h e  British, 
therefore, had to end their support for Muhammad Mahmud and facilitate
v  -----   _
54. Al-»Khashkul, 5 July 1929, p. 12.
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the return of Parliament, which meant the return of the Wafd to power,
if the British wanted their treaty to be endorsed by the Wafd. This
was understood? if they had agreed to Muhammad Mahmud's treaty, what
would have been left for them? Besides, realising they had a much
stronger bargaining power in their command of the mass support of the
majority, especially with a Labour government in office in London, they
were naturally inclined to believe they could extract better terms than
those of Mahmud. Nahhas became so convinced of this policy, allegedly
under the influence of Makram, that he ignored any other tendency of
moderation in the Wafd regarding acceptance of the British proposals as
advocated by Nokrashi.^6 His bitterness against the King was also
unabated, and he refused any suggestion of reconciliation by refusing
to send a delegation to His Majesty when that was suggested in a
Wafdist meeting in Alexandria.57
Nahhas' optimism regarding the success of his, or Makram's, policy
was confirmed with the appointment of a new British High Commissioner,
Sir Percy Loraine,^® to succeed the much hated Lord Lloyd. Nahhas
expressed his ideas in a speech on 21 August 1929, when he said,
For it has been proven from the statements made by the 
British Foreign Secretary that he was implementing a policy 
which Lord Lloyd insisted upon, with stubbornness although 
Sir Austin Chamberlain disapproved of it as being dangerous.
Then he added in another part,
Therefore it [British government] paved the way by sacking 
the High Commissioner [Lord Lloyd] who constructed the policy 
of the present government [Muhammad Mahmud] and backed it in 
its coup against the constitutional system and against the 
authority of the Nation. Thus this action was a right step
56. FO 407-209 J3132/5/16 Sir Percy Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson, (No.
451) Confidential, 12 November 1929.
57. FO 407-209 J2350/5/16 Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson, (No. 238),
16 August 1929.
58. Formerly British ambassador at Ankara, a career diplomat (Marlow 
288).
unaprer t w o  - a/
on the part of the British government to clarify the 
relationship between Great Britain and Egypt, which we met by 
what it deserved in consent.59
Finally Nahhas had his way when the British informed Muhammad Mahmud
that they would only recognise a treaty with Egypt which had been
ratified by a freely elected P a r l i a m e n t M a h m u d  had no choice but
to resign in order to make way for new parliamentary elections. An
interim cabinet under ' Adli was formed and elections were held which
resulted in a sweeping victory for the Wafd®^ .
B. The Second Nahhas Government
The Cabinet of 1930 and Negotiations with the British
Nahhas* second government was formed on 1 January 1930, its most 
important feature being the exclusion of 'Ali al-Shamsi and Fathallah 
Barakat. Nokrashi was appointed Minister of Communications, and 
Bahie al-Din Barakat (son of Fathallah Barakat) Minister of Education. 
In this way Nahhas excluded his ex-rival Fathallah Barakat and one of 
his supporters, 'Ali al-Shamsi, in a bid for more political power 
between the two rival factions of the Wafd. It is interesting to note 
that Barakat complained in his memoirs that Nokrashi became the strong 
man of the Wafd.®2 At the same time, 'Ali al-Shamsi was reported to
/n
have said that Nahhas, Makram,.^ -yEbeid, Nokrashi, and Ahmad Mahir formed 
63the real Wafd. As can be seen from the composition of the
59. Al-Balagh 22 August 1929, p. 4.
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61. Al-Rafi'i V2 pp. 95-97. See Appendix 1.
62. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot 'Egypt's Liberal Experiment 
1922-19361, University of California Press Los Angeles California 
1977, p. 131. Quoting Fathallah Barakat Memoirs 1930 (12:91).
63. F0 407-210 J148/4/16 Sir Percy Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson (No. 
12), 4 June 1930.
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government, the seeds of the 1932 split (in which both Fathallah
Barakat and 'Ali al-Shamsi defected from the Wafd) were sown by the
policy openly expressed by Makram Ebeid in a conversation with Mr.
Watson after the failure of the negotiations at the British Embassy in
Cairo, and which consisted of a hard line against the King and a better
understanding with the British.64 This same policy was enunciated by
Nahhas in his "Speech from the Throne" at the opening of the Parliament
on 11 January 1930
And it is our dearest wish that the nation should continue to 
uphold the Constitution, benefiting from what it guaranteed 
of rights and freedoms; that the Constitution itself should 
remain immune, defended by legal measures which would insure 
its existence and continuity. The government will present to
you the necessary legislation to achieve that goal.66
This was a clear indication of the intention to introduce legislation
for the protection of the Constitution, aimed more directly at the King
than the British. Yet whenever Nahhas seriously tried to curtail the
power of the King, he was opposed by the British.66 For the next two
decades at least, and despite his efforts to appease the British, the
latter would never unleash him against the monarchy as he wished. The
British logic for that was the maintenance of a delicate balance of
power between the two rivals.6  ^ The question is, Was Nahhas aware of
that policy, and was he trying to extract the maximum out of his
allotted zone? Or was he trying to upset the whole balance as he had
tried more than once - in 1936 and 1937 for example - by using his Blue
Shirts Youth organization. Nevertheless, it seems at that moment he
64. al-Feki, p. 112 FO 371/14615 J2127/4/16 Sir Percy Loraine to Mr. 
A. Henderson (No. 594), Cairo 21 June 1930.
65. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab, 11 January 1930 p. 3.
66. FO 371 /J497/130/16 Sir Percy Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson (No. 
9 2)*-, 12 February 1930.
67. Muhammad Saad al-Din, Zaim Misr al-Khalid Mustafa a1-Nahhas 
Matbaat Tuma Cairo 1977 p. 70.
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did not 'appreciate the danger he constituted to the British as the
events of June of that year clearly showed,68
Mr. Henderson in his opening speech on 31 March stated that they 
had met to achieve a great purpose.
Firstly, to bring a contribution, and an important one, to 
strengthen the great organisation which is being built up by 
the nations to establish peace between the peoples of the
world. I refer to the League of Nations. Secondly, to seal 
by a treaty a friendship between two peoples whose interests 
are in so many respects identical.
To which Nahhas answered in French that Egypt, which held firm to its
constitutional liberties, had expressed its desire to conclude a treaty
with Britain,68 Thus Nahhas in his answer emphasized that he was the
representative of the people, and could argue therefore against
previous agreements that were not negotiated by properly elected
bodies.
In the first session of the negotiations a general discussion was
held. The principles to be deduced from the British proposals were
summarized by Nahhas as follows:
1. The termination of the British occupation.
2. The alliance: The principle was accepted.. .Egypt was ready
to prove her goodwill by allowing Great Britain to assist her 
in defending the Canal, and for this purpose would allow 
Great Britain to maintain a military base (Nahhas was careful 
to use the singular) near the Canal until the time had come 
when Egypt had proved herself fit to hold it until British 
reinforcements could arrive....
3. Protection of foreigners was the right of Egypt, only as 
restricted by the Capitulations. The Capitulations were 
destined to pass away, but for some time and until they had 
passed away Egypt accepted the existence of the competency of 
the Mixed Courts as proposed, subject to modifications.
68. Al-Mufawadat al-Rasmiyah bayn al-Hikumatayn al-Misriyya wa
al-Britanaiyya Sanat 1930, Mufawadat al-Nahhas-Henderson, Magmuat 
al-Watha'iq wa al-Mahadir al-Rasmiyah Cairo 1936, pp. 9, 13.
69. FO 407-210 J1067/4/16 Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hoare (No. 339), 
2 April 1930/al-Mufawadat p. 19.
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4. Until this question was settled by a definite agreement in 
the future, the administration of the Sudan should be carried 
on jointly.
Mr. Henderson summarized the points which both- sides had agreed 
upon. These were the termination of the British occupation of Egypt,
the principle of an alliance between the two countries, and Britain's
assistance in helping Egypt to become a member in the League of 
Nations. Nahhas added that in all previous negotiations between Egypt 
and Britain, it was agreed that Egypt would help Britain as an ally in 
any war but only on Egypt's territory.^8 By that Nahhas was 
expressing his own fears of repeating the experience of World War One 
when Egyptian volunteers were sent to Palestine. Nahhas wanted to 
stress that this experience could not be allowed to be repeated under 
any pretext. Nahhas would remain faithful to this principle when he 
opposed any collective defence pact for the Middle East in the early 
1950's as it implied Egypt's involvement in other countries. Nahhas 
would also apply that principle in the Second World War when he would 
-argue that as long as the territory of Egypt was not affected by the
course of the war, then Egypt should not get involved. Thus one could
see how Nahhas was trying to give the British the minimum of their 
demands in order to get the maximum of his own demands.
During the second session of the negotiations Mr. Henderson 
commented on the Egyptian proposals, stating that there were ten points 
of very marked difference between the British. Five of these proposals 
were of a serious nature, one of which was the Sudan. Nahhas replied 
that his proposals regarding the Sudan did not depart from Mr. 
Henderson's when he mentioned the 1899 convention. However, he had to 
defend himself in Parliament, and convince his country that the 
concessions he had made were given for an agreement in the interests of
70. FO 407-211 J1026/4/16 Record of Proceedings at First meeting with 
the Egyptian Delegation on 31 March 1930/a1-Mufawadat pp. 21-25.
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both countries .^ 1 in that sense it appeared as if Nahhas was telling 
Henderson that if he ~ could make some concessions on the issue of the 
Sudan, then Nahhas would be able to accede to some of the British 
demands in other respects.
On 3 April, a private conversation took place between Nahhas and 
Henderson, of which I found no trace in the British version of the 
negotiations. The most important aspect about it was that it was
almost entirely devoted to the question of the Sudan. According to 
this Mr. Henderson refused to accept Nahhas' interpretation of joint 
rule of the Sudan.^2
In the third session Nahhas objected to the British proposal of 
article 6 which stated that "His Britannic Majesty recognizes that the 
responsibility of the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt 
devolves henceforth upon the Egyptian Government," because, as he
later indicated after some debate, "the mere mention of the part of the 
article implied that Egypt would be responsible before Britain, and 
that the latter were still responsible for the lives and property of 
foreigners." After further discussions about whether Britain had the 
right as an ally to at least consult with the Egyptian government 
concerning that issue, a compromise was reached: "His Britannic
Majesty recognises that the responsibility for the lives and property 
of foreigners in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian
Government who will ensure the fulfilment of their obligations in this
7 0
respect."
On the fourth meeting Nahhas demanded the omission of the eighth
71. FO 407-211 J1088/4/16 Record of Proceedings at Second meeting with
the Egyptian Delegation on 3 April 1930/al-Mufawadat pp. 29-30.
72. Al-Mufawadat pp. 31-35.
73. FO 407-211 J1107/4/16 Record of Proceedings at Third meeting with
the Egyptian Delegation op 4 April 1930/al-Mufawadat pp. 36-44.
clause in the British proposals which stated, "The Egyptian Government 
will, by exchange of notes demand the presence of a British Military 
mission, for a definite period, with a view to be responsible for the 
instruction and training of the Egyptian Army", and suggested it be a 
footnote as it was of a temporary nature; retaining it in the treaty 
would place the Egyptian army in a position of inferiority and imply 
that Egypt is a tributary state. Lord Thomson answered that it was 
merely advisable to retain the British proposal in the treaty, namely 
that "this was a permanent alliance". (Here it is quite obvious that 
while Nahhas was thinking of decreasing the presence of the British in 
Egypt gradually until the final evacuation of British troops from the 
country, the British were not following his line of thought and were 
merely interested in legalizing the status quo.) Nahhas reported that 
he could find no precedent for the British proposals in any 
international treaty and that he wanted the treaty to have the 
appearance of a treaty between equals or two independent sovereign 
states. Then the British side proceeded to ask why imperial 
communications had been omitted, and Nahhas argued that the main object 
was the defence of the Canal which was mentioned (referring to the 
defence of the Egyptian army with the assistance of Britain). ^
The fifth session was devoted to the defence of the Canal and the 
location of the British troops. Naturally Nahhas insisted on the 
participation of the Egyptian army in protecting the Canal, rather than 
leave it exclusively in the hands of the British forces. In that, 
Nahhas, like Zaghlul before him, accepted a British force on the Canal 
75zone.
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In a private conversation on 8 April, Nahhas suggested that for 
each British head of department in the Sudan, there should be an 
Egyptian deputy who would replace him on the former’s retirement. In 
order to finance these extra Egyptian employees Nahhas offered to 
maintain the annual subsidy which the Egyptian government paid to the 
Sudan and which the Egyptian Parliament was thinking of cancelling.76 
In the sixth session certain rules concerning agreement over the 
Capitulations were discussed.77 In the seventh session the position 
of the British Ambassador in Cairo was discussed. Nahhas objected to 
the British demand of granting the Ambassador any special position 
which would imply Egypt's inferior position vis-a-vis Britain. When 
Nahhas was told that his predecessors had agreed to that, he answered 
that he represented the people and defended their rights and therefore 
knew what was acceptable to them. Finally Nahhas agreed that the 
British Ambassador would have precedence over any other foreign 
representative since he was going to be the first Ambassador appointed 
in Egypt, as the diplomatic code said.78 The eighth session dealt 
once more with the defence of the Canal,78 while the ninth session 
considered the period of time to be covered by the treaty.88 The tenth 
session tackled the Sudan-again and the location of British troops. At 
first Nahhas tried once more to adopt the 1899 formula which the 
British categorically refused. As for the second matter Nahhas 
insisted that the troops would be stationed in one place only.81
76. al-Mufawadat pp. 59-60.
77. FO 407-211 J1189/4/16 Record of Proceedings at Sixth meeting with 
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In, the eleventh session on 15 April, Mr. Henderson threatened to 
break the negotiations after the Egyptian delegation had omitted the 
clause "with the agreement of both sides" in the ninth article
concerning the presence of the British troops in the Canal and whether 
they were necessary any longer or not. At that point Nahhas asked to 
be given time to consult with his colleagues in Egypt, and in order to 
brief them about the Sudan clauses.8^
Finally in the fourteenth session (thirteenth in the English 
version since the Egyptian minutes consider the meeting of Wednesday, 
16 April in the afternoon a separate one from that held in the 
morning). Nahhas started by saying that the Egyptian delegation had 
made concessions which his party had never envisaged. (Referring to 
the location of British troops on the Western side of the Canal.) All 
that he asked for was an agreement that conversations should take place 
after a year with regard to the application of the provisions of the 
treaty in the Sudan. Nahhas ended by stating that the Egyptians had 
acceded to British demands on the issue of the Canal which were less 
important and vital to Britain that the Sudan to Egypt, and that they 
could not face public opinion in Egypt if they left the Sudan matter 
that way. It was clear that this was Nahhas' last bid to save the 
negotiations from breaking down over the Sudan issue, but it seemed not 
to be to the satisfaction of the British who insisted on a complete 
admission by the Egyptians of the British point of view, which would 
had been tantamount to political suicide for Nahhas.88
Mr. Henderson then spoke for the first time about how he had 
refused to sign a treaty with Muhammad Mahmud, and insisted on
82. al-Mufawadat pp. 96-98.
83. FO 407-211 J1298/4/16 Record of Proceedings at Thirteenth meeting
with the Egyptian Delegation held at Egyptian Lagation at midnight 
16-17 April 1930/al-Mufawadat pp. 109-111.
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negotiating with a constitutional government; how His Majesty's 
Government proceeded to create an agreeable atmosphere (referring to 
the appointment of a new High Commissioner) and negotiated with the 
Wafd party when a large section of British public opinion was not in 
their favour; and how the Wafd had refused to comment on the draft of 
the treaty submitted to Muhammad Mahmud, but insisted instead on coming 
to London first, and how their conditions were met. Yet, despite all 
of that, and with the agreement on the main issues of the relationship 
between Britain and Egypt, the Wafd was ignoring an opportunity to sign 
a treaty, and it was doubtful whether such an opportunity would present 
itself again. The Wafd were risking all that for a position 
unacceptable by the British Government at the moment. Then Mr. 
Henderson referred to Tharwat who dissociated the Sudan question from 
the Egyptian one, and asked Nahhas to do the same. It was quite clear 
that the British were getting impatient, and subtly hinted that had it 
not been for them the Egyptian Constitution would not have been 
restored.8^
After the fifteenth session which took place on the 17th of April 
1930, Nahhas proceeded to consult with his colleagues. A week earlier 
Rose al-Yusuf published the story that Muhammad Salah al-Din (a member
in the secretariat of the delegation) flew back to Cairo from London to 
consult public opinion in Egypt as to what was happening in London. On 
his way back to London he carried with him the reply of the King, 'Adli 
Yaken, President of the Senate, Wissa Wassif, President of the Chamber 
of Deputies, the Cabinet's opinion, the Wafd committee's opinion and 
the general drift of the public opinion. In its next issue Rose 
al-Yusuf said that every one of the abovementioned elements supported 
the Wafd^'s stand on the Sudan issue, and that whatever was said about a
84. Ibid.
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division among the Wafdists concerning that issue was absurd.88 At 
the same time the British report said that Nahhas, Makram, and Nokrashi 
favoured a rupture, while Wassif Ghali, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
was hoping to reach an agreement.
Nothing better than Mr. Henderson's words could explain the 
situation as it developed around the Sudan clause on the meeting of 5 
May 1930.
The article dealing with the question in his proposals of 
last year had been negotiated during the present conference, 
and would had been introduced to safeguard Egypt's rights. 
He now found that that article, as laid before the House of 
Commons and the country last summer, had been omitted, and 
that the only words which remained of the draft which had 
been agreed on the 16th April were the words which the 
Egyptian delegation had asked to be inserted. Nahhas Pasha 
had said that he understood that the Sudan clause in his 
proposals implied co-administration. How had he understood? 
He had never given Mr. Henderson an opportunity for 
explaining the proposals. Mr. Henderson was aware of the 
answer which Nahhas Pasha would give, but his Excellency knew 
full well that Mr. Henderson had done his best to obtain even 
privately from Nahhas Pasha before he came to London a 
statement of his position. Nahhas Pasha had said that it was 
in the interests of the treaty that he should say nothing 
before he came, and that it would be best to await his 
arrival in London. Look at the position in which that 
attitude has landed us now. If Nahhas Pasha had wanted to 
negotiate on the position of the Sudan vis-a-vis Egypt, he 
should have apprised Mr. Henderson, but he did not do so, and 
he now asked for what it was quite beyond the power of the 
British Committee to give.
With this statement, Henderson made further negotiations unlikely. In
fact the negotiations did not last longer than four more sessions, at
the end of which it was decided to terminate the discussions. Nahhas
issued a statement in Parliament on 20 May 1930 to this effect. He
attributed the failure of the negotiations to the Sudan question, but
expressed the hope that negotiations would be resumed in the near
future.86
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The failure of the Anglo-British negotiations occurred for various
reasons, but it also had an undisputed impact on the Wafd as an
organization and Nahhas as a leader. As for the reasons of failure,
the British claimed that they had committed the error of not letting
the Egyptians know from the start that they regarded the Sudan as a
"potential independent state". Among the Egyptians, Barakat believed
that the Wafd had put too much faith in the Labour Government, whose
aims were supposed to be different from that of a Conservative one.87
Nahhas had gone as far as he could without jeopardizing his own
constituency. He played his cards very shrewdly, for he knew that any
further concessions would not be accepted without losing his own public
stand as an uncompromising national leader. Thus came his famous
sentence "My hands could be cut but not the Sudan", implying that he
was ready to loose his position as a national leader but not the
Sudan* There is no doubt that his stand was well received by the
public if the warm reception he was given when he returned to Egypt is
any indication.88 On the other hand, Nahhas hoped that, by his
previous compromising attitude (except for that of the Sudan over which
the British wanted him to commit what would had been his own political
suicide), he had convinced the British of his willingness to become
their ally in Egypt, This was not only what he hoped; he was convinced
he had achieved it. For
Nahhas was convinced that though he had failed to negotiate a 
treaty, he had never the less forged such strong links of 
friendship with the members of the British government that
they would render him their full support.88
The fact that Nahhas himself conceded that he had lost the treaty but
gained the friendship of the British supports this notion. It also
87. al-Sayyid-Marsot p. 132 Barakat memoirs 1930 16:25-26. Ibid 4:28.
88. Al-Yusuf, p. 137.
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to Sir J. Simon. (No, 558) 27 June 1932.
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explains Nahhas' conciliatory attitude and his moderation when he
explained what happened in Parliament by saying
In fact, both parties exerted their energies in order to
reach a just and honourable solution in the matters
concerning Egypt, except for few things which remained under
consideration, but unfortunately we did not reach a
settlement on the issue of the Sudan which would safeguard
the sacred rights of the country and its vital interests . • •
and the negotiations were terminated in a very friendly way
in which both parties departed with a general belief that the
near future would resolve what they had missed on that vital
issue, and that the intention for reaching a just solution
would not be hindered by the termination of the negotiations,
QObut would be strengthened and continued.
There is no doubt that Nahhas was also preparing the ground for 
another attempt to negotiate a settlement. His statement, "We lost a 
treaty but won the friendship of the British", came as a disappointment 
for many people who were thrilled by his early defiant stand against 
the British over the Sudan, Rose al-Yusuf started preparing public 
opinion for the resumption of the negotiations. It wrote that some of 
the senior negotiators said in a conversation about the resumption of 
the negotiations that if the negotiators had suggested about fifteen 
different formulas for Article 13 on the Sudan, then there was no doubt 
that they could reach a formula which would be acceptable to both 
sides. This was particularly the case, considering the fact that some 
of these formulae had been accepted by both sides, including four 
British ministers, and they were about to agree on them if it had not 
been for the stubbornness of the British government. British 
stubbornness could not be understood unless what was rumoured about the 
pressure applied by the Liberal Party and their leader Lloyd George was 
true. Rose al-Yusuf continued writing that one of the members of the 
delegation told them that he personally believed that if it was not for 
the urgent necessity for Mr. Henderson to travel to Geneva, the 
negotiations would not have been terminated. "And thus we asked him
90. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab 20 May 1930 p. 981.
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frankly" reported Rose al-Yusuf, "whether he believed the negotiations 
would be resumed in the near future, and he answered Yes".81 By 
taking into consideration that Rose al-Yusuf was a leading Wafdist 
organ at that time, one could conclude that either they sincerely 
believed that they were going back to the table of negotiations since 
the British were now their friends as indicated by Nahhas, or that they 
were trying to justify to the people their conciliatory mood towards 
the British on the grounds that as agreement was in the offing it was 
pointless to return to a period of struggle against the British.
The impact of the failure of the 1930 negotiations was not to stop 
here, but was to extend to inter-Wafdist leadership relations. For 
according to Barakat, Wassif Ghali and Nagib al-Gharabli were to accuse 
Nahhas of changing his story of the reasons for the failure of the 
negotiations after making everybody believe the opposite to suit his 
political needs.82 According to Barakat, it led to the growing 
rivalry between Makram Ebeid and Dr. Ahmad Mahir. Cecil Campbell 
described Ebeid as trying to undermine the treaty negotiations and 
playing a despicable role, while he praised Mahir for his efforts and
QO
superior intellect.
All this was to be overshadowed by the events which took place 
immediately after Nahhas returned to Cairo. There is no doubt that 
Nahhas felt the time was ripe for a showdown with the King. He was 
sure of British support (though he was mistaken in his assumption, for 
the support soon proved to be a mirage) and had to compensate for his 
failure in the treaty negotiations. However, Nahhas was not acting 
impulsively, but on the basis of his long-term objectives of curtailing
91. Rose al-Yusuf 20 June 1930. No. 173.
*
92. al-Sayyid-Marsot p. 133 Quoting Barakat 1930 15:7.
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the powers of the monarchy and safeguarding the party's constitutional 
rights.
The King for his part seemed to have grasped the situation at that 
moment and calculated that the time was ripe to dismiss the Nahhas 
government. Only a bill dealing with tariff reforms to encourage 
industry was approved by the King in February, A l l  others were 
delayed, including for example a bill aiming at founding a Court of
Cassation, a list of nominations to the rank of Minister
Plenipotentiary and President of the Court of A p p e a l . B y  the
beginning of June 1930, Nahhas presented to the King the law for the 
prosecution of ministers who attack the Constitution. For two weeks
the King refused to sign it, while at the same time another issue of 
conflict arose over the nomination of some members of the Senate. But 
before Nahhas took any further steps, he had to be sure of the British 
position, and to this end he had a conversation the same week with Sir 
Percy Loraine in which the latter told the him that the British 
government was not concerned with the constitutional issue, and that he 
had made this clear to the King. Nahhas tried to press Loraine to make 
his position publicly known, but the latter refused on the grounds that 
Nahhas would use it for party purposes. As for the Bill for the 
prosecution of ministers, Loraine argued that his government was 
concerned only indirectly if the measures produced had an internal 
shock whose reaction would reflect unfavourably on the friendly
atmosphere between Britain and Egypt,^ Nahhas interpreted this 
exchange as a go ahead.
The last episode came when the King made overtures to Muhammad 
Mahmud (leader of the Liberal Constitutional Party) and granted him an
94. Ibid p. 135.
95. Saad al-Dln, p. 75.
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audience that lasted for two h o u r s . o n  17 June Nahhas presented his
resignation to Parliament saying,
When the present cabinet assumed office it took an oath to 
defend the Constitution and to surround it with a fence of 
legislation which would afford it a long life (referring to 
1925, 1929). I pointed that out in the letter I sent to the 
King on accepting the premiership of that cabinet, and in the 
speech from the throne which you heard. But the government 
was not able to present to the Parliament that legislation 
which is stipulated in Article 68 of the Constitution. Thus 
the government considered it its duty to present its 
resignation to His Majesty the King.^
That was in the morning, and on the same day Parliament renewed its 
confidence in the Nahhas government. On Wednesday, 18 June, the Wafd 
Parliamentary Committee held a meeting in the Nation’s House (Zaghlul’s 
house) to discuss the situation, while masses of people stood outside 
shouting "Long live Nahhas and the Constitution". The general council 
of the union of government officials too held a meeting at which they 
decided to support Nahhas and publish another protest against his
resignation in all the newspapers. Soon they were followed by other 
organizations and individuals all over the country. On Thursday the 
19th, the Central Committee of the Wafd in Cairo held a meeting to 
declare its support for Nahhas and register its protest against the
formation of any government by unconstitutional means. Al-Ahram that 
morning published in big headlines "The Arrangement of a Public 
Demonstration next Friday", and then wrote that a big popular 
demonstration composed of several thousand would take place on Friday,
20 June, through the streets of Cairo on its way to 'Abdin Palace 
Square where it would shout slogans in support of the Constitution and
ask the King not to accept Nahhas's resignation. It appears that the
Wafd's desire to mobilize the greatest number of supporters was the
96. Al-Sayyid-Marsot, p. 134. Quoting Barakat 1930 14:59.
97. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab, 17 June 1930, p. 1181.
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reason for delaying that demonstration to F r i d a y . ^ 8 So far, the Wafd 
had succeeded in portraying the conflict between Nahhas and the King as 
one over the constitutional rights of an elected government.
C. The Sicfai Interlude
Twice before the constitution had been abrogated, and only for one 
or two years, but never completely abandoned and abolished for five 
years. Now the battle for the Constitution was not merely part of the 
Wafd's struggle, but its whole struggle, for without it, no
independence could be achieved. It was the same old story of Adly 
versus Saad, the autocracy of the Palace and the large landowners
against the "people", that is, the urban class. This can be seen 
clearly through the provisions of the new Constitution. if the old 
Constitution, the 1923 Constitution, had given a chance to elements
outside the establishment to come to power, the new 1930 Constitution 
did its utmost to avoid that situation. It did so on two levels? first 
by changing the electoral laws, secondly by changing the functions of 
Parliament, thus blocking any possibility of undesired elements
entering Parliament, and even if they succeeded, rendering their 
membership ineffectual.^
It was a condition for a member of the committee of fifty
comprising the electoral college that would elect the deputies to
satisfy some financial prerequisites. In the 1923 Constitution 
elections were conducted directly, not in two stages as in the new 
Constitution* For example, it was necessary to be either the owner of 
untransferable money tied with taxes on property for the government, or 
to be the inhabitant of a house whose annual rent was not less than
98. Rose al-Yusuf, 24 June 1930, p. 4.
99. Ramadan, pp. 720-721.
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E£12, or to be renting agricultural land whose tax was not less than 
E£2 annually, and to have the primary school certificate, or its 
equivalent. Finally, it was prohibited to nominate for Parliament any 
member of the free professions living outside Cairo. This actually 
meant prohibiting lawyers, physicians, journalists, engineers, and 
merchants from all over Egypt who were the backbone of the Wafd except 
Cairo from becoming members of the P a r l i a m e n t . 1 0 0
Some might argue that Sidqi's intention in curtailing the powers 
of the legislature was to increase the power of the executive in order 
to give him a free hand for his administrative and economic reforms. 
Nahhas, the Wafd, and large segments of the population did not accept 
this argument. Others saw Sidqi's measures as a setback to the process 
of political development which had started in 1919, was consolidated by 
the 1923 Constitution, and confirmed by the 1924 cabinet of the Wafd. 
Sidqi was simply turning the clock back to the pre-1919 situation when 
political power was concentrated in the hands of the Palace and its 
Turkish aristocracy. This antagonised not only the Wafd with its power 
base among the professional middle class— that was only to be
expected— but it also put up the backs of the landowners, especially in 
the Liberal Constitutional Party, who were inspired by the democratic 
principles of the 1923 Constitution. Now they had to struggle all over 
again to reinstate a Constitution they once regarded as unsatisfactory.
But some sections of the lower or petty bourgeois class were now 
starting to question the whole policy of the Wafd and its futility, and 
whether the constitutional way was their only means to achieve
independence and a share in political power. Although still at an
incipient stage, and with their ideas not yet clear or formulated, two
new political groups and various others began to appear, which would
100. Ibid., p. 739.
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play a significant role in attracting the urban middle class away from 
the Wafd. These were the Muslim Brotherhood (1928) and the Young Egypt - 
Society (1933), and their activities among students in the 1930s.
The Emergence of Nahhas as a Charismatic Leader
Yet it was at this time that the image of Nahhas as the persecuted 
national leader was at its sharpest. The Wafdists appeared, rightly or 
wrongly, as victims of a British plot, in which the King and Sidqi were 
British pawns out to punish Nahhas for his refusal to abandon the
rights of Egypt in his negotiations with Henderson.
Nahhas on his part, with the rest of the Wafdist leadership,
resorted to political propaganda. When they decided that members of 
the dissolved Parliament should go out on a demonstration headed by 
Nahhas to Parliament, Sidqi let it be known that the police would open 
fire at the demonstration with the intention of shooting Nahhas. To 
the disappointment of the people the demonstration was substituted by a 
petition to the King.1^1 Yet that implicit threat later backfired,
for when Nahhas visited the city of Mansoura on 8 July, and Sinnut 
Hanna was wounded by the bayonets of the soldiers who were dispersing 
the demonstrators, it was easy to believe that Nahhas had escaped an 
assassination attempt. On the following day, Nahhas went to pray in 
the al-Hussein mosque in Cairo, and shouted "Allah Akbar 'Ala Men 
Ta'anani Min al-Khalf Wa Takabar" three times,1^2 and Sidqi was
allegedly paralysed the next day.
Naturally for the masses, these incidents were not isolated,103 
and by that time Nahhas's popularity was on the ascendency, and Sidqi's
101. al-Yusuf, p. 142.
1°2* Al-Balagh, 9 July 1930, p. 7, No. 2219.
103.’ Ibrahim Faraj Dhikrayat, A1-Ahrar 12 April 1982 Number 3.
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policy was doing its best, albeit unintentionally, to present Nahhas 
_(.who did' not miss a chance) to the people as the persecuted leader. 
Another opportunity came when he started out to visit the city of 
Asyout on 6 April 1931; he was not allowed to leave the train at the 
station and remained there for twelve hours, A picture of him was 
published sleeping on one of the benches. It had a great impact on his 
image as the simple popular leader as compared to the other 
aristocratic politicians,^^ thus enabling the ordinary man to
identify more closely with him. Fatma al-Yusuf in her memoirs
characterized Nahhas at that time as a very simple man with a good 
heart and friendly features. In his presence there was nothing of that 
which characterized the social meetings of other VIPs. On the 
contrary, in his behaviour he was as any other ordinary Egyptian 
person. She also described him as almost the only person who did not 
speak badly about other people including his bitterest opponents. The 
utmost he would say was that he was not a patriotic man. Even when he 
was about to get married, he was very angry that Rose al-Yusuf 
published an article about his private life protesting that he was not 
one of the 'Roses of Society'.105 ^  eyewi-tnesg described how Nahhas
in the midst of his speech would scold a person for interrupting him 
even by shouting "Long Live Nahhas". This was to have a magical effect 
on his listeners.
An account of Nahhas1 visit to Port Said gives a fair idea of his 
personality and the style of the campaign which gained him such
popularity. He started on the agreed route into the city, then the car
turned to the Arab quarter (the city had an Arab and a European 
quarter) and he was then persuaded by his companions to proceed on foot
104. Saad al-Din, p. 75.
105. Al-Yusuf, pp. 117-120.
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through the narrow side streets, collecting a number of boys around 
him. A British police officer attempted to disperse the boys with his 
cane, but struck Nahhas* hand. This infuriated Nahhas, who aimed a 
blow at the British officer, spat in his face and cursed him and his 
religion. This incident was typical of all Nahhas's visits? first the 
local Wafdist committee would accept the police programme, then comes 
Nahhas's breach of faith which would be followed by disturbances, and a 
furious tirade by Nahhas, with the remainder of the programme passing 
off in relative calm.1<^ ^
E. The Defection of 1932; The Complete Triumph of the Lawyers' Wing
The failure of Nahhas' previous policy in confronting the King was
leading to some dissension among the members of the Wafd who were in
any case ill-disposed towards him from the beginning. For Nahhas had
told his colleagues in the 1930 cabinet that the Residency would not
support the King against his government and that the British were
therefore favourable to his policy. Apparently Nahhas had
misinterpreted a statement made to him by Sir Percy Loraine of his
1 07neutrality towards the constitutional issue.IW/ To make matters worse
for himself, he had informed the Wafd committee that the British had no
choice but to support him against the King, holding to his belief that
1 ORit was only he who would be able to negotiate a treaty. However,
time was passing and Nahhas' authority was waning. In a Wafd meeting 
to discuss the best policy to be adopted towards the British, his 
proposal for a boycott of British goods commencing 19 March 1931
106. FO 407 Sir Miles Lampson to Sir J. Simon (No. 698), 3 August 1934.
107. FO 407-213 J1933/26/16 Sir P. Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson (No. 
56tf) Cairo 6 June 1931. FO 407-210 J1848/4/16 Sir Percy Loraine 
to Mr. A. Henderson (No. 258) Cairo 9 June 1930.
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(Independence Day) was opposed as being premature.109 n o w thought 
that if the British were not interested in his policy, he should make 
them believe in it. Thus in addressing the nation on 13 November 1931 
(on the anniversary of the visit to Wingate in 1918 by Saad, Sharawi, 
and Fahmi) he stated that the British however they tried to hide their 
position under the pretext of neutrality, were responsible, for they 
were the power on which the present system depended on, as they 
controlled the army and the police.11°
On 30 December 1931, the Wafd committee held a meeting to discuss 
the matter of a National Government. The twelve moderates who also 
controlled the majority, argued that the British would intervene to 
secure such a government. They were hoping to be endorsed by the 
British, as happened in 1923 over the issue of the Constitution when 
the British sided with the Liberal Constitutional Party against the 
King. These were Fathallah Barakat, Hamad al-Basil, Fakhri 'Abd al-Nur, 
’All al-Shamsi, George Khayat, Mustafa Bekir, 'Alwi al-Gazzar, Murad 
al-Shari'ai, 'Atta Afifi, Raghib Iskander, Salama Mikha'il and Muhamma_d
A
Nagib al-Gharabli. Nahhas accused them of following a will-o'-the-wisp 
of British assistance. He was supported by Sinnut Hanna, Ahmad Mahir,
* A  ^ ^
Makram Ebeid, Hassan Hassib, and Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi. This group 
argued that the government should be exclusively from the Waf d , m  on 
the basis that their party represented the nation. It was the same 
argument which raged between Saad and 'Adli years earlier. On 6 March 
1932 in a Wafdist meeting Nahhas repeated his demand to boycott British 
goods, arguing that the Wafd would lose popularity if they did not act
109. FO 407-213 J682/26/16 Sir P. Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson (No. 60) 
Cairo 4 March 1931.
110. Al£Balagh Mulhaq al-Misa' 13 November 1931 p. 3,
111. FO 407-215 J178/14/16 Sir PI Loraine to Sir J. Simon (No. 26) 
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against the British. It would be thought that they were flattering the 
British in order to return to power. Nahhas contended that it was only 
Zaghlul's method of acting resolutely without consultation that was 
responsible for his success.112 Nahhas' instinct was correct, for the 
support of the masses was derived more from the Wafd's anti-British 
stand than any other issue. It was this understanding of the popular 
mood of Egypt which both Nahhas and Zaghlul cleverly played on whenever 
it was necessary. The trick was never to play against it or to abstain 
from it. That was the source of their strength.
The Liberal Constitutionals were eager to dissociate themselves
from any hostile activity towards the British and, in contrast to the
Wafd, that was why they had no popular appeal. The Wafd always 
contended that the Liberals1 social composition would not permit an 
anti-British policy, whereas their own following among the more 
militant urban middle class did, and not only for pur poses of 
propaganda, but because their interests were more in conflict with the 
British than those of the large landowners.112 A ministerial report 
indicated that the latter advocated a policy of friendship towards the 
British while the Wafd, in remaining hostile, could at the appropriate 
time mediate between them. The moderates in the Wafd including Shamsi 
and Ghali, agreed while Nahhas objected. Another report showed that 
the moderate elements inside the Wafd were considering (along with the 
Liberal Constitutionals) the idea of accepting the 1930 Constitution
and fighting the government within its limits. Nahhas refused such an
idea categorically,114 and not surprisingly so because it could have
112. FO 407-215 J786/14/16 Sir P. Loraine to Sir J. Simon (No. 247) 
Cairo 12 March 1932.
113. See^Chapter 1, p.
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meant his political suicide. This suggests that the conflict between 
the Sidqi regime and the so-called moderates was of a compromising 
nature, and had it not been for the 1919 revolution and the democratic 
ideas which penetrated the political consciousness of the elite, the 
intellectuals and some segments of the population alike, the alliance 
between the Palace and the big landowners would have been very strong.
A
Barakat described in his memoirs how Nahhas lost his temper in a 
Wafd committee meeting in which they refused to issue a call to the 
nation declaring Britain their main enemy and inciting the people to 
rise against it. He threatened to issue the call alone, and said that 
the people were sneering at him for doing nothing and that he would not 
commit political suicide. By that time 'Atta 'Afifi and Wassif Ghali 
had stopped attending these meetings.11® It was obvious to Nahhas, as 
well as to his predecessor, Zaghlul, that the only action to restore 
his position in the heart of the nation was to take an uncompromising 
stand against the British,
The rift between the two factions was healed by a compromise 
solution, that of a national government to be formed to conduct 
elections based on the 1923 constitution, as a result of which the 
majority party would form the government.11® Yet the split had its 
impact, for the moderates were headed by Barakat, and it seemed as if 
the section of the Wafd which did not favour Nahhas in 1927 was heading 
for a new confrontation hased on the same lines as the confrontation 
between the two factions in the 1927 election over the Presidency of 
the Wafd.
The crisis erupted once more over an issue between Gharabli and 
Makram Ebeid, when the former refused to associate himself with the
115. al-Sayyid-Marsot p. 159. Quoting Barakat 1932 26:70.
116. FO 407-215 J451/14/16 Sir P. Loraine to Sir J. Simon (No. 128) 
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latter in withdrawing from the bombs’ case. This was the case in which 
several persons were accused of illegally possessing and manufacturing 
explosives for the purpose of using them in a terror campaign against 
the government. Already one bomb had exploded in the Ministry of 
Justice on 19 July 1931, and another had exploded in the house of the 
Deputy Minister of the Interior on 27 July 1931. Other prominent 
figures in the Sidqi regime received threatening letters, and there 
were such acts of sabotage as derailing public transport or cutting
telephone wires. Since the accused were regarded by the Wafd
A
leadership as fighting Sidqi's dictatorship, it found that it was its
duty to send some of its most prominent lawyers, such as Makram and
others, to defend them.11^
Nahhas criticized Gharabli for his previous stand vis-a-vis
Makram, but members of the Wafd urged Nahhas to give him a chance to
withdraw his resignation, which Nahhas did and Gharabli obliged. But
in the letter withdrawing his resignation, Gharabli said that he did it
in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Wafd. This meant
that he was returning to the Wafd despite the opinion of Nahhas and
Makram who were mistaken in their stand against him in the first
place. Naturally Nahhas considered the letter an insult to him and a
challenge to his own judgment. He conferred with Madame Zaghlul
(Saad's widow) and expelled Gharabli. The others, Hamad al-Basil,
Murad al-Shari'ai, Salama Mikha'il, 'Atta 'Afifi, Fathallah Barakat,
Fakhray *Abd al-Nur, 'Alwi al-Gazzar, Raghib Iskander, and Mustafa Bekir
signed a letter protesting at Nahhas' action and sent it to the
press.118 Even when the political split did. coincide with the social split 
■ it did not correlate with it.
117, Ramadan, Vol. 1, pp. 750-751.
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Gharabli was a lawyer by training and profession,119 whereas Barakat
was a wealthy landowner129 who played a role in every approach between
the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalists, and who was the candidate 
of the landowners for the Presidency of the Wafd in 1 9 2 7  against
Nahhas. Barakat could have headed the faction which defected in 1 9 3 2
and formed a new party but he died on 1 7  February 1 9 3 3 .  'Ali al-Shamsi 
was the son of one of the wealthy cotton merchants whose interest was 
mainly in agriculture.121 This lends some support to our Jthesis of,.__a
social split, especially now that the actual leadership of the Wafd was 
left wholly in the hands of the urban middle class, or the "gang of 
four", consisting of Nahhas, Makram, Mahir, and N o k r a s h £ . 1 2 2  
true that Nahhas appointed to the Wafd Committee twelve new members, 
eight of whom were large landowners,123 yet the balance of power was 
in the hands of the four previously mentioned whose history, prestige, 
and capabilities added to their power and position.
F, The Decline of the Wafd
This period saw the beginning of the decline of the Wafd as the 
militant national movement it had been in the early and late twenties, 
only a decade after its formation. The Wafd leadership was entirely in 
the hands of one faction, without any internal frictions which could 
hinder its leadership's ability for free movement. Yet at the same
time, they were facing an entirely new situation. The Constitution
which had given them a degree of political mobility within the
119. 'Azabawi p. 334. Al-Ahram 29 January 1924.
120. Rose al-Yusuf, 1 August 1932 Number 233, p. 20.
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political establishment was abolished, and the British remained 
silent. With no friction between the Palace and the British at the 
moment, the Wafd was at a loss.
Thus one day in February 1933, Nahhas paid a visit to Dr. Novacan, 
the Yugoslav Charge d 1 Affaires, Nahhas told him that he was not a 
revolutionary, and that his esteem for the British High Commissioner 
was still the same although every type of relation had ceased, and that 
the British should not pay attention to what he said in the heat of 
political conflict. Nahhas also added that the failure of the treaty 
negotiations was due to an insignificant divergence on one or two 
details connected with the Sudan. Nahhas asked Dr. Novacan to convey 
what he said to Sir Percy Loraine and inform him of the result. The 
following day, the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires met Sir Percy Loraine, 
and then telephoned Nahhas to tell him his impressions as agreed on the 
previous day. The message was clear: Sir Percy Loraine blamed Nahhas 
for the present situation and felt it was up to him to redeem the 
situation. Nahhas could call on him at the Residency, continued Sir 
Percy Loraine, and cease anti-British propaganda and the call for the 
boycotting of British goods.124
The seeds of the events of 1935 and 1936 were sown during these 
days. Nahhas understood that the British were determined not to change 
their course, and youth discontent which was to erupt violently later 
was reflected in the emergence of Ahmad Hussein and his Young Egypt
Society that year. The "Wafdist Young Men's Committee" was founded, 
organized on the initiative of Nokrashi, and warmly sponsored by 
Nahhas* Members were educated in the "spirit of 1919" and were to be 
used on 13 November celebrations. Nahhas's own speeches were 
increasingly directed at the youth urging them to fight for the Wafd
124. FO 407/217 J438/29/16 Sir Percy Loraine to Sir John Simon (No. 26)
Cairo 11 February 1933.
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cause.12® That organization was the first sign of the forthcoming 
Wafd Blue Shirts.
The year 1934 saw two other developments which had a profound 
significance later. To the arrival of a new British High Commissioner 
Nahhas responded by doubling his efforts in visiting the provinces to 
impress him by the extent of the Wafd following and strength.12® The 
second was Nahhas1 marriage on 12 June to Zainab al-Wakxl, two days 
before he reached the age of fifty-five, and thirty years older than 
her. She was the daughter of one of the leading Wafdists from the 
Buheira province.12"^ Much was said about this marriage, to the 
daughter of a once wealthy Pasha, who had become bankrupt. It was also 
rumoured that the marriage had been arranged by Makram and his wife.
Two reasons were given for Nahhas1 marriage. It was said that it 
was intended to stop a rumour that Nahhas was having an affair with a 
married woman. One writer described it as an innocent friendship which 
developed between Nahhas and a woman from Alexandria who was seeking 
his legal advice in order to get a divorce from her husband. Nahhas 
was not known to have a reputation as a womanizer; on the contrary, he 
was known for his strict moral codes regarding himself and his family. 
The affair could have been used by his opponents to attack his personal 
life, especially after charges of corruption had no effect* It could 
have been Nahhas' first love, or just a friendship. The other reason, 
which most writers emphasize, was a law decreed by the Sidqi regime at 
the time, depriving the family of a retired official from his pension 
if he was not married at the age of fifty-five. It was said that
125. FO 407/217 J2571/25/16 Sir Percy Loraine to Sir John Simon (No.
926) Cairo 20 October 1933.
126. FO 407/217 J334/9/16 Mr. Yanchen (Acting High Commissioner) to Sir
John Simon (No. 75) Cairo 26 January 1934.
127. FO 407-225 Leading Personalities in Egypt (No. 697) 22 July 1941.
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Nahhas was the main target of that law, and that he had to get married 
before reaching that age.12®
The same year saw also the end of the Sidqi regime • 
Simultaneously, the British had decided on a policy of reconciliation 
with the Wafd, since they saw no further need to alienate Nahhas. It 
also seems that the appointment of Tewfiq Nesslm as Prime Minister came 
as a response to Wafdist wishes or at least did not contradict them. 
Nahhas told Mr. Peterson that his party would not object to British 
interference to form a cabinet headed by Nessim.129 The latter 
however had the support of the Wafd for not endorsing the 1930 
constitution.
Although Nahhas' attitude towards the British was softening with 
the arrival of the new High Commissioner, his views towards the 
constitutional issue were discussed with Mr. Peterson, the Acting High 
Commissioner. He said that his party would not take part in any 
elections unless they were conducted according to the 1923 
Constitution, which he described as the "Magna Carta" of the people 
against the throne, whereas the 1930 Constitution was the 
opposite.139
The Acting High Commissioner reported that since his arrival the 
Wafd wanted to contact him but did not wish to be the first, and when 
the Acting Oriental Secretary enquired about the health of Nahhas 
during a minor indisposition which confined him to his room, Nahhas 
answered by visiting him on 8 October. Nahhas said that they were
128. Hafiz Mahmud, al-Ma'arik fi'l-Sahafah wa'l-Siyasah w'al-Fikr 
bain 1919-1952 Kitab al-Jumhuriya Cairo 1969 p. 34 Terry p. 278.
129. Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat, p. 372. FO 407/217 J2431/9/16 (No. 867) 
Peterson to Simon 5 October 1934. FO 407/217 J2502/9/16 Peterson 
to Simon (No. 879) 12 October 1934.
130. FO 407/217 J 2502/9/16 Mr. Peterson to Sir J. Simon (No. 879) 
Ramleh 12 October 1934.
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prepared to seek a settlement with Britain once they returned to power 
as a result of the impending elections. He also added that since 
British forces were present they gave automatic support to the Sidqi 
regime, regardless of their neutrality, and that now they expected
something more than neutrality to redress the wrongs done before. He 
then likened Nessim's ministry to that of 'Adli's in 1929.131 In
effect, Nahhas was asking the British to help him return to power. 
Fatma al-Yusuf wrote that the Wafd's policy was one of moderation
towards the new British High Commissioner, who they hoped would not 
support the Sidqi regime and would restore the 1923 Constitution, 
whereas their policy towards the Palace remained the same, that is as 
hostile as ever.132 At the same time, added Fatima al-Yusif, Sir 
Miles Lampson, was, contrary to all his predecessors, ready to meet the 
Wafd's demands half-way and not antagonize them.133
By that time Nahhas was pressing Nessim for an announcement as 
soon as possible concerning the return of the 1923 Constitution. It is 
interesting to note that while Nahhas was losing patience, Mahir and 
Nokrashi wished him to wait and make a last representation to
Nessiem.134 At the same time 'All al-Shamsi told the Oriental 
Secretary that the quarrel between Nahhas' and Makram Ebeid's faction 
with Mahir's and Nokrashi's was getting acute, and that if the Wafd was 
left to its own desires —  i.e. ignored —  it would have yet another
split.13® On 1 June Nessim and three ministers had a two-hour
131. Ibid.
132. Al-Yusuf, p. 152.
133. Ibid; p. 222.
134. FO 407/218 J1731/1 10/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Sir John Simon
(No1. 201), Cairo 6 May 1935.
135. FO 407/218 J1455/110/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Sir John Simon
(No. 368), Cairo 6 April 1935.
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meeting with the "Gang of Four" who ran the Wafd, namely, Nahhas, 
Makram, Mahir, and Nokrashi during which they were taken aback - when 
Nessim informed them of his intention-to resign. They begged him not 
to do so. They noted that the British were not opposed to a 
constitution though not that of 1923 or 1930 as Nessim told them. They 
agreed not to oppose him on the basis of his new programme. Nessim 
impressed upon Nahhas that the new constitution would only be brought 
into force en temps opportun. Nahhas jibbed, but then finally 
a g r e e d , ^36 a policy that cost him the defection of Rose al-Yusuf and 
the leading Wafdist writer 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad.1 3  ^ Two incidents 
clearly represented the Wafd's attitude, the first when Rose al-Yusuf 
published an open letter to the King demanding the restoration of the 
1923 Constitution. Makram, Fatma al-Yusuf wrote, said that people are 
mistaken to think we want to approach the King.138 The second 
incident was when Nahhas asked Fatma al-Yusuf why she opposed the 
Nessim government, and then interrupted her by asking her if she 
preferred Muhammad Mahmud or Sidqi to return to power, and told her 
that he and the Wafd have had enough.139
But the bombshell came on 9 November when Sir Samuel Hoare, the 
British Foreign Secretary, said in a statement to the House that he was 
against the Constitutions of both 1923 and 1930.^ O  reaction was
severe, especially among students.1^1 Memories of the days of 1919
136. FO 407/218 J2166/110/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Sir John Simon 
(No. 246), Cairo 2 June 1935.
137. Hafiz Mahmud Asrar al-Madi min 1907-1952 fi al-Siyasah wa 
al-Wataniyah Par Rose al-Yusuf Cairo, 1973 p. 131.
138. Ramadan, Vol 1 p. 772*
139. Al-Yusuf, p. 176.
140. al-Balagh, 8 January 1935, issue 3710.
141. al-Ahram, 10 January 1935.
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revolution were revived, and on 7 November, Muhammad Mahmud, on the 
-occasion of the 13 November annual celebration, gave a speech in front 
of 20,000 in which he attacked the Nessim government for not restoring 
the 1923 Constitution and demanded that the people expel it.142 Once 
it became evident that the British were against the return of the 1923 
Constitution, its defence and the demand for its restoration became a 
national question, no less nationalistic than the demand for 
independence•
Muhammad Mahmud was intelligent enough to take advantage of the 
situation and outbid Nahhas as the defender of the Constitution and the 
sovereignty of Egypt. He was emerging as the leader of the country, 
not only of his own party, when all non-Wafdists began to rally around 
him. Nahhas', as leader of the nation, was facing a potentially 
serious threat. The openly proclaimed British hostility to the 1923 
Constitution and the rise of Muhammad Mahmud to national prominence 
were no doubt behind Nahhas' decision to withdraw his support from the 
Nessim government. 143 That support had cost him the defection of one 
of the Wafd's major weekly magazines Rose al-Yusuf, and the Wafd's main 
writer 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad. Surely Nahhas was not against the 
restoration of the 1923 Constitution, for he fought for it, defended
it, and made it his top priority. But Nahhas was ready for a
compromise at the end when public opinion was not. And he was clever 
enough to be the last to defend Nessim's government, but the first to 
benefit from its fall.
A few days after Mahmud's speech, Nahhas gave his annual speech on 
13 November. He confessed that he, along with three other member of 
the Wafd, had a meeting with Nessim and three of his ministers in
142. Mahmud, pp. 147-148.
143. FO 407/218 J7719/110/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Samuel Hoare
(No. 551), Cairo 12 November 1935,
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Nessim's house. The latter read to him a statement concerning the 
promulgation of a new Constitution. Nahhas then moved to the issue of 
the war between Italy and Abyssinia which it was feared might escalate 
and include Egypt. Thus it was necessary, he argued, to conclude a 
treaty with Britain so that Egypt know its situation in the eventuality 
of a war. He then issued a warning to Britain by saying that the 
situation in Egypt now was different from that in 1914, from both the 
legal aspects and the nation's mental attitude. In fact Nahhas was 
expressing his and others' fears of the repetition of a situation like 
1914. Britain had already moved the headquarters of her Mediterranean 
Fleet from Malta to Alexandria,1 44 an^ a between Britain and Italy
seemed not far off. The fear of the imposition of martial law by the 
British army, control over the export of cotton and its cultivation, 
censorship of the press, war detainees, the voluntary work corps, and 
suspension of the Legislative Assembly, were all nightmares to any 
Egyptian which he or she would not like to see it repeated twice in 
their generation. An article in the Wafdist organ al-Jihad (21 August 
1935) argued that if a settlement was not reached soon, Egypt would 
face a situation as in 1914, and she would not be treated as an 
independent nation able and willing to defend herself with the 
co-operation of Britain, but would be regarded merely as an occupied 
country. Britain would exploit the crisis in Abyssinia to strengthen 
her hold over Egypt without giving any guarantee for the future. 
Britain might even enforce measures on Egypt which would ignore Egypt's 
status under the Declaration of Independence or even modify it.1 
Another factor was the traditional Egyptian fear over the continuity of 
the flow of the waters of the Nile and its security. Most of the Nile
144. Marlow, p. 294.
145. Hassan Ahmad Ibrahim, The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Khartoum
University Press Khartoum 1976 p. 58.
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water came from Abyssinia, and Italian domination over that country was 
not reassuring to the Egyptians•146 Bearing in mind the Italian 
presence in Libya, Egypt could be the scene of any future war between 
Italy and Britain. He then cited the Wafd decisions:
1. Non-co-operation with the British;
2. The resignation of Nessim’s cabinet;
3. No support for the present government if it did hot resign;
4. Any government which co-operated with the British or was 
formed outside the terms of the 1923 Constitution would be
regarded as being contrary to the general will of the
nation,147
Then he ended his speech by stating that national unity should be based 
on the restoration of the 1923 C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 48
Nahhas was emphasizing the priority of the constitutional question
over the national question. The irony lies in the fact that it was the
Wafd which had condemned the 1923 Constitution when it was promulgated 
as it implied recognizing and legitimizing the Declaration of 
Independence of 22 February 1922, and the parliamentary system that was 
the outcome of that independence* The Liberal Constitutionals were 
criticized for adopting that Constitution which implied the acceptance 
of the four reserved points (as indicated in Chapter One). But because 
that Constitution proved to be an asset for the Wafd and a liability 
for the Liberal Constitutionals, their positions were soon reversed 
during the crisis of 1935. Nahhas now believed that the road to 
independence was through the Constitution of 1923, which Muhammad 
Mahmud was not that keen to see back, and tried to play the role of the
146. For arguments over the security of the Nile resources in Abyssinia 
under the Italians see Muhammad Lutfi Juma; Bayn al-Asad al-Ifrigi 
wa al-Namir al-Itali, p. 34, al-Jihad 4 April 1936.
147. Actually he was trying to revive the memories of 1919 when Egypt 
was without a cabinet for several months.
148. Al-Balagh 14 November 1935 pp. 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11.
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ardent nationalist after the liberal card had failed to bring him 
popularity and power (remertlber his role in 1928 when he suspended the 
constitution for three years). On 24 November, Muhammad Mahmud issued 
a statement to the nation stressing to his compatriots that the 
struggle for independence took precedence over any other issue, and 
suggesting that the constitutional issue was a secondary one. Since 
independence without the Constitution was meaningless to Nahhas, the 
Wafd responded by issuing a statement on 27 November stating the 
conditions for setting up a national front with the Liberal 
Constitutionalists:
1. That all should declare the independence of the nation.
2. That all should demand the restoration of the 1923 
Constitution immediately and without any delay, and that 
would be done by handing a petition to the King to that 
effect.
3. That all parties should abstain from forming a cabinet unless
the Constitution was r e s t o r e d . 1 ^
Nahhas insisted on his terms to form a coalition, and his stand
can best be highlighted in his own words
"Shall we overlook the blood of the martyrs which has been 
shed for the Constitution and that great upheaval until when 
God wishes and the conditions are appropriate and the British 
consent to sign a treaty with Egypt? No. The nation does 
not approve that and is not deceived by those who say 
Independence only. We rose in 1919 under the leadership of 
Saad Zaghlul demanding full independence, and in our struggle
by the constitution, which makes the nation the source of
authority, we achieved our wish and completed our
independence. So shall we abandon our constitution to leave 
the rule to the British and some Egyptians who fight against 
the nation? No."150
Nahhas argued unequivocally that without the Constitution independence
was meaningless, since rule would revert to pre-1919 conditions, only
149. Mahmud Sulaiman Ghannam, al-Muahadah al-Misriya al-Ingliziya wa 
Dirasatha minal Wigha al-'Amaliya Matb'ait Dar al-Kutub
al-faisriyya Cairo 1936 p.
150. Saad al-Din, pp. 111-112, p. 11.
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with a great share of power this time going to the large landowners, 
while the urban middle class would be deprived of its only means 
namely, the Constitution, for a share in governing the country.
Meanwhile, negotiations were taking place between Nahhas and Miles 
Lampson. Lampson was pressing Nahhas for a National Front to negotiate 
with Britain, but Nahhas argued that the Wafd would definitely not 
participate in any negotiations or conversations before the elections, 
neither would it form part of a coalition government. This was in 
Britain's best interest, argued Nahhas, because once the Wafd came to 
office constitutionally, they would be able to make concessions in the 
actual terms of a treaty which no coalition government could ever do, 
as the electorate would assume that any treaty negotiated by a 
constitutionally elected Wafdist government would have the approval of 
the whole country.1^1 Nahhas was resuming his 1929 stand before the 
1930 negotiations —  a constitutional government first, then treaty 
negotiations. Nahhas was to urge Lampson to press his government to 
declare that they were prepared to conclude with the constitutional 
government of Egypt a treaty on the basis of the Nahhas-Henderson draft 
of 1930, and to negotiate with the said constitutional government the 
remaining problems in the same friendly spirit as in 1930. That kind 
of declaration was what was hoped for and not immediate treaty 
negotiations. A declaration such as this, continued Nahhas, had the 
advantage that in the interval before the new Parliament assembled, 
time would be afforded in which to explore outstanding difficulties in 
the hope of finding a mutually satisfactory solution to them.152
The situation developed rapidly afterwards, as the British had to, 
yield and the Constitution was restored. But what is noteworthy here
3.
151. FO 407 J667/2/16 Miles Lampson to Eden (No. 25), 20 January 1936.
152. FO 407 JSS/2/16 Miles Lampson to Eden, (No. 701), 31 December
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is first, the petition of the leaders of the parties to the British 
after the restoration of the Constitution demanding the resumption of 
treaty negotiations, and second, the British response to that
I C O
petition. On 12 December 1935, the leaders of the "National Front" 
with the exception of Hafiz Ramadan, leader of the Watanx Party whose 
political doctrine was against any negotiations with Britain, presented 
a petition to the British High Commission. In it, it was stated that 
Egypt was eager to reach a settlement with Britain, especially after 
the negotiations of 1930 which a last-minute dispute prevented both 
sides from signing a treaty. As a result some issues remained 
unresolved, such as the Capitulations, the European Department in the 
Department of Public Security, the matter of an independent Egyptian 
defence force, and Egypt's membership in the League of Nations. 
Furthermore, the lack of any settlement in the relationship between the 
two countries was one of the reasons for the instability of the various 
governments and the disruptions in public affairs. With the present 
international crisis arising from the dispute between Italy and 
Abyssinia, Egypt was convinced of the need of a treaty. For she saw 
that this crisis could lead her to taking part in it, especially now 
that the Egyptian government had responded to the League of Nation's 
decision to apply sanctions against Italy and boycott it. With Britain 
taking military precautions by preparing itself in Egypt, Egypt could 
be the scene of the war. It was necessary therefore to conclude a 
treaty based on the draft of the 1930 negotiations. Had that treaty 
been signed then, Britain would have had the full co-operation Egypt in 
the present crisis as between any two a l l i e s .154 These were exactly
153. The National Front was formed from all parties in December 1975 
for1- the restoration of the 1923 constitution and negotiating a 
treaty with Britain (al-Rafi'i Vol. 2 p. 204).
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the same issues that would be resolved in the treaty afterwards* It 
seems that the Egyptian side, understanding the situation as it existed 
at that time internationally, estimated that the British would not 
compromise on the military clauses, and so decided to press hard on the 
civilian ones. The answer came on 20 January 1936. The British were 
prepared to negotiate but not on the basis of the 1930 draft, and only 
after agreemnet had been reached on the military clauses. In case of 
failure, Britain might have to change its position towards Egypt,1^  a 
threat which did not pass unnoticed.
Nahhas' response was that when the official letter answering the
team of negotiators was sent to the British High Commission, it
contained the stipulation that in no way should the relationship of the 
two countries alter i f  the negotiations f a i l e d . 1 ^5 This was in line 
with Nahhas* legal mentality of registering his right in a case, and by 
doing so securing it.
On 13 February 1936, a Royal Decree was issued appointing the 
negotiating team, with Nahhas as its President, Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, 
Ismail Si^qi Pasha, *Abd al-Fatah Yehya Pasha, Wassif Butrus Ghali
Pasha, Dr. Ahmad Mahir, 'All al-Shams! Pasha, Osman Muharam Pasha, 
Hilmi Issa Pasha, Mr. Makram Ebeid, Hafiz 'Afifi Pasha, Mr. Mahmud 
Fahmi al-Nokrashi, and Ahmad Hamdi Seif al-Nasr Bey, as members. The 
delegation had a majority of Wafdists as it included six others besides 
N a h h a s . T h u s  Saad's battle against 'Adli was finally won by Saad's 
successor, Nahhas against Mahmud, Sidqi and the others. On receiving 
the British reply, King Fuad began consultations for a coalition
government under Nahhas, which the latter refused categorically. It
155. al-Rafi'i Vol. 2, pp. 210-217.
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was then decided that ’All Mahir should form a neutral government in
order to conduct elections.^® Nahhas knew well that in order to
secure a treaty he needed a coalition with all parties, but he was 
resolute in his conviction of never giving in to a coalition
government. He also knew well that by accepting a coalition to
negotiate, and refusing a coalition in the government he would be 
killing two birds with one stone, as the King could not deny him a 
government after he had accepted to negotiate with the participation of 
other parties. Thus Nahhas had his way and elections were held. On 10 
May 1936 Nahhas formed his third government.
G. The Third Nahhas Government
Besides the Abyssinian crises and the fear of a repetition of the 
experience of World War One, was the fear on the part of the Wafd of an 
alliance between its opponents and Italy. There is no doubt that some 
groups, like "Young Egypt", for example, were beginning to look to 
Italy for support. The threat of these new political groups did not 
come from their own strength, but from what support they could gain 
from the Palace and Italy at the expense of both the Wafd and the 
British, and so it was not only the external threat which drove the 
Wafd to sign a treaty with Britain. Although the latter was not so 
evident at that year, later in 1942 Nahhas accused the "Young Egypt" 
society of direct links with Italy, which could suggest that that type 
of thinking might have been present, or at least suspected during 1936, 
especially with the historical tradition of enmity between the Wafd and
such groups not to mention the Palace. The co-operation between such 
elements as Ismail Siqlqi and 'All Mahir was not far o f f . ^ 9  Qther
158. Ramadan'V.1 pp. 790, 791 .
159. Ibrahim, p. 63.
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main reason, which was not so apparent at that time, was to cement an 
alliance with the British at the expense of the Palace. There is no 
doubt that the absence of a strong monarch gave a chance to the Wafd 
leadership to court the British without being hindered by intrigues 
from the Palace or elsewhere. In the struggle among the three forces 
on the Egyptian political scene, any rapprochement between two of the 
three actors, was surely at the expense of the third. With the 
monarchy at its lowest ebb, the illness and then death of F«uad, and 
with Faruk not yet on the throne, surely it entered the head of Nahhas 
and other Wafdists that an alliance with Britain at that particular 
moment, would ensure their complete control, that is, the monopoly of 
government at that moment at least, and a guarantee against any future 
threat from the monarchy. As will be shown in the following chapter, 
Nahhas spoke his mind at that time when he commented in 1937 on hearing 
of his dismissal from power, by saying that he did not sign the treaty 
for that to happen to him.
Unlike the 1930 negotiations between Nahhas and Henderson, the 
1936 negotiations will be treated very briefly in this thesis, since 
they have been dealt with at length in two other theses. The
points to be stressed here are how Nahhas approached the British, and
the concessions he was able to extract from them. In the opening 
session, on 2 March 1936, Nahhas tried to stress two points. Firstly, 
that the provisions of the 1930 draft regarding full facilities in case 
of war satisfied British requirements• Secondly, that there should be 
no compromise over Egypt’s s o v e r e i g n t y .^ 1^ jn a meeting on the
160. Also Muhammad Farid 'Abd al-Majid Hashish, Muahadit 1936 wa Athani 
fi al Ailakat al Misraya al Britaniya Hata 1945 PhD. Thesis 'Aim
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morning of 17 March between Nahhas and Lampson, the former tried to 
persuade the latter to take the 1930 clauses and discuss them, but 
failed. Nahhas stressed that British soldiers should be stationed in 
the Canal zone only, and that from there they could reach any place in 
a few hours • If the British were dissatisfied with the existing means 
of communication, the Egyptian government would build adequate roads 
and railways,16  ^ and Britain could increase the number of troops in 
the Canal area.1^  Thus Nahhas agreed to the stationing of British 
troops in the Canal Zone, while at the same time refusing to sanction 
the British occupation of Cairo and Alexandria.164 He then rejected 
the clause suggested by the British which read "to the satisfaction of 
both parties" concerning the ability of the Egyptian army to defend the 
Canal.166 Nahhas, who had earlier agreed to increase the garrison in 
the Canal, also agreed to increase the number of British troops from 
8,000 as agreed in 1930 to 10,000 land forces with 400 pilots and 
ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. He also 
consented to Britain's right to send reinforcements not only in the 
case of war or imminent threat of war as in the 1930 draft, but also in 
the case of an apprehended emergency and before a state of acute crisis 
was reached.166 Nahhas also offered extensive training facilities 
south of Ismailia for the British army in the Suez Canal. Britain was 
given the right of passage for her troops across the Delta to manoeuvre 
in the Western Desert whenever necessary. The Royal Air Force would
162. FO 407-220 J2401/2/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Eden (No. 227), 
17 March 1936.
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have landing grounds in Egypt wherever it wanted and freedom to fly to 
them whenever it wished.16  ^ In addition, as Nahhas had suggested
earlier, the new communications, from the Canal Zone to the interior of 
Egypt, would be provided and the existing ones improved. Still the
British were not content and Lampson had to fly to London to consult
with Eden, to British Foreign Secretary, about the question of the 
Canal. Nahhas then informed Mr. Kelly, the acting British High 
Commissioner on 4 June 1936, that even after the withdrawal of British 
troops from Cairo and Alexandria, Britain could send her troops back 
without limit in an apprehended emergency. On 6 June 1936, Makram 
repeated the same offer to Mr. Kelly.168 Britain agreed that either
country could refer the question of the Canal and its defence to the 
League of Nations after twenty years if at that time they disagreed on 
the subject.169 In return, Britain agreed to add "international" to 
the "apprehended emergency" since it was harmless and assured the 
Egyptians of non-interference in their internal affairs. They also
agreed on consultation in case of a threat of war only after Nahhas 
assured them that it would be purely formal and that the British 
discretion as to the extent and nature of the reinforcements to be sent 
to Egypt would be absolutely unfettered.1^6 Nahhas also did not 
object to British soldiers defending the British Embassy, but suggested 
that British soldiers should be positioned inside the compound so as 
not to be visible to Egyptians, which they would be if they were
167. FO 371/20102 (Tel No. 245), Lampson to Eden 9 July 1936.
168. Ibrahim, p. 90.
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stationed outside the walls of the Embassy.1^1 As to the question of 
who should build the new barracks for the British troops to move. into> 
Nahhas suggested that instead of Egypt doing so, the British should 
build them and Egypt would buy them when the British left.17^
It is interesting to note the role played by Muhammad Mahmud in 
the negotiations. Whether it was in agreement with Nahhas in advance, 
or on his own initiative, the result was to the benefit of Egypt. 
Mahmoud objected at the last minute to the military clauses on a number 
of specific points and on the general ground that they went into too 
much detail which showed Britain's distrust of the Egyptians. It was 
because of these differences that Nahhas attempted on 6 July 1936 to 
secure modifications on almost every point on which agreement had 
previously been reached. On 12 July 1936 Makram and Amin Osman went to 
see Mr. Beckett of the British delegation in order to convince him that 
if certain amendments were not made, Muhammad Mahmud and other
9 %   4
non-Wafdist members of the Egyptian delegation would break away from 
the negotiation.1 Finally, Muhammad Mahmud accepted the military 
clauses, after Britain did not show any sign of retreat from her 
position, provided that he was free to go back on his consent failing 
satisfaction over both the Sudan and the Capitulations.174 Mahmud 
with Helmi Issa suggested breaking off negotiations if Britain refused 
Egypt's demand of abolishing the Capitulations.176 The suggestion was 
accepted, and Britain pledged to assist Egypt in abolishing the
171. Miles Lampson Diaries, Nov. 11, p. 231.
172. FO 407-206 J1126/4/16 Lord Lloyd to Sir Austin Chamberlain 
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Capitulations. This meant that the ' Egyptian government could levy
taxes on foreigners, which it had not been able to do before.176 The
question of the Sudan was also settled. Egypt no longer demanded that
the Sudan should return to its normal position as an ordinary Egyptian
province. The British view of the character of the administration in
the Sudan was accepted, provided that Egypt had a share in it on the
basis of the Condominium Agreement.177 The result of the negotiations
was, as one scholar put it, that
Of the four points reserved in the 1922 Declaration, one, the 
protection of foreigners and minorities had been conceded by 
Britain. But the other three, Imperial Communications, the 
Sudan, the defence of Egypt had been conceded by Egypt to 
Britain.176
Despite that, Nahhas was given an rapturous public welcome on his 
arrival in Cairo, after signing the treaty in London 26 August 1936. 
It was estimated that 600,000 Egyptians were in the streets of Cairo to 
welcome him.178 Nahhas called the treaty "The Treaty of Honour and 
Independence". When he was confronted by the fact that the role of the 
Wafd had come to an end with signing the treaty, since the Wafd had 
been established in the beginning for that express purpose, he replied 
that the Wafd's role does not end by signing the treaty, but by 
implementing it. He also added that the Wafd was not a political party,
but a deputation of the nation to safeguard its rights and
1 flf) *interests. Yet, when Ahmad Mahir's turn came to speak in the
Chamber of Deputies before ratifying the treaty, he said "If you
176. Marlow, p. 310.
177. Ibrahim, p. 101.
178. Marlow, p. 302.
179. FO 407-219 J8251/2/16 Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden (No. 98), 22 October 
1936.
180. 'All al-Din Hilal, al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm fi Misr 1803 - 1971
Maktabat Nahdat al-Sharq, Cairo 1975, p. 141.
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consider that treaty a step towards our national aspirations, then 
accept it. But if you are looking for the full account of all our 
national aspirations, then reject it."181
H. Conclusion
Nahhas' willingness to sign a treaty made his concessions the 
target of the opposition which must surely have detracted from his 
political capital. An allegation by Lampson later that Nahhas told him 
in a private meeting on 20 July 1936 that he was prepared to give the 
British the substance if they could give him the form, can be verified 
by examining the draft treaty of 1936,182 it is. true that Egypt 
secured the termination of the Capitulations as a real tangible gain 
out of the treaty, an achievement which should not be underestimated, 
but the military occupation remained and was further legitimized and 
rendered indefinite.182
Nahhas had now reached the peak of his popularity and
achievement. He had reached a settlement with the British over the
national question. The treaty was the utmost Nahhas could have reached 
through negotiations and in those particular circumstances. Now he 
could devote his energy to more pressing domestic questions, the most 
important of which was the relationship with the Palace. Nahhas, it 
could be argued, had faithfully complied with and implemented the 
political doctrine of his generation which was greatly influenced by, 
if not directly the product of, the pre-World War One Umma Party,
181. Hafiz Mahmud Min Asrar al-Madi, p. 152.
182. Ibrahim, p. 25. FO 371/201 14 J6452/2/16 (No. 713), Lampson to
Eden 20 July 1936.
183. For11the full text of the negotiations see FO 407-220 also Muhammad 
Farid Abd al-Majed Hashish, Mouahadit 1936 wa Athajvkinfi al Ailakat 
al-Misraya al-Britaniya Hata 1945 PhD. Thesis Aim Shams University
. A ^Cairo, 1975 and Hassan Ahmad Ibrahim The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty Khartoum University Press, Khartoum 1976 with the full text 
of the agreement.
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namely, that of reaching a satisfactory settlement with Britain. Now 
he could direct the nation's energy to domestic reform, and the
curtailment of the power of the monarch. The argument was that
national aspirations could only be achieved gradually, and each step 
was a prelude to the next. But was Nahhas' treaty of 1936 a step in 
the right direction which was to be followed by other steps? His whole 
future career depended on an affirmative answer, but as later events 
were to show, this was not to be the case. Nevertheless, the 1936
Treaty was the most significant contribution of Nahhas to the national 
struggle.
One of the first and major reforms undertaken by the Wafd 
government was the expansion of the military college in order to
increase the size of the army. What Nahhas and his fellow Wafdists did 
not realize was that these reforms produced their own dynamic to which 
they were the first ones to fall victims. By and large one could say 
that the direct result of the 1936 treaty was the revolution of 1952. 
For the generation of army officers who were admitted in this year and
the following three to four years, came from the section of the urban
lower middle class whom the Wafd represented at that time, but which
later withdrew its support of the party. In his annual speech on 13
November 1937 Nahhas boasted that the number of cadets admitted to the 
military college had been increased from fifty to nearly three 
hundred. In one sense, Nahhas was the real father of the 1952
revolution, and to that extent, he was also right. By gaining one 
concession from the British, several reforms could produce the elements 
of another further step towards independence and constitutionalism. But 
he did not conceive the nature of these new elements or against whom 
they would be directed.
Chapter Three 
Nahhas, the Wafd and the Palace, 1936-1942
A* The Accession of Farouk
King Fuad of Egypt died on 28 April 1936. At that time his son, 
Prince Faruk, was only seventeen years old and ostensibly studying in 
Britain, The first act of the new Parliament was to open the late 
King's will. It was fourteen years old, written on 21 June 1922. As 
one of the three named Regents, 'Adli Yaken, was already dead, the Wafd 
seized the opportunity to demand the appointment of new regents. They 
wanted Tewfiq Nessim, as the will demanded, but failed.1 The new
Regency Council consisted of Prince Muhammad 'All as President, Sherief 
Sabri (brother of Queen Nazli) and 'Abd al-'Aziz Izzat, the last two of 
whom had good contacts with the Wafd. There was an attempt on the part 
of Prince Muhammad ' All to raise the legal age for the coronation of 
the prince from eighteen to twenty-five. Nahhas refused on the grounds 
that his attention was concentrated on the treaty negotiations with the 
British, and that this move demanded the amendment of the Constitution 
which he was not prepared to do.^
The idea was that it would be easy to control Faruk, and by doing 
so, they would win the young King to their side. People were very
optimistic about the new King, though one doubts whether Nahhas 
shared their optimism. Once he had agreed to Faruk's accession, a very 
necessary step would have been taken, and that was to expel some
1. Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat, pp. 385-386.
2. Muhammad al-Tabi'i, Min Asrar al-Sasa wa al-Siyasa Par al-M'aarif
Cairo 1978 p. 60. Hashish, p. 151.
3. Ahma_d Baha' al-Din, Faruk Malikun Par Rose al-Yusuf Cairo p. 21.
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of the employees of the Palace who were dangerous to Faruk. 
Al-Tabi'i^ mentioned that Faruk's mother, Nazli, had asked her brother 
(Sabri, a member of the Regency Council) to go to his Wafdist friends 
and tell them on her behalf to look after of Faruk, for he was their 
son, and to advise them to dismiss the old team in the Palace, that is 
Sa'id Zu al-Fiqar, Head of Protocol, Shawki Pasha, the private 
secretary, and 'Abd al-Wahab Tala'at Pasha, Head of the Arabic 
Department. Sabri went to &bd al-Hamid al-Bannan who conveyed the 
message to Ahmad Mahir and Nahhas.5
Yet Nahhas did nothing of that sort and 'All Mahir, as Prime 
Minister at that time, proclaimed Faruk King after calculating his age
according to the lunar calendar to be eighteen.® The attempt made by
Nahhas to win over Faruk to his side by refusing Prince Muhammad 'Ali's 
proposal soon met other obstacles which naturally led to conflict 
between Nahhas, as representative of a constitutional government 
elected by the people, and Faruk, representing a monarchial institution 
which refused to make any concessions.
That was what the Egyptian sources said, but a British report 
mentioned that the Wafd was of the opinion that Faruk should return to 
England as soon as possible, and his legal age for the assumption of 
his royal duties should be raised to twenty-one on the grounds that 
this was necessary to give him a proper education. The report 
continued that the British Residency in Cairo admitted that this 
argument had some weight, yet it felt that if the Wafd got all the
power in its own hands during the four years before the King came of
age, the Wafd might be tempted "to give an anti-dynastic turn to
4. Pro-Wafdist journal.
5. Hashish, p. 152. al-Tab'ai, pp. 177-178.
6 . Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi Mudhakirat, Rose al-Yusuf, 25 July 1982 No.13.
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Egyptian n a t i o n a l i s m " T h e r e  is no doubt that some quarters of the 
Wafd might have thought so, but according to the Egyptian sources, it 
seems that if Nahhas had thought of it and did not find the British 
receptive to the idea, he had not pressed the matter for fear of 
jeopardizing his treaty negotiations which was his first priority. 
Thus his excuse of an amendment to the constitution for which he was 
not ready because of the treaty negotiations can be understood in that 
light.
The first conflict came over the accession ceremony. A journalist 
working in al-Ahram newspaper picked up an idea from Prince Muhammad 
'All and began to publicize it. The idea was that the ceremony should
be held in the Citadel and the Sheikh of al-Azhar would present the new
King with the sword of his grandfather, Muhammad 'All.
When Nahhas first heard about this his comment was that the "game" 
had begun. Al-Misrl® (the voice of the Wafd) published under banner 
headlines that a high-level source had "leaked" the information that 
the cabinet had categorically decided not to hold a religious
ceremony. As if to show the people that only the cabinet decided what 
was to be d o n e ,9 Nahhas in Parliament stated his position clearly in 
answering a question concerning that subject.1® He also objected to a 
proposal of a crown, for which the nation would have to pay, to be
placed on the head of the King by the President of the Senate at a
party to which Kings and Presidents of other nations would be invited. 
He also objected to another proposal by Prince Muhammad 'All that
7. Ibrahim Hassan p. 26 (FO 371/20107 J4472/2/16 Sir Miles Lampson to 
Mr. Eden (No. 522), 8 May 1936.
8. al-Tabi'i, pp. 89-90. Daily since 1936, edited by Mahmud Abu
al-Fath (Hamza, p. 151).
9. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab, 21 July 1937, p. 2221.
10. Saad al-Din, pp. 127-132.
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Faruk should pray the Friday Prayer on the second day of his accession 
in the Al-Azhar Mosque where the Sheikh of al-Azhar would read a 
special prayer•11
In his speech submitting his Cabinet to the Regents, Nahhas 
stated,
With a view to strengthening the bonds of loyalty and 
confidence between the Throne and the Nation, and in order to 
establish the regime on democratic bases honoured in 
countries with old parliamentary traditions, the government 
propose to create a new Department to be called the Ministry
of the Palace,1^
As Dr. Rizq contends1-^
A post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Palace 
Affairs had been created (at British insistence). Nahhas 
informed me that it replaces Minister of Palace. It would be 
attached to his own office instead of being in the Palace, 
and would function as a department of the Prime Minister's 
office. In substance this scheme achieved the objectives of 
the original scheme, without however threatening Royal 
dignity. Everybody, including the Regents, were satisfied, 
and he hoped, Miles Lampson would be too.1^
In the period between Nahhas1 taking office and the King being
sworn in, another battle was under way between himself and the King.
This time it was over the control of the army. Nahhas had a special
interest in it for two reasons. One was that through the army, Egypt
would finally gain her independence. According to Article 81® of the
11. FO 407-219 J 4213/2/16 Miles Lampson to Eden (No. 413), Cairo
11 May 1936.
12. Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat, pp. 385-386.
13. FO 407-219 J 8676/2/16 Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden (No. 584), Cairo
23 June 1936.
14. al-Said, p. 75.
15. Article 8:
In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an
integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communication as
also . an essential means of communication between the different 
parts of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt, until 
such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian 
Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty 
and entire security of navigation of the Canal, authorises His 
Majesty, the King and Emperor to station forces in Egyptian
(cont.)
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Treaty, once the army became able to defend the Canal there would be no 
need for British troops to stay in the country; so strengthening the 
army was one of his long-term objectives, and it was therefore
important to place it under his supervision. The second reason was
purely political. Nahhas was very suspicious of the Palace's 
autocratic tendencies. If the army could not be under the Prime 
Minister's supervision, then at least it must be neutralized. But it 
should by no means be under the control of the Palace lest the latter 
increased its autocratic tendencies. Thus, with the new King not yet 
crowned, Nahhas issued Law Number 72 in the year 1937 for the 
establishment of a Higher Defence Council, In this law he removed 
from the King all authority over the army and transferred it to the 
Prime Minister. By so doing, he automatically cancelled the post of 
the High Commander of the Armed Forces which the King had occupied.1®
The second incident was the oath the army was to swear during the 
coronation ceremonies. The Palace wanted it to read, "To be faithfully 
loyal to the King, obeying his orders." The Government wanted it to
be: "Faithful to the King, obedient to the Constitution."1"^ The
(cont.)
territory in the vicinity of the Canal, in the zone specified in 
the Annex to this Article, with a view to ensuring in co-operation 
with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal, The detailed 
arrangements for the carrying into effect of this Article are 
contained in the Annex hereto. The presence of these forces shall 
not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way 
prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.
It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty 
years specified in Article 16 the question whether the presence of 
British forces is no longer necessary owing to the fact that the 
Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the 
liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal may, if the 
High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be submitted to the 
Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with 
the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature 
of the present treaty or to such other person or body of persons 
for* decision in accordance with such other' procedure as the High 
Contracting Parties may agree (Hassan Ahmad Ibrahim, pp. 138-139),
16. Baha1 al-Din, p. 28.
17. Majallat al-Shubban al-Wafdiyyin 16 September 1936 p. 16.
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meaning was clear in both oaths and the difference needed no comment*
Nahhas' intention was to encroach on the young King's 
prerogatives, and diminish the Royal power. This was attempted by 
several means, one of which was to reduce palace expenditure. In May, 
he and Marram visited the Palace and proposed that the new King should 
buy the Koubbeh and Montazah Palaces, or at least take on the cost of 
their upkeep. This was reckoned at E£20,000 per annum at that time's 
rate of expenditure. Nahhas also proposed to reduce the allowances of 
other members of the royal family by one third as King Faruk had 
already volunteered to do.1® Another attempt made by Nahhas to reduce 
the Palace's prestige was to have detachments of the Royal Bodyguard go 
out to meet him (the Prime Minister), to have the National Anthem 
played for him on his return from Europe. The Ministry of War and 
Marine too ordered out to sea two coastguard vessels to escort Nahhas' 
ship when it arrived at Alexandria. This incident greatly annoyed the 
Palace. Nahhas also postponed the annual day ceremony of the Naval 
School at Alexandria on 18 October 1936 because he could not be there, 
although the King had already promised to attend.1®
All these incidents were monitored by the British Residency in 
Cairo, and their significance was not underestimated. Lampson advised 
Nahhas that he should be on terms of respect and, if possible, 
friendship with his sovereign. The Prime Minister listened
sympathetically and Makram warmly supported what Lampson had said. 
Lampson wrote to Eden commenting on the conversation that he had had 
with Nahhas and saying that, though he did not as a rule say much at 
the time, yet he more often than not subsequently acted in accordance
18. FO 407-219 J5095/2/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Eden (No. 54), 
31 May 1936.
19. FO 407-219 J8253/2/16 Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden (No. 102), 24 October
1936.
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with the advice g i v e n . 20 gu-j- ^  seems that Nahhas was more determined 
than ever to settle his dispute with the monarchy once and for all. He 
had secured the backing of the British through signing the treaty with 
them, and his archfoe, King Fuad, had died. The new monarch was young 
and unexperienced, and no better opportunity would ever present itself 
again. His policy was two-fold: on the one hand to curtail the power
and authority of the Palace as far as he could, and on the other, to 
increase his own power and prestige so as to render it very difficult 
for the Palace to challenge his authority. This he was intending to do 
through the "Blue Shirts".
Although the "Blue Shirts" were to become synonymous with the Wafd 
in general and Nahhas in particular, the Shirst movement goes as far as 
1933 and is of a non-Wafdist origin. As noted in Chapter Two, a new
generation of students and young people were losing faith in both the 
constitutional system and the political parties. New political groups 
appeared, the most notable were "Young Egypt" and the "Moslem 
Brotherhood". "Young Egypt", influenced by both Italy and Germany, 
soon was to develop "The Green Shirts", as an Egyptian version of the 
"Black Shirts", as some scholars have argued.21 with the crisis of 
1935, this trend which was confined to "Young Egypt", was soon to
expand and acquire several other dimensions.
For the first time since 1918, students and young people would try 
to construct or organize a political power base independent of the 
established parties. They were not left alone for long, and political 
leaders started canvassing among them to win over these new recruits to 
public life. But this time, the political leaders were to follow the
general trend of young people in order to use them. We have, for
instance5', Muhammad Mahmud, who was able to rally the people for a
20. FO 407-219 J3402/20/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Eden, 25 July
1937.
21. See Yunan Lablb Rizq Ashab al-Qumsan al-Mulawana fi Misr 
al-Mijalat al-Misriyya lil Dirasat al Tarikhiyya Vol. 21 1974.
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short time especially after his speech on 7 November 1935, and was to 
induce Prince 'Abbas Halim to form a new group among the students and 
unemployed. Subsequently, a new organization "The National Student 
Group" was founded under the leadership of Nur al-Din Tarraf, a Liberal 
Constitutionalist medical student. This organization included
followers of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, of the National 
Party, and Prince 'Abbas Halim himself. It was organized along 
military lines and its members had a distinctive uniform and badges. 
While Muhammad Mahmud helped the group financially, Ismail Sidqi 
sympathised with it and allowed it to meet in his house.22
Soon the Wafd was to join the fray when the incidents of November 
of that year gave notice to the Wafdist leadership that they were in 
danger of losing their hold over the youth of the country. The Wafd 
and the Liberal Constitutionalist sections of this movement had already 
started to organize themselves into clear political groups which seemed 
to model themselves on the Fascist paramilitary organizations in Italy 
and Germany.
Although Nokrashi had begun forming Committees of Wafdist Youth in 
mid-July 1933,22 onpy -j_n December 1935 was the idea taken up seriously 
in order to counter the "Green Shirts". Thus they were organized on 
paramilitary lines, and their number by 1936 was estimated to be
8,000.24 The purpose of the new organization was to create a strong 
Egyptian youth with military and athletic spirit who knew their rights 
and duties towards their religion and country under the leadership of 
the leader of the Wafd, Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha. Each member had to 
take the following oath before becoming a member "I swear by God, my
22. Ibrahim p. 22. FO 371/20098 (No. 102) 19/15/36 Memorandum by
Farid Bashatly Effendi, deputy assistant Director-General of the
European Department 27 January 1936.
23. Rizq, Ashab al-Qumsan al-Mulawana fi Misr 1933 - 1937, pp.205-206.
24. Ibid., p. 207.
Chapter Three - 140
country, my honour to be a soldier to the King, and the Country, and 
the Wafd, to fight for the sake of Egypt and abstain from what would 
contradict my p r i n c i p l e s .25 _
What frightened the Wafd most was that their main rival among the 
students, the Green Shirts, gave their loyalty to the King and were 
opposed to the Wafd and liberal ideas generally. One could argue that 
such a group was not a real threat to the Wafd; but it was a potential 
one, especially if it had the backing of the Palace through 'Aly Maher, 
in addition to their links with the A x i s . 26 one could say that at 
least the Italian Embassy in Cairo looked on them with favour and
surely would have regarded them as a co-operative force in its 
propaganda activities in Egypt.
With the Italian invasion of Ethiopia constituting a threat to
Egypt and world tension mounting, it is quite possible that Nahhas had 
these thoughts in his mind when he signed the treaty with Great 
Britain. Yet one could also argue that this might have been the
primary reason for creating the Wafd's "Blue Shirts" and so discourage 
the youth from joining the "Green Shirts", but eventually it had a far 
wider purpose, which was to be used in any future conflict with the
King.
Nahhas' object is not clear: maintain Wafd hold on youth,
intimidate opponents as they fear that a coup d'etat is to
take place after the ratification of the treaty by the 
Palace, following the strained relations arising out of the 
dispute on the "honours" and other questions. Nahas is not 
sure whether he can rely on the allegiance to him of the army
and the police in case of such a conflict. He wishes to
mobilize and train the youth into a force on which he can
rely. He does not believe that this force could successfully 
oppose the army and the police, but he is sure that if there 
were a number of casualties amongst these youth, public 
opinion would veer overwhelmingly in his favour against the 
Palace.
25. Ibid., p. 240. Quoting Al-Jihad 20 August 1937.
26. Al-Said, p .  22.
27. FO 407-219 J 8299/2/16 Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden (No. 1212), Cairo
24 October 1936.
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Supporting this assumption is the question of why Nahhas, as Prime 
Minister, did not promulgate a law proscribing the "Green Shirts" in 
the same way he had tried to get Tewfiq Nessim to do during his tenure 
of office. If even he had tried once more as Prime Minister, but 
failed due to pressure from the Palace, then the evidence needs no 
proof and the conflict is clear.
Once more Nahhas expressed his fears of a Palace coup when the 
British expressed their reservations about the Blue Shirts.2® It is 
interesting to notice how the Blue Shirts clearly became more and more 
a personal weapon in the hands of Nahhas himself against the monarch, 
although he tried to accommodate the fears of the British by issuing 
new regulations forbidding members to carry sticks or any kind of 
weapons, and appointing an executive council to regulate and supervise
OQ
them. However, the oath had changed to
I swear by God to fight for my country under the leadership 
of Mustafa al-Nahhas to the last drop of my blood, and remain 
faithful to the memory of Saad as long as I live, and resist 
with all my strength every one who is not - a patriot, and 
refrain from what may jeopardize my principles.30
This time there was no mention of the King. Dr. Bilal, one of the
leaders of the group, spoke of an attempt by the King to have him issue
a declaration in the papers about the loyalty of the Blue Shirts to the
monarch and their allegiance to him,31 which indicated, if anything,
that they had none. On the contrary, they were hostile to him. In a
dispatch from Cairo to London, Miles Lampson wrote about a conversation
between himself and Amin Osman, asking the latter to tell Nahhas to
28. FO 407-219 J 8843/2/16 Miles Lampson to Mr. Eden (No. 123), Cairo, 
26 November 1936.
29. Majallat al-Shuban al-Wafdiyin, 16 December 1936 No. 7.
30. Yunan Labib Rizq Ashab al-Qumsan al-Molauana fi Misr al-Migalat-al 
Tarikhiya al-Misriya Vol. 21 1974 p. 240.
31. Muhammad Bilal, al-Musawer, 6 September 1979, p. 74.
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disband the Blue Shirts in return for good faith from the King. Amin
Osman answered that Nahhas would be surrendering his main weapon
without any guarantee,32 one cannot but ask, what did Nahhas have in
mind? A repetition of 1930 when he tendered his resignation expecting
the people to support him as they did with Zaghlul in 1924, but with
the backing of the Blue Shirts? Why did he not use them in 1937-38?
Or was he caught by surprise this time also?
The Blue Shirts were not only an issue of conflict between Nahhas
and the Palace, but they seem to have created a division inside the
party itself and became an issue of conflict and dissension. One of
the reports had noticed that
The general tendency of the present development is to create 
a petit bourgeois party dictatorship of Nahhas and Makram 
Ebeid, and to exclude from the Wafd the former elements
within it drawn from the same aristocratic families and the
intelligentsia.33
As it was later revealed by Nahhas himself in his speeches, 
long-standing differences between himself and Makram Ebeid on one side 
and Nokrashi on the other caused him to exclude the latter with others 
from the cabinet over the Aswan issue in mid 1937. Nokrashi had 
already resigned six times before, once because he objected to the 
dismissal of al-'Aqqad in 1935, who was accused of demanding a new 
leadership - that of Nokrashi? another time when he objected to the 
presence of Nagib al-Hilali in the Wafd's Committee.®4 In his 
testimony before the Revolutionary Court in 1953 Hilali said that 
Nokrashi and Ahmad Mahir were opposed to the Tewkiq Nessim government. 
In support of his contention Hilali cited the expulsion of Fatma
32. FO 407-221 J 5174/20/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Eden (No. 706), 
Cairo 13 December 1937.
33. FO ‘"406-221 J 3978/20/16 Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden (No. 1094), Ramleh 
16 September 1937.
34• Al-Masrl, 18 September 1937.
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al-Yusuf from the party on 28 September 1935 when she was supported by 
them against Nahhas and Makram Ebeid*3® Even earlier, according to 
Hilali-, Nahhas accused Nokrashi of being the reason behind Britain's 
hardline stand in the negotiations of 1930. It was Nokrashi who 
favoured the continuation of the negotiations despite the Sudan clause 
which led to the British position. Ever since that time Nokrashi, 
according to Nahhas, sought the leadership of the party, and he accused 
both Mahir and Nokrashi of seeking to replace him. Nahhas defended his 
friend Makram Ebeid by accusing the others of demanding special favours 
for their relatives and friends which the Minister of Finance (Makram) 
refused to grant. On the other hand Mahir and Nokrashi accused Makram 
of deifying the leadership of Nahhas and building a personality cult 
around him.3® It also seems that the protagonists in the conflict had 
much more serious differences regarding the Treaty of Alliance with 
Great Britain and its implications. For Nahhas it was an obligation to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty, especially as this would be in 
Egypt's favour when he would be able to get rid of the Capitulation 
system at the Montreux Conference in 1937 with British help. On the 
other hand, Nokrashi viewed the treaty as only a step towards the 
termination of the British presence in Egypt. He wanted to get rid of 
any British personnel working in the Egyptian government.3  ^ His stand 
on the Aswan issue can be understood from that perspective, for the 
issue was whether to put up the scheme to international tender or give 
it to a British firm, as Nahhas, Makram, and Osman Muharam, Minister of 
Public Works, wanted. It seems that this conflict was the last straw 
leading to the final break. From then on, the difference took other
35. Hashish, p. 118,
3®# Al-Ahram 4/1/1938.
37. Rizq Tarikh al-Wi2arat, p. 393. FO 407/221 J3520/20/16 Sir Miles
Lampson to Mr. Eden (No. 902), Cairo 28 July 1937.
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forms which led to the famous defection of Nokrashi and his friend 
Ahmad Mahir. But it seems that Makram for his part was helping to 
widen the gap between the leader, Nahhas, and his one-time staunch
supporters. Al-Tabi'i strongly implied this when he described in his
book how Makram telephoned Nahhas to congratulate him on his agreement 
with Nokrashi with whom he had shaken hands at a party that 
afternoon .2®
At the beginning "The Mother of Egyptians", the wife of the late
Zaghlul, tried to reconcile the four by bringing them together in a
meeting on 5 September 1937, but finally she sided with Nokrashi, who
was a kinsman, after threatening to close the "House of the Nation"
against the Wafd.®® Nokrashi published his statement in the
newspapers on 7 September 1937 accusing Nahhas of dictatorship.40 On
13 September the Wafd expelled Nokrashi over Mahir's objection.41
About sixty-eight members of the Wafd Committee joined Nokrashi: they
were mostly from the cadres of the Wafd who had played a part in the
nationalist movement.42
There is no doubt that this split was the most severe blow the
Wafd Party had suffered and the greatest challenge to the leadership of
Nahhas since 1927. He was forced to make a series of provincial visits
with a view to rallying his followers and preventing further defections 
* Ato Nokrashi; for this reason he went to Damanhour, Tanta, and Bani 
Sweif.
38. Al-Tabi'i, p. 164.
39. Hashish, p. 123, Al-Tab'ai, p. 165.
40. Al-Balagh 7 September 1937.
41. Al-Masri 14 September 1937, p. 8.
42. Al-Shahid, p. 135.
43. FO 407-221 J 3891/20/16 Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden (No. 1063), Ramleh 
9 September 1937.
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The challenge was more serious and different than when the 
majority of the Wafd high command defected in 1932. The kind of 
people who defected in 1932, and the' issue on which the Wafd was 
divided, resembled the split of 1921 between Saad and 'Adli. The result 
was the strengthening of the leader of the Wafd inside his own party 
and outside with the people; inside the party by eliminating any 
challenge or opposing ideas, outside by appearing as the uncompromising 
leader. In both instances, Saad and Nahhas assessed the situation 
carefully and were well advised of the general trend of public opinion 
at the time. It was their opponents who were outside the mainstream of 
the Wafd and the large section of the population which supported the 
Wafd. Finally, in both cases, the defectors were opposed to the 
leadership of the incumbent presidents, and some of them did not help 
them in their campaign for the presidency of the Wafd, especially in 
the case of Nahhas. In 1937, however, the circumstances were 
different. First, it was to Madame Zaghlul and Nokrashi's support that 
Nahhas owed his presidency. These were the people on whom Nahhas 
depended and who formed his inner circle. There is no doubt that they 
continued to feel that Nahhas owed his position in the Wafd to them, 
and that he should feel obligated to them. Madame Zaghlul gave her 
allegiance to Nahhas on condition that she would be consulted on every 
major step taken by the Wafd: a promise which Barakat refused to
give. With the blood relationship between Madame Zaghlul and Nokrashi, 
and the friendship the latter had with Ahmad Mahir, the idea of 
managing without Nahhas must have been thought of * Later allegations 
that Makram was to blame for dominating Nahhas leads us to the second 
remark.
There is no doubt that Nahhas, ten years after his election as 
president of the Wafd, during which he was Prime Minister three times, 
faced a challenge to his leadership from inside the Wafd which he was
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able to overcome successfully. He concluded a settlement with Britain,
something which others before him had failed to do. Throughout this
time Makram sang his praises as the "sacred leader". It was
inevitable, in the face of these developments, that Nahhas'
relationship to his one-time supporters in 1927, would change.
Nokrashi's allegations against Makram meant that Nahhas no longer
consulted him as he used to do. The fact that Nahhas ignored Madame
Zaghlul's threat to close Beit el-Umma, the House of the Nation, in his
face if he did not heal his rift with Nokrashi, showed how Nahhas was
confident of his position, and felt that he no longer needed the
support of those who once were vital to his primacy. This new
dimension in Nahhas' personality, contrasted with his early days when
he was still under the control of those who helped him in 1927, was to
have grave repercussions, which is our third comment. Not only did
Nahhas feel he no longer needed the services of those who once helped
him in his early days, but, by removing them from his way, he was also
destroying his own power base. With the defection of 1921 or 1932,
those who followed 'Adli or Barakat were not from the grass roots of
the Wafd nor the power base of Saad or Nahhas. But those who defected
in 1937 were from the grass roots of the Wafd and from the same
constituency on which Nahhas depended for his political survival. The
crack this time was in Nahhas1 constituency, and it weakened him. The
process was to be repeated once more in 1942 with the defection of
Makram.• *
Ahmad Mahir who sided with Nokrashi, had not yet been expelled 
from the Wafd, nor had he himself resigned from the party. It seems 
that he wanted to lead a coup from inside the Wafd itself to replace 
Nahhas as a leader. Mahir had his own reasons. Like Nokrashi, hem
viewed the treaty as merely a step towards independence, and he urged 
that with the signature of the treaty, party politics should cease and
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a new era should begin. At the same time, with his brother as Royal 
Chamberlain, the old idea returned of replacing Nahhas as leader of the
Wafd with another, thus defusing the tension between the Wafd and the
Palace. Surely Mahir must have thought that if he could persuade the
majority of the Wafdist deputies to endorse him, he might become the
next Prime Minister?44
Personal ambitions were interwoven with real differences over 
policy, and the split was inevitable as there was no room for 
compromise. On 23 December 1937, at a meeting of the Wafd 
Parliamentary Committee, Ahmad Mahir with three others withdrew from 
the Wafd after he had proposed that Nahhas should retire and that 
another Wafdist should replace him so as to resolve the conflict with 
the Palace. According to another version, Nahhas spoke about the 
situation and his stand in the crises. He said that he agreed to 
dissolve the "Blue Shirts" and would not insist on the Constitutional 
Oath for the army. But he still opposed the appointment of 'Abd 
al-'Aziz Fahmi to the Senate. Mahir recommended moderation. Only 
three members of the Wafd Parliamentary Committee endorsed him, and 
when a vote was taken, 228 voted for Nahhas and three against him. 
There was also a vote to expel any Wafdist who accepted to form a 
government or participated in one or supported one which was not
presided over by Nahhas.4®
The two stories do not contradict, but complement each other. 
When Parliament met to hear of the dismissal of Nahhas' government and 
the formation of a cabinet headed by Muhammad Mahmud, Ahmad Mahir, who 
was the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, prevented anyone, including 
Nahhas, from speaking. He subsequently went to the Saadist club where
44. Hashish, p. 118. Heykal, Vol. 2 p. 48.
45. Rizq Tarikh al Wizarat, p. 407.
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he made a speech attacking Nahhas before withdrawing from the Wafd
along with twenty-nine other deputies and senators.4®
On 28 November 1937, Ezz al-Din Tewfiq, a member of Young Egypt's
society, fired four shots on Nahhas while he was riding in his car in
'Abbas Street, One shot hit the car, but Nahhas was not harmed.
Tewfiq was arrested, and on being questioned, he said that he had read
the treaty signed by Egypt and Britain and was opposed to it. He was
later sentenced to ten years imprisonment with hard labour on 28 March
1939. Nahhas was convinced that the Italians were behind the attempt
on his life, as the Minister of Justice had told him. Later he would
accuse Young Egypt of direct links with Italy, He was irritated by the
manner in which the King had widened the gulf between himself and the
King. For Faruk had sent his second chamberlain to congratulate Nahhas
on his escape later in the morning.4^ That was the first attempt on
Nahhas' life from a member of a society directly opposed to his
policies, showing that his hold over the public after signing the
treaty was waning.
As for the conflict with the King, it developed into a more
serious confrontation. Nahhas in a statement published on 1 January
explaining what had happened said
In the present reign, the cabinet was prevented from the 
right of submitting new legislation to Parliament.... The 
government has also been denied the right to appoint 
employees and remove them, or to recommend the appointment of 
senators, or the bestowal of titles and ranks to the notables 
and employees. The government, in short was unable to 
govern, and the control of Parliament over it was rendered 
meaningless. People in the Palace, without constitutional 
rights or responsibilities, took over.4®
46. Hashish, p. 123. Al-Balagh, 5 January 1938.
47. Vatikiotis, p. 294; 'Abd al-Qadir p. 105; al-Said p. 101;
al-;JBalagh 29/11/1937; FO 407 J4965/20/16 Sir Miles Lampson to 
Mr. Eden (No. 677), 29 November 1937; Russell Papers, Oxford
Private Papers.
48. Al-Ahram, 1 January 1938, p. 9, 14.
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What Nahhas was actually referring to were the following incidents:
1
When two seats in the Senate became vacant from among the seats 
appointed by the King, the question of who was to have the right of 
appointing the two fifths of the Senate was revived. It was in fact an 
old dispute between the monarchy and the government going back to 
1924. At that time the dispute was resolved in Saad's favour. The 
dispute was to emerge once more when Nahhas nominated Mahmud Fahmi 
Pasha and Hassan Naf'a to occupy the vacant seats. The Palace objected 
to the nomination of Hassan Naf'a and insisted on the nomination of its 
own candidate 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi Pasha, The latter was known for his 
longstanding hostility to the Wafd and Nahhas was left with no 
alternative but to refuse.
Another was when the King refused to sign a law increasing the 
budget of the secret expenses. The justification was that the money of 
that budget was spent on the Wafd's Blue Shirts which was contrary to 
the law. A third incident was when the King refused to sign a law 
which would lower the marks for entrance examinations in the 
universities. The reason given by the King for not signing the law was 
that it should have been first approved by the University Council 
before being signed by the King.49 Yet another incident of friction 
between the King and Nahhas' government was when some members of the 
cabinet, namely Makram and 'All Zaki al-Urabi, did not attend the royal 
celebrations of the Eid al-Futur, the end of the Ramadan feast, without 
giving a proper excuse. That led the Palace to ignore the 
congratulatory telegrams these ministers had sent to the King on that 
occasion.®0 A fifth incident was when the Palace expressed a desire 
that the army should take an oath of loyalty to the King. Contrary to
49. Muljammad Hussein Haykel, Mudhakirat fi al-Siyasah al-Misriyyah
Maktabat al-Nahdah al Misriyah Cairo 1951-1953, Vol. 2, p. 80.
50. Al-Balagh 5/12/37.
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the wishes of the Palace, the government wanted the occasion to include 
an oath by the army to uphold the Constitution. Naturally the Palace 
refused, as it implied that the army could intervene against the 
monarchy. Rumours were also spread of contacts between the Wafd and 
some high ranking officers in the army. Finally, the army officers 
were introduced by the Wafdist Minister of War to the King, which was 
unprecedented•
As the relationship with the Palace deteriorated further, a big 
demonstration against Nahhas took place at the university on 31 
December 1937. This was the largest demonstration against the Wafd 
since the one by the students of the Azhar against Saad thirteen years 
before. The King seized the opportunity and dismissed Nahhas. Nahhas 
was later to comment on the dispute between himself and ’All Mahir as 
being a constitutional one. The issue at stake was who was to rule? 
The duly elected government or the Palace? The answer was clear in the 
mind of Nahhas, Government matters were the responsibility of the 
elected government which was accountable to the representatives of the 
nation. But 'All Mahir, continued Nahhas, was of the opinion that 
Palace men should have the last word, which actually meant his last 
word.®® Thus Nahhas summarised the old historical dispute between the 
Palace as an unelected institution versus the Wafd as representative of 
the nation in Parliament and government. It was the same old battle 
over who should lead the country, who should govern, Saad or 'Adli, 
Nahhas or Faruk.
Nahhas was not to enjoy the fruits of his new alliance with the 
British after signing the treaty for long. He thought that he would 
have their unlimited support for as long as he wished,but this, not 
unnaturad.ly proved to be illusory, for the British, although satisfied
51. Al-Balagh quoting Daily Telegraph on 14 December 1937.
Chapter Three - 151
with the treaty, were not content with his administration, and asked 
him to broaden his government to include more capable personalities 
like 'All al-Shamsi for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ahmad Mahir 
as Minister of War.®2 This, of course, was not acceptable to Nahhas, 
but was this the price of support which the British were asking for as 
some writers have argued?®2 Nahhas was convinced that the King could 
not have dared to dismiss him unless he had known that the British had 
withdrawn their support from him. Therefore he blamed the British for 
his dismissal.
After Nahhas left office, Miles Lampson visited him and then
reported the visit to London saying:
According to custom, I visited Nahhas to take leave of him. 
He put the blame upon me for having held him back when he 
wished to have the issue out in Parliament at the beginning 
of November. It had been a plot from the beginning by 'Ali 
Mahir, who had finally forced the pace after the attempt on 
Nahhas' life as he knew there was proof of his implication 
and was determined to stifle the enquiry. He also blamed me 
for not taking the strongest line with King Faruk. Short of 
using threats backed by force we could not have done more; as 
a nationalist he would hardly have benefited if we had kept 
him in by force even had that been feasible. The new 
government had strong Italian traits. It was a betrayal of 
the country that all secret defence arrangements made, at his 
urgent insistence should now have to be disclosed to such 
creatures as the new War Minister who was a Palace tool and 
everything would be known to Italy.®^
Was Nahhas inciting the British to bring him back to power lest Egypt
turn to Italy?
In two lengthy talks with Mr. Chapman-Andrews, Nahhas said 
that his removal from power was like that of Mr. Eden, 
engineered by the British government in order to facilitate 
their change of policy towards Italy... The British 
government should follow the example of Mr. Henderson in 1929 
and refuse to discuss any important questions with the 
present government as nothing which the Prime Minister did
52. Al-Said, p. 79. FO 407-221 J4966/20/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. 
Eden,(No. 579), Cairo 29 November 1937.
53. Al-Said, p. 79.
54. FO 407-222 J 50/6/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Eden (No, 158), 
Cairo 31 December 1937.
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could be accepted at its face value by the people. Nahhas 
added that his feelings towards the Palace were different. 
He would fight the Palace and Palace despotism by all the 
means in his power, even though it cost him his life. The 
Court was "sale" and all associated with it were ambitious, 
intriguing, self-seekers. He had fought the British, King 
Fuad, and the whole combination of dishonest jobsters like 
Sidki, 'All Mahir, Muhammad Mahmud and was not afraid to
a  C  wmmm *stand up to King Faruk.
Once more the same views were expressed.
Nahhas had conversations with Mr. Kelly and Mr. 
Chapman-Andrews on May 1 • First he refused to admit that 
after the conclusion of the treaty the Wafd could no longer 
claim to be the only national party in Egypt. Second it is 
impossible that King Faruk advised by 'Aly Mahir could have 
dismissed Nahhas if the British had really wished to stop 
him. Looking at it from another angle, he also feels that he 
could have taken the offensive and dealt drastically with the 
Palace if he could have obtained an assurance that the 
British would be prepared to see him through. Thirdly, the 
motive for his betrayal by the British is that they have
already decided before the end of last year to reach a 
general agreement with Italy, felt that difficulties might be 
experienced in keeping the Egyptian Government in step if 
Nahhas were in power on account of his violent anti-Italian 
sentiments. Having exploited these sentiments for so long as 
it served their turn, the British were not sorry to see him 
removed and placed by a weak and unrepresentative 
government.®®
As could be seen, Nahhas was actually asking for British help, or at
least he expected it. He tried to play the old theme of a weak
unrepresentative government which would be of no use to the British, 
and a new theme, that of the Italian danger. In both cases, they had 
no choice but him. As time passed on and nothing changed, except for 
the worse to himself and the Wafd, his patience with the British was 
running out.
The new government under Muhamma_d Mahmud dissolved Parliament and 
called for new elections, and for the first time the Wafd was not able 
to nominate candidates for ninety-eight constituencies,®7 The
55. FO 40.7-222 J 3354/6/16 Mr. Bateman to Viscount Halifax (No. 970), 
Alexandria 18 August 1938.
56, FO 407-222 J 1992/6/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Viscount Halifax 
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57. Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi Mudhakirat Rose al-Yusuf 2 August 1982 No. 
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elections were held in March and the Wafd suffered a crushing defeat. 
Makram Ebeid, the general Secretary of the Party, Mahmud Bassiuni Bey, 
Speaker of the Senate, Zaki al-Urabi Pasha, Nagib al-Hilali Bey, and
Osman Muharam, all lost their seats. Even Nahhas failed to get the
necessary votes to win. Marcel Colombe concluded that six months of 
King Faruk's rule were enough to defeat a foe his father was not able 
to crush throughout his reign.58
Naturally the administration had interfered in the elections with
all its power and in every possible way. Only twelve Wafdists were
elected to Parliament, whose seats now numbered 264.®^ In the 
elections of the Bar Association, Muhammad 'All 'Alluba, a Liberal 
Constitutionalist, not a Wafdist, was elected President,
While this was happening, and the British stood unmoved, contact 
was made between Nahhas and 'Ali Mahir. There were two versions of the 
incident, one was by Nahhas and Amin Osman, the other by Aly Maher.
Nahhas' ^ version to Mr. Chapman-Andrews was that he agreed to
meet'Aly Maher after overtures from the latter. Nothing was
to be told to the press or the Wafd, Aly Maher said that the
King was not pleased with the government and asked whether
Nahhas would improve relations with the King and join a
National Government. Nahhas declined, it was the sole
responsibility of 'All Mahir who advised the King to set up a
committee to arbitrate upon the constitutional issue then
raised. The only solution, Nahhas said, was to have free
£f)elections under a neutral government,ou 
Amin Osman's version to Miles Lampson was that Aly Maher visited Nahhas 
at his house on 17 June, and said that the present government was 
unsatisfactory and asked on what conditions Nahhas would be willing to 
co-operate. Nahhas answered, only if a neutral caretaker government 
supervised elections from which the majority party would form the 
government. 'All Mahir suggested 'Abd al-Fatah Yehya to whom Nahhas
58. Col'ombe, p. 108,
59. Rizq al-Ahzab Qabl ThawratV552, p. 52.
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had no objections* Nahhas told Amin Osman that he did not mind if the
matter were dropped as he wished to have no contact with 'Ali Mahir,®1
Yet 'Ali Mahir's account is that it was Nahhas who asked to see him,
suggested the dismissal of the present ministry and demanded new
elections. 'Ali Mahir's response was that it was impossible owing to
the cost to the country. Then they discussed the old question of an
arbitration committee to decide points at issue between the King and
Parliament.®2 It seems that Nahhas, after losing hope in any British
move to assist him, began to distance himself from them and take steps
to get closer to the Palace.
On 13 August 1939, in a speech given in Alexandria, he threatened
the British, saying
between both of us there is a treaty. If it is implemented, 
on the basis of truth and equality, and giving each one his 
right, then you are welcome. Otherwise there should be no 
treaty or friendship, if what it brings is hunger and
destruction to Egypt, and the booties and profits only to you 
[British].... 0 British, either friendship or enmity, so
chose for yourselves what you want.®2
During these renewed contacts with the Palace another factor
intervened, namely the outbreak of the Second World War. It was to
change the political scene dramatically.
B. The Antecedents to the Palace Incident of the 4th of February 1942
In August 1940, Ahmad Hassanein was appointed Royal Chamberlain to 
succeed 'All Mahir who had been Prime Minister from 18 August 1939®^ 
until he resigned on 23 June 1940. On 1 April 1940, Nahhas submitted a
memorandum to the British Ambassador in Cairo demanding the following:
61. FO 406-222 J 2927/6/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Viscount Halifax 
(No. 383), Alexandria 24 June 1938.
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(1) that the British government promise to withdraw all foreign troops 
from Egypt after the war; (Z) that Egypt have the right to participate 
in the peace conference following the war? (3) that Britain enter into 
negotiations with Egypt to recognize its complete sovereignty over the 
Sudan; (4) that martial law be terminated? and (5) that the embargo 
imposed on exporting cotton be lifted.®® The memorandum was intended 
to show the British that as they had signed the treaty, they were the 
most qualified to rule. They were the representatives of the nation, 
and they could easily incite trouble. This argument proved its validity
two years later when the British brought the Wafd to power in 1942.®®
The incidents of June 1940 were surely a prelude to 4 February
1942. As a matter of fact one could argue that the latter incident was 
a replica of the former, with one exception, and that was the political 
rivalry between the' Wafd and other parties, which was given much more 
publicity by anti-Wafd parties. By June 1940 Lampson had come to the 
conclusion that a more loyal and friendly government was needed which 
could take a firmer stand towards Italy. Hassan Sabri and Hussein 
Sizzi were considered. Even the notion of deposing the King and 
replacing him with Muhammad 'All was entertained.®^ At the same time
Lampson received despairing messages from Muhammad Mahmud and Nahhas
urging him "to save the country from ’All Mahir." Lampson comments 
that he was ready to accept a purely Wafdist government since Nahhas, 
with all his faults, would work loyally with Britain, especially as he 
was genuinely convinced of the Italian peril and looked upon Great
Britain as Egypt's only hope.®8
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On 17 June 1940 at 3.30 pm, Lampson submitted the following
ultimatum to Hassanein
It is plain that 'Ali Mahir has no heart to face difficulties 
and dangers which present situation inevitably involves for 
Egypt and that even when he complies with our requests he 
allows it to appear that it is against his will and 
judgment. This cannot continue. You therefore have my 
instructions to tell King Faruk that in time of war the worst 
policy is one of uncertainty and that attitude of Aly Maher 
is not in accordance with spirit of the Treaty nor 
representative of the feeling of Egypt and the Egyptian 
people nor conductive to Egypt's ultimate interests. It is 
therefore necessary for another Government to be formed.®9
Two days later a meeting was held at the 'Abdin Palace attended by 'Ali
Mahir, the incumbent Prime Minister, Nahhas Pasha, Ahmad Ziwar, Ismail
Sidqi, 'Abd al-Fatah Yahya, all ex-Prime Ministers, Muhammad Mahmud
Khalil, President of the Senate, Ahmad Mahir, Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies, Muhammad Salih Harb, Minister of War, Muhammad Tewfiq
Rifa'at, ex-Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Muhammad Hilmi Issa,
President of People's Union Party, Mahmud Bassiuni ex-President of the
Senate, Muhammad Bahy al-Din Barakat, ex-Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies, Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan, President of National Party, Mustafa
'Abd al-Raziq, Vice President of the Liberal Constitutional Party, 'Abd
al-Hamid Badawi, Head of the Royal Advisers, and 'Abd al-Wahab Tala'at,
Deputy of the Royal Council,
It is interesting here to record what Nahhas had to say and to
compare the whole situation with what happened two years later. Nahhas
said that there was no doubt that there was no right for any foreign
country to interfere in the appointment of a government in an
independent country such as Egypt. The treaty between Egypt and
Britain compelled both sides to implement it in the spirit of which it
was conducted. As for the Egyptian government, he knew for sure that
the Egyptian people would like to see a neutral government supported by
69. 'Abdin Archives Al-Khilaf Bain Misr wa Iinjiltira Bisha'n 
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all parties to conduct elections when this was possible. That was the
solution, in his opinion and that of the Wafd, to save the King from
the awkward position he found himself in.
Nahhas argued further that since the Wafd had not participated in
the last elections they would not participate in a government supported
by the present Parliament. Moreover, a coalition government was
unacceptable. Rather a neutral government must dissolve the present
Parliament and hold fresh elections. Lastly, he said, that Britain was
in a critical position, and if any obstacles arose against her in Egypt
during the war, she would take over and turn it into a British
dependency without concern for the t h r o n e . 7° was he signalling to the
throne what was to happen later? Another meeting was held two days
later with the same arguments and results.^1
On 25 June, Lampson submitted another ultimatum
I take exception to the political activities of Aly Maher 
Pasha since he tendered his resignation, as they are 
complicating the situation. His work should be purely 
administrative until the formation of the new Cabinet. His 
Majesty should summon Nahhas at once and accept his advice,
i.e. to form a Cabinet, as he advises. Nahhas's views are 
already known from the Compte-rendu, i.e., for a neutral
Government. The proper execution of the Treaty in its letter 
and spirit requires in the present circumstances that the 
biggest popular Party, namely the Wafd, should be behind the 
Government. Should it prove impossible to form such neutral 
government, the alternative is a purely Wafdist Government. 
In either case, the responsibility for the fulfilment of the 
Treaty will thus lie with the President of the Egyptian 
Delegation which negotiated the Treaty."^2
Facing a clear determination on the part of the British to appoint
Nahhas as Prime Minister, the Palace dispatched 'Abd al-Wahab Tala'at
to Nahhas where he was in Kafr 'Ashma taking part in what were later
known as the negotiations, or talks, of Kafr 'Ashma between Nahhas and
70. Ibid.. Khulasat al-Munagashat allati Darat fi al ijtima alladhi
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'Abd al-Wahab Tala'at. The full translation of the meeting, as recorded
by 'Abd al-Wahab Tala'at gives us some insight into the thinking of
Nahhas •
When Tala'at met Nahhas and showed him how his opinion 
differed completely from those of other parties, and asked 
him for his practical suggestions, Nahhas answered: If the
idea of a non-partisan government is to be adopted, then work
should proceed as follows: (1) the cabinet should be
composed from non-party elements? (2) the cabinet should be 
accepted by all parties? (3) the cabinet should be backed by 
those parties which are willing to support it, and they 
should meet with it regularly to help it in running the 
affairs of state and monitor its conduct? (4) the cabinet 
should pave the way to free elections. As for Parliament, it 
could be adjourned until the time decided for its meeting, 
and at that moment the Parliament should be dissolved before 
it meets? in any case, it should be dissolved two months 
before the next session; (5) As for the composition of this 
cabinet, the president could be Seif Allah Yussri Pasha 
because he would be acceptable to some of the parties • I 
('Abd al-Wahab Tala'at) asked him if he would be prepared to 
form such a cabinet, he answered that he would refuse for the 
following reasons: (1 ) because his aim is the unity of the
nation, and that would not be realized by him presiding over 
the cabinet since it would upset most of the parties if not 
all of them? (2) because he cannot work in the present 
circumstances with a state administration which, since the 
coup of the Liberal Constitutionalists had concentrated power 
in its hands by dismissing who was considered either a 
Wafdist or pro-Wafd and replaced them by promoting others via 
exceptional promotions. In these circumstances it would be 
difficult for him and futile to govern. As he mentioned in 
the 'Abdin Palace meeting, he did not want to lead a coup in 
the present situation so that he could govern with men loyal 
to him, the King, and the country. Were he to attempt such a 
coup, he would alienate almost all the parties. However, the 
critical stage of the war which was on Egypt's door step 
precluded such step. Thus it was prudent that a neutral 
government should take over, and it could work with this 
administration as much as possible. When Talaat asked Nahhas 
if the King realized that it was inevitable for Nahhas to 
preside over such a cabinet, he answered: in that case he
would ask the King's permission to introduce all these 
changes - implying that the King would become involved in the 
matter. Nahhas ended by saying that he was at His Majesty's 
service at all times.73
Thus the conversation ended with Nahhas putting forward, or laying 
down, his terms. He wanted a completely free hand, and would not 
accept anything less, and this was not, of course, to the liking of the 
Palace. While Nahhas was preparing to go to Cairo, had gathered the
73. Ibid. Mudhakkira Bisha'n Muqabalat 'Abd al-Wahab Talaat Wa 
Mustafa al-Nahhas fi Kafr 'Ashma 26 Yuniyu 1940.
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members of the Wafd, informed them of the latest development and 
pressed them to take a decision of what should be done, the Palace 
issued a royal decree appointing Hassan Sabri as Prime Minister.7  ^ it
was a blow to Nahhas, as it was to the British, according to the 
statement of Lord Halifax in the House of Commons in which he said,
The King of Egypt shouldered his responsibility, and after 
consultation with his advisers invited Sabri Pasha to form a 
government. We should have been happy if it had been 
possible to associate with the new Government, the Wafd 
Party, whose leader was Prime Minister when the 1936 Treaty 
of Alliance was signed? but in wartime cabinet making is not 
always an easy matter. I am glad to say our relations with 
the present Government are completely satisfactory.7®
Later Nahhas in his annual speech on 13 November that year described 
what happened. He said that he expressed his view in the negotiations 
at ’Abdin Palace and his interview with Abd al-Wahab Talaat Pasha when 
the later visited him in Kafr 'Ashma. The solution which the Wafd
would accept was the formation of a non partisan government which would 
dissolve the present Chamber of Deputies and conduct new free 
elections, by which everyone would submit to the will of the nation. 
At the same time he showed every possible way to facilitate matters in 
other details. He accepted that elections would be held when 
circumstances were suitable. A committee of all parties should be 
formed so that the neutral government could consult them concerning 
important matters, until elections were held. In case war developments 
prevented the holding of the elections at their appointed time, the 
Constitution permitted their postponement. The check on the government 
by the nation represented in its various committees and parties would 
be stronger, more effective and representative than the present Chamber 
of Deputies from whom the majority of the nation have been excluded. 
He also offered to agree on the distribution of the constituencies to
74. Al-Tabi'i, p. 210.
75. Ibid,
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hold elections quietly under the present conditions• He also suggested
reducing the time campaigning for elections to its minimum. Nahhas
concluded by saying that if the others had accepted what he had
76offered, there would have been no problem today.
C. The Incident of the Fourth of February 1942
On Bairam 1941 Nahhas delivered a speech at Zaghlul's monument 
attacking the government strongly over the food situation. Although 
directed in the first instance against the government, it involved the 
British at least by implication. Popular belief, formed by Axis 
propaganda which was difficult to eradicate, was that the shortage was 
due to British army consumption.77 A food crisis was naturally 
exploited by the Wafd, who were in opposition in order to demonstrate 
the ineffectiveness of the government. Hussein Sirri's government was 
not only facing the opposition of parties outside the government, but 
intrigues from the Palace, and especially 'All Mahir who did not cease 
for one moment to plot the downfall of the cabinet. The incident of 
the Vichy _affair was the climax which brought down Sirri's government, 
and a prelude to the events of 4 February.
On 5 January Salib Sami, Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed 
Miles Lampson that the Council of Ministers had decided to break off 
diplomatic relations with the Vichy government of France. On 3 January 
the Prime Minister was urged to break off relations with the Vichy 
regime as soon as possible. Next day in the morning, Salib Sami 
phoned Miles Lampson suggesting that Marshal Petain was adopting a 
stiffer attitude towards Germany and that consequently an Egyptian 
rupture of relations might be inopportune.78 On 18 January, Miles
76. Al-Masri, 14 November 1940, p. 7.
77. FO 371-31566 J43/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office 
(No. 42) Cairo 4 January 1942,
78. FO 371 (No. 58) 5 January 1942. FO 371 (No 68) 6 January 1942.
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Lampson received a report that the Palace was exploring with-Nahhas the 
possibilities of an agreement with a view to strengthening Egypt 
against the feared encroachments of a victorious Britain on Egypt’s
independence.7® There is no doubt that this report, although as Miles 
Lampson has himself noted, it should be taken with reserve, together 
with the growing impatience of the people over food shortages and the 
Wafd's policy of exploiting the situation, must have alerted the 
British Embassy of a possible Wafdist-Palace agreement which they would 
have to do everything possible to break up.
At that time the King was on holiday in the Red Sea, and the
decision of breaking relations with Vichy was taken in his absence, A
row followed over whether this action was constitutional or against the
royal prerogative. The King demanded the immediate resignation of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, but Hussein Sirri stood firm by his
Foreign Minister and asked for Miles Lampson's help. The following
report of a private talk between the Prime Minister and Lampson is of
special importance and interest:
The Prime Minister said that the story of the King's action 
was true - (i.e. asking Salib's Sami resignation) and he had 
had a most stormy interview with him whom he had beaten into 
withdrawing his intervention in this matter • He added "the 
boy" (King) is an absolute coward: he has to be frightened
from time to time and saved from himself." He added with a 
smile that the French Minister would not expect to receive
decorations on departure. I observed that if he had I could
assure him that the pot which was now only simmering would 
most certainly have boiled over. Meanwhile, the prospect did 
not seem encouraging: must we go on having to frighten the
boy at periodical intervals? If so, I felt myself that our 
patience might very easily give out. Persia should surely 
serve as a reminder to the King of what happened if it was 
overstrained. The Prime Minister admitted it and added that 
he was having a "Hellishly" difficult time. But he hoped we 
would still be forbearing and help him in his task, I replied 
that, as to that, he certainly realised how forbearing and 
patient we had been up to date: we did not want to meet
trouble half way, but if trouble deliberately came out to 
* meet us, I personally had no shadow of doubt what advice I 
should give my government as to meeting it.79
79. FO 371-31566 J281/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office
(No. 240) Cairo 18 January 1942.
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The Embassy was convinced that 'Ali Mahir was behind this incident and 
that it was he who was inspiring King Faruk not only to sack the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs but also the whole cabinet for sacrificing 
the rights of the country to Great Britain, and that great pressure was 
being exercised upon King Faruk to replace Hussein sirri's government 
with one controlled by 'Ali Mahir behind the scenes and whose motto 
would be "strict execution of the treaty but not complaisance towards 
the British",80 Naturally that would be one of the reasons for Miles 
Lampson to get close to the Wafd and later ask for the arrest of 'All 
Mahir.
For Miles Lampson, as he wrote in his report, it seemed that the
moment for the final trial of strength with the Palace might be
imminent. In addition to the expulsion of 'Abd al-Wahab Tala'at, 'Ali
Mahir's tool, he was inclined to insist (with a time limit) on total
elimination of all Italians of whom many still remained in the Palace
employment and one of whom (though now technically Egyptian), the
notorious Pulli, was particularly dangerous and obnoxious. Miles
Lampson held a meeting of the War Council and discussed every
possibility, including force saying "I am convinced that it is high
time King Faruk had a lesson, and that if we do not pull him up sharply
over this glaring case, we shall only be storing up worse trouble in
the future." The situation got worse, especially on the military
front? Benghazi fell to Rommel on 29 January, and students started
ft 1demonstrated, shouting "Advance Rommel".
On the first of February Hussein Sirri had already told Hassanein, 
Ahma_d Mahir, and Muhammad Hussein Heykal of his intention to resign on
80. FO 371-31566 J333/98/16 From Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office
(No\ 272) 20 January 1942.
81. FO 371-31566 J334/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson (No. 284) 21 January
1942.
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2 February, or 3 February at the latest. He met Miles Lampson that day 
who asked him about his ideas about his successor and brushed aside 
names already mentioned, such as Barakat, Ahmad Mahir and Heykal as 
unsuitable for one reason or another. "What did he really think?" He
at once replied "Force King Faruk to send for the Wafd". I informed
his Excellency that that was precisely my own conclusion."82
There is no doubt that some news might have reached Nahhas of the 
intention of Sirri to resign since he had already told Hassanein, 
Mahir, and Heykal about it. What happened next is a mystery, or a 
matter of pure speculation. There are some who accuse Nahhas of
deliberately plotting with the British to precipitate the events of 4 
February. Others accuse the Palace, especially Hassanein, for 
consciously allowing the situation to deteriorate to the extent it had 
by 4 February in order to discredit the Wafd. Amidst these summary 
accusations and counter accusations, we will try to make our way 
through all the information to hand in order see what it suggests.
Dr. Anis wrote that the British were hinting at the participation of 
the Wafd in the government since the resignation of Mahir in June 
1940. That was publicly known to the Wafd and its opponents, as well 
as the Palace, but the issue was whether to bring in a purely Wafdist 
government, as Nahhas wanted, or a coalition government under Nahhas, 
as the Palace wanted. It is most likely that Nahhas did not know of 
“.the intention of the British to deliver an ultimatum to the King when 
he was in Upper Egypt. It is also probable that when he was called 
from there, his first thought was that the idea of a coalition 
government had been revived.
We come now to the role of Amin Osman, the well-known British
*
82. FO 371-31566 J514/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson (No. 442) 1 February
1942. Anis, Al-Ahram, 9 March 1973. FO 371-31566 J515/38/16 Sir 
Miles Lampson to Foreign Office (No. 443) Cairo 2 February 1942.
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sympathizer, -whom Lord Wilson called the negotiator of the British 
Embassy in political crises. It is known that he had met Nahhas more 
than once after his return from Upper Egypt and informed him of the 
determination of the British to let him form the government. Dr. Anis 
contends that it was perhaps the conversation with Amin Osman which 
encouraged Nahhas to hold on to his initial idea of a Wafdist 
cabinet.®3
Before we proceed any further, some light must be shed on Amin 
Osman. What makes the role of Amin Osman so important? Hashish 
writes,
What adds weight to the role of Amin Osman, in our opinion, 
is that Nahhas later rewarded him for his efforts, possibly 
at the suggestion of the British Embassy, by appointing him 
Minister of Finance in June 1943. When Dr. Salah al-Din was 
interviewed by an Egyptian scholar, he vehemently defended 
Nahhas saying that Nahhas knew nothing about the 
communications.
Salah al-Din added "As for Amin Osman, he might have had some
contacts." Hashish adds that Mr. Mahmud Sulaiman Gannam tried to
defend Amin Osman, but his defence raised doubts, for he said
Maybe all these rumours about the contacts with the British 
was due to the presence of Amin Osman near Nahhas, as it was 
thought that it was he who conducted those communications • 
But I cannot, being impartial towards Amin Osman, accuse him 
of not being a patriot for he wished every good for his 
country, even if it required an understanding with the 
British authorities, and there is nothing wrong or shameful 
about that. But he had his special way and his way was 
unfamiliar. I was one of those who were not in agreement 
with him before knowing him, until I became close to him and 
knew his good intentions.®^
Thus the role of Amin Osman was not denied by the Wafdists or their 
sympathizers•
A close look at the British records would complete the picture, 
but from a British point of view of course. On 2 February, Miles
83. Anis Al-Ahram, 10 February 1967, p. 3,
84. Hashish, p. 202 interview with Mahmud Sulaiman Ghannam 3/12/67.
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Lampson was instructed by the Foreign Office to establish direct 
contact with Nahhas and clarify three points which might arise in 
dealing with a new government. The first was that in such 
circumstances, every point which arose could not be measured by the 
yardstick of the Treaty, and that they could not allow any question of 
Treaty revision to be raised. Secondly, was to ascertain if Nahhas was 
ready to continue the policy of his predecessor towards curtailing the 
Palace and the Italians, including 'Ali Mahir? Here one must note that 
Nahhas was mentioned by name as the next Prime Minister. Thus he was 
not contacted just for consultation as the beginning of the telegram 
would suggest, but to bargain with him for a deal. Thirdly, though not 
as important, was the decision to let his predecessor receive some mark 
of the King's favour. If Nahhas agreed at least to the first two 
demands, then Sirri's advice should be followed, Lampson was urged to 
meet Nahhas at any cost, before the king could summon him in order to 
appoint him in place of Sirri.85
Although the telegram arrived after midnight and Lampson claims he 
did not act according to these instructions due to their late delivery, 
yet he wrote
I gravely doubt the wisdom of my getting in direct touch with 
Nahhas Pasha in advance of my audience [with the King as he
was instructed to do]: nor do I fancy he would be willing to
see me at the moment as it might embarrass him. It might 
even deter him from going to see the King, if he knew that we 
were pressing him in advance to make terms with us.8®
Being on the spot, and knowing Nahhas from at least the way he
conducted the 1936 treaty negotiations, he could understand Nahhas'
sensitivity about his public image, and how any formal contact, which
could suggest a British backing, might ruin his patriotic image. On
85. FO i371-31566 J515/38/16 From Foreign Office to Cairo (No. 543),
2 February, 1942.
86, FO 371-31566 J553/38/16 From Cairo to Foreign Office (No. 453),
3 February, 1942. See Appendix 4.
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the same day, 3 February, Amin Osman called on Lampson (was he sent by 
Nahhas, or asked to come by Lampson?, although Osman denies both 
suggestions categorically) to whom he conveyed the three points 
mentioned by the British Foreign Office as issues he would raise with 
Nahhas in case he was appointed Prime Minister. Lampson also asked 
Amin Osman to tell Nahhas that he should not accept a transitional 
government, but to form a coalition government. Answering Amin, 
Lampson said that Nahhas could hold elections after his appointment. 
In the same conversation Lampson said that he was sure that Nahhas 
would agree that he should for the time being keep in the background. 
Amin also said that Nahhas was determined to clean out the Palace.87 
Thus the second point of the three points raised by the British was 
satisfied.
An indirect contact was established between Nahhas and Lampson 
through Osman. The fact that Osman did not meet Nahhas before the 
latter met the King to convey to him Lampson's message did not change 
the matter much, nor did it affect the course of events which went 
along with what both had agreed on.88
What is interesting here is the dubious role played by Amin Osman, 
and how it was easy for Nahhas to deny any knowledge of what was 
supposedly going on behind his back.89 This impression of being only 
a figure-head whose real moving force was another person behind the 
scenes would be strengthened in the future. In the past, for example 
it was assured that Nahhas was elected in 1927 by Makram, Mahir, and 
Nokrashi, and that, as it would be later charged, Makram was the real
87. FO 371-31566 J554/38/16 From Cairo to Foreign Office (No. 461),
3 February, 1942. See Appendix 4.
88. FO ‘311 -31566 J555/38/16 From Cairo to Foreign Office (No. 462),
3 February, 1942. See Appendix 4.
89. Compare with his reaction to the meeting between Makram and the
King later (Chapter Four, p. ).
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personality to reckon with while Nahhas was a nominal leader. Thus
Makram was blamed for the split of '1937 and the defection of Mahir and
Nokrashi; and Amin Osman was blamed for the events which led to the
Palace incident of 4 February. Does not that raise some doubts, or at
least suggest something about the type of leader Nahhas was, under
whose patronage such figures flourished, including in later years his
wife, Zeinab al-Wakil, and the last Secretary-General of the Wafd,
Fuad Sirajj al-Din?
According to the official report on the subject of that day, on 3
February before noon, Lampson contacted Hassanein to advise the King to
invite Nahhas (or whoever he nominated) to form a government. Nahhas
was summoned by the King, but rejected an offer to form a coalition
government. After that, Hassanein went to Lampson and informed him of
what happened.90 The latter in his turn informed Nahhas through Amin
of what he had said to Hassanein,91 The second day in the morning
Lampson sent his ultimatum that if by 6:00 pm of that day Nahhas was
not summoned to form a government, then King Faruk would bear the
consequences. By then all party presidents, members of the National
Front (who negotiated the 1936 treaty) members of the ex-Regency
Council, ex-prime ministers, and senior royal advisers were invited to
attend a meeting to discuss the situation.92
Once more Amin Osman pops up in the picture, and as the telegram
from Lampson reveals
Amin has just called and told me that at 2:00 pm Dr. Neqib,
an emissary of the Palace called on Nahhas and told him that
the King was "packing with a view to leaving the country." 
Amin continued that the King is summoning Nahhas at 3:30 pm
90. 'Abdin Archives Malaf 4 Febrayir Wathiqa Tarikhiyya Li-Hadith 
4 Febrayir min 2 Iia 5 Febrayir Malaf 27.
91 • FO 371-31566 J557/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson, Foreign Office
(No. 409), 4 February 1942.
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together with the other leaders and will tell them that the 
British have sent him an ultimatum to summon Nahhas by 6:00 
pm and ask him to form a cabinet: that His Majesty regards
this as an interference which, is inadmissible and he leaves 
it to them. Nahhas proposed to answer that he had no 
knowledge of any British interference and that the only 
person who can appoint a Prime Minister is the King, that the 
situation in the country had reached a very serious point 
through not being governed by a real democratic party; that 
he considered himself representing the democratic party and 
was ready, as he informed His Majesty yesterday, to form a 
Wafdist cabinet to save the situation if His Majesty would
As could be seen so far, Amin Osman was not dealing with Lampson in his
personal capacity, but as an emissary of Nahhas. The question to be
asked then, was he really so? I do not think the British would have
attached so much importance to him if he was not.
According to a report by the Palace on the incidents of that day, 
those who attended the meeting were Muhammad Sherif Sabri, member of 
the ex-regency council, Muhammad Hussein Haykal, vice president of the 
Liberal Constitutional Party, Mustafa al-Nahhas, President of the Wafd 
Party, Muhammad Tewfiq Rifaat, ex-minister, 'Ali Mahir, ex-prime
minister, Muhammad Helmi Issa, President of the Popular Unionist Party, 
Hussein Sirri, President of the outgoing Council of Ministers, Hafiz
Afifi, ex-minister and President of Bank Misr, Muhammad Mahmud Khalil, 
President of the Senate, Ahmad Mahir, Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies and President of the Saadist Party, and 'Al* *1 -shamca*.
ex-minister and President of the Board of Directors of m e  National 
Bank, Ahmad Ziwar, ex-prime minister, Ismail Sidqi, ex-prime minister, 
'Abd al-Fatah Yehya, ex-prime minister, Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan, 
President of the Watani Party and Crown Prince Muhammad 'All, President 
of the ex-Regency Council did not attend.
It is not appropriate here to reproduce the whole text of the 
meeting,* but some extracts are illuminating, especially regarding what
93. FO 371-31567 J576/98/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office
(No. 482), Cairo 4 February 1942.
charge him with the t a s k .
Chapter Three - 169
Nahhas had to say. He did not know anything about the interference of 
the British authorities, and he expressed his views on the reasons for 
refusing to accept a coalition government when he met the King. In 
another extract, he said that the present regime was responsible for
what the nation was suffering from disease, hunger and mismanagement.
Thus he could not co-operate with any of its adherents. That was why 
he told the King he could not accept to form a coalition government. 
The matter was serious, and the Prime Minister does not receive his 
orders except from the King, and the ultimatum was dangerous. We ought 
to be aware that it was not for the British to intervene to form the 
government. He was ready to save the situation, but on the basis of a 
Wafdist government.
Nahhas was urged by Ahmad Mahir to back down from his position
after he knew about the ultimatum, but Nahhas responded by saying "do
a
what you want". Sherif Sabri suggested that a neutral government should 
be formed, its president and members would be chosen by Nahhas, and 
that he would form his cabinet after elections if he had the majority. 
Nahhas answered that he had already asked that but was refused, so he 
could not accept now. Sidqi then summarized the situation as first, 
that those present urged Nahhas to form a coalition government which he 
refused. Secondly that he should refuse to form a cabinet on the basis 
of the British ultimatum. Nahhas accepted Sidqi's suggestion. Sidqi 
then registered that Nahhas refused to form a cabinet based on the 
British ultimatum on account of Nahhas saying "Do what you want", which 
he had taken as meaning that Nahhas had accepted their point of view 
and would therefore refuse to form a government. Nahhas objected to 
that summary, since he would accept the cabinet if it was offered to 
him, and1' what he meant by "do what you like" was to do whatever was 
possible so that the government would not be offered to him.94
94. 'Abdin Archives Ibid.
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It was also reported in another account of the meeting that Nahhas 
warned the participants in the meeting of the consequences of their 
decision, which was that he (Nahhas) should refuse to form a Wafdist 
government under the pressure of the ultimatum. He added that the 
British would retaliate in a violent way. He then added that he agreed 
with them in refusing the ultimatum but held them responsible for the 
grave consequences which would result from that rejection.95 Both 
documents agree on the fact that Nahhas participated in drafting the 
answer and signed it, while Ziwar was the only one to abstain.96 
Later Nahhas was to say that he warned those present in the meeting 
that this ultimatum was not of a threatening but of an executive 
nature. He told the King that that protest was good but would lead the
country and the throne to a catastrophe.®^
Hassanein then went to Lampson and submitted the following protest 
to him:
On receiving the British ultimatum His Majesty the King 
convoked the persons mentioned in the attached list who
submitted after discussion of the British ultimatum, the 
following decision: "That in their opinion the British
ultimatum is a great infringement of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty and of the independence of the country. For this 
reason, and acting on their advice His Majesty cannot consent 
to an action resulting in an infringement of the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and of the independence of the
country."99
Meanwhile Lampson had received a telegram from the Foreign Office 
instructing him not to force the Wafd into a coalition government,
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Gamal Selim, Qira'ah Gadidaeh fi Hadith 4 Febrayer p. 92. Diya
al-Din Bibars Safhat Maghula min Mudhakkirat al-Nahhas. Al-Isbi'a
al-1Arabi Beirut 3 February 1975. Anis al-Ahram 6 February 1976.
98. FO ^371-31567 J578/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office
(No. 487) Cairo 4 February 1942.
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since they had never favoured them.99
An investigation later conducted by the Palace showed that Amin
Osman was at the British Embassy that afternoon at 4:00 pm according to
an eyewitness.100 It does not contradict what Lampson wrote on
receiving Hussanein's answer
As it was impossible to get into direct touch with Nahhas who 
is still at the Palace, Minister of State (Lyttleton) and I 
informed Amin of this message and asked him whether Nahas
would take on the government in the event of the King being
forced to abdicate or being deposed. Amin swore by all his 
gods that Nahhas would do so.101
The rest is known.
D • The Significance of 4 February
Whether the exchange of letters which followed Nahhas1 visit to 
the British Embassy after his appointment as Prime Minister was a
cover-up or expressed real intentions, it reflected once again his
lawyer's mentality. For him, as in a court, when two opponents settled 
a dispute one affirmed the rights of the other in a document. Thus his 
right would not be challenged in the future, since it was documented. 
According to the same logic, Nahhas stressed the importance of 
publishing these letters before forming his cabinet.10  ^ It was also a 
public relations act, intended to defend and justify whatever he might 
be faced with. By publishing these letters he was showing how he had 
safeguarded the rights of the nation and how everything was done
according to certain principles which the British themselves had agreed 
to. The British who had obtained what they desired, had nothing to 
lose by signing these letters. By doing so, Nahhas thought he had
99. FO 371-31566 J551/38/16 From Foreign Office to Cairo (No. 609), 
4 February 1942,
100, 'Abdin Archives Ibid.
101. FO 371-31567 J578/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office 
(No. 487), Cairo 4 February 1942.
102, FO 371-31567 J579/98/16 (No. 502), 5 February 1942*
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dealt with the issue of the British intervention, and showed that his 
appointment had nothing to do with the previous incidents. Of course 
he was greatly mistaken, and the public reaction was not as he had 
calculated. Truly there was still strong support for him among the 
staunchest of the Wafdists, and he was praised alongside Miles Lampson, 
but, on the whole, as a national leader Nahhas was on the decline.
It is important to record here the first official and public 
contact between Nahhas and Lampson, in which the letters were 
exchanged, which was after the King had summoned him to form the 
cabinet. Lampson wrote that Nahhas arrived an hour later and had a 
satisfactory interview with him in the presence of the British Minister 
of State. He added that Nahhas agreed with him wholeheartedly that the 
evil elements both in the Palace and outside should be eliminated 
immediately. Then Lampson emphasized his desire to pursue his policy 
of remaining as much as possible behind the scenes, while Nahhas 
carried out the necessary measures on his own.10  ^ Nahhas also asked 
the Minister of State to supply the country with some of the items 
consumed by the British army to solve the acute shortage of food in 
Egypt at that time. His request was granted.
The intended or unintended deal was to become more assured when
Miles Lampson paid his first official visit to Nahhas as Prime 
Minister. According to Lampson's own words he touched on the immediate 
need of eradicating the root cause of their troubles, to which Nahhas 
answered that he appreciated the need to deal with ’Ali Mahir and the 
Palace but would prefer to deal with the King in his own w a y . 1 ° 4  
(Some unconfirmed reports suggested that Nahhas or the British wanted
. A A  .either to declare Egypt a Republic or for Faruk to abdicate. Others,
103. FO 371-31567 J608/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office
(No. 491), Cairo 5 February 1942.
104. FO 371 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office 7 February 1942.
Chapter Three - 173
including Nahhas himself later asserted that they had saved the monarch 
from a greater evil. Did they mean the above-mentioned rumours, taking 
into account the fact that Nahhas was a loyal royalist, and it went 
with his legal mentality,) Lampson then assured him of his continuing 
backing while Nahhas assured him of his standing endorsement for the 
treaty and its application.10  ^ Once could argue that the treaty was 
finally being implemented after six years from signing the official 
one.
Before proceeding further, two important questions should be 
considered. First, why should the British, who regarded Nahhas as 
their main enemy, bring him to power? Secondly, why should a leader of
a national movement like Nahhas, co-operate with the occupying force to
that extent?
Before answering these two questions, a point must be made. The
British in no sense regarded Nahhas a stooge when they gave the order
and he carried it out, and in no way did Nahhas look at the British as
his superiors whose advice he always had to accept. But it was a deal
between two opposing forces, at a time in which both felt it was in
their common interest to reach a mutual understanding and an agreeable
compromise as in 1936. The question then to be asked is, whether
Nahhas as a national leader did strike a good bargain, and why. But
before answering the last question, one has to go back to the first
question, and I could not find a better answer of the British position
than the view expressed by Mr. Beckett (Head of the Egyptian Section at
the Foreign Office in London). Nahhas filled the bill in a time when
they felt that they needed the support and loyalty of Egypt. Nahhas
was the only person who could guarantee that.106
%
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(No. 525), Cairo, 7 February 1942.
106. See Appendix 4.
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As for why Nahhas cooperated with the British one could argue that 
the roots of this policy go back to the ideological origins of the
party to be found in the old Umma party's concept of co-operation with 
the British against the monarchy. This co-operation reached its climax 
when the professional, urban middle class took over the leadership of 
the Wafd. The signing of the treaty in 1936 was its greatest 
achievement. But because of the nature and context of the relationship 
between the Wafd and the British, the treaty of 1936 was the most the 
Wafd could have got from the British in terms of reaching their goal of 
complete independence by gradual means.
Thus the Wafd for the moment had nothing more to present for the 
national cause. They were the prisoners of their own supposed 
victory. Since independence was achieved, what was left was to exercise 
their right of rule under independence. That was what the whole issue 
was about, between Saad and 'Adli, Nahhas and the others. The argument 
was that British occupation did not allow the representatives of the 
people to rule. Now that the British occupation was terminated,
representatives of the people should rule. That was the tacit 
understanding Nahhas hoped to reach with the British. Nahhas knew 
quite well, as did Zaghlul before him, that independence did not 
necessarily mean the rule of the people, because there was already the 
rule of the powerful institution of the Palace. But Nahhas hoped that 
by delivering the goods, the strong arm of Britain would help him to 
curtail the power of the monarchy as Saad believed before him. 
Independence shackled by the King's rule was meaningless, that was the 
essence of the conflict with the Liberal Constitutionalist Party 
representing the large landowners and the King's allies, as
distinguished from the Wafd, Nahhas, the urban middle class and the
masses. British backing was what Nahhas expected and demanded, it was 
in line with his own logic and thought, as well as the logic of events.
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He saw no paradox in that, since he was the leader of the majority 
party and it was for the majority party to rule. Being in power, even
with British help, was for Nahhas simply promoting or advancing the
interests of the majority party. That is why in 1942 he insisted on a 
purely Wafdist government. With the Wafd in power, Egypt's national 
demands would be promoted further • Thus even if he came to power as a 
result of British backing, it was in the interest of the people in the 
long run, and there was no doubt in his mind of that or of his ability 
to manipulate the British in order to further these interests.
Like Zaghlul, knowing how sensitive the Egyptian people were to
the national issue and how easily he could be labelled a British
stooge, one could understand how the role of Amin Osman developed, and
how Nahhas played the political game very consciously without being
caught in its web. A British report on the incident from the Foreign
Office sent to Lampson illustrates the point:
But I have one serious caveat to lodge and that is that at no 
time in this business as regards either the appointment of
the new government of the possible deposition of the King has
Sir Miles Lampson been in personal touch with Nahhas. As a 
result not only is it open to Nahhas publicly to deny (and he 
will certainly deny it) that he either owes anything to our 
support or is under any obligation towards us, but we really 
have nothing to flourish, even privately, in his face when 
the next crisis arises. I do not regard the various messages
which have passed between Sir Miles Lampson and Nahhas
through the intermediary of Amin Osman as in any way a 
satisfactory substitute for a personal interview between the 
Ambassador and the Wafdist leader since such messages 
entrusted to such a channel may quite well not have been 
delivered, or at least delivered in a form entirely different 
from that in which they were sent.107
That was how Nahhas played it, and this did not differ much in essence
from the general trend of events since 1924. It was the British who
had the final say and the return of the Wafd to power whether in 1930
or 1936 was, on the whole, with their consent, which makes 1942
consistent with previous governments. For if the political scene was
107. F0 371/31567 5 February 1942.
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left free to the monarchy and Muhammad Mahmud in 1929-1930 or the♦ —  »
Palace institution and 'All Mahir in 1935-1936, without any 
intervention or pressure by the British, one could argue that Nahhas 
would not have formed his governments of 1930 or 1936 and the 
governments of the time would have stayed in power•
But what made 1942 (even though the British had forced a change of 
government in June 1940 as shown) different were two things. First was 
the fact that never in the past had the British intervened with such 
force to back the Wafdists to the extent of surrounding the Palace with 
tanks. In the past the British would cease giving support to the 
Wafd's rivals and abstain from using any force against them, i.e., it 
was a passive action. Giving such forceful support to a nationalist 
party it must have accepted the latter's claim to be the leader of the 
national struggle against the occupying British. Thus the Wafd lost 
the support of those who formed its base, especially the younger army 
officers who had entered military college by the good graces of the 
Wafd after signing the treaty, and who could be considered as the 
natural sons of the Wafd. The result was that they rebelled against 
their patrons. The price was extracted ten years later.
The second factor was that the internal situation was not the 
same, Farouk was not Fuad. He was popular and still thought to be 
religious and uncorrupted. Egypt after the treaty was not Egypt before 
the treaty, it was supposedly independent. Lampson's action in 
February 1942 was that of a country that still regarded itself as the 
occupying force. Last, but not least, some sections of the population 
that were anti-British, regarded their enemy's enemy as their friend,
and they harboured pro-Axis sympathizers. The Wafd with the British 
was not =- the best choice from their point of view. These were the 
factors which had changed, which made the situation different, and on 
which the opposition seized the chance to blacken Nahhas and the Wafd
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in every possible way. Nahhas was right in the sense that if he had 
accepted a coalition government he would have been a hero, not a 
traitor. But that was party politics and if he wanted to avoid it, he 
should have taken that factor into consideration and acted accordingly.
Was Nahhas hoping to out-manoeuvre the British, the same way as he 
tried to do in the case of the Blue Shirts? One must seriously doubt 
his ability to do so especially after confining himself to a set of 
rules which did not allow him more than he had already achieved, i.e., 
the treaty of 1936. 4 February 1942 was proof that Nahhas had reached
his peak in achieving the goal of national independence by 1936. After 
that he was moving in a vicious circle to achieve his aim of the 
treaty, which was to come to power, and that was the only way. His
road was then blocked, and now he was reduced to a mere party leader 
asking for the premiership for himself and the posts of government for 
his colleagues in the party.
Dr. Rizq argues that, while the British had interfered against an 
unpopular king (Fuad) to bring down the Sidqi regime and the public 
reacted favourably to the return of the Wafd, in this instance the 
scene was different and the public reacted angrily against the British 
action against a popular monarch (Faruk).10® At the same time
opponents of the Wafd did not miss the chance to attack the Wafd. One 
of their leaflets illustrated how public feelings were aroused against
the Wafd. It described how the British forced the King to choose
between Nahhas as prime minister or exile, and how the King answered 
courageously that he was not bothered about the throne, but would not 
like to see Egyptian blood spilled in such circumstances. This type of 
propaganda continued throughout the coming years. But the direct and 
most important result I would argue was Makram Ebeid's defection from
* ^
108. Rizq Tarikh al-Wizarat, p. 391.
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the Wafd. Three years after the Palace incident, the Egyptian Gazette 
published a story to the effect that Makram had told Nahhas that he had 
made a fool of himself by going to the Embassy, and that by doing-so he 
had shown that it was the Ambassador who had appointed him.10^ Could
it be argued that Makram did not object to the principle of
British-Wafdist co-operation, but objected to how it was implemented? 
He thought that Nahhas had exposed himself, and therefore was no longer 
the representative of the national movement, and that he, Makram, could
replace him or make the attempt outside the Wafd. Unlike other
opponents of Nahhas, Makram did not base his attack on the Palace 
incident, but chose another field, corruption, and dealt with it at 
length.
109. The Egyptian Gazette, 18 November 1945.
Chapter Four 
The Pinal Years 1942-1953: The Wafd in Decline
A. The Defection of Mafcrapi
The year 1942 was not only marked by the assumption by Nahhas of 
the Premiership, but by another more alarming incident on the way to 
the decline of the Wafd, and as a further indication of a new course on 
which Nahhas was embarking. Not only did Nahhas1 leadership of the 
Wafd for the independence of Egypt reach a stage of stagnation after 
1935, but the type of leadership which he projected, changed. With the 
defection of Makram Ebeid shortly after the formation of Nahhas' fifth 
government, the last of the old vanguard or the third member of the 
"Gang of Four" which once ruled the Wafd came to an end. Thus Nahhas 
was left alone, but he was no longer the Nahhas of the twenties and 
thirties. With the disappearance of the old leadership, through 
defection or change, a new one emerged. The old struggle between the 
urban lawyers and rural landowners was finally settled, but this time 
it was the cause of the destruction of the party. For neither were the 
representatives of the urban middle class, such as Sabri Abu 'Alam or 
’Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa, of the same calibre as the ones who had
defected, nor did they represent the new middle class which was
growing, though outside the confines of the Wafd. The party ceased to 
be representative of the effendi class that it was.
The defection of Makram was the culmination of several factors,
some personal, like the competition with the new elements in thef, party 
led by Mrs. Nahhas and Fuad Siraj al-Din, others more general such as 
corruption and public policy. Ironically enough, it was Makram who 
introduced Zainab al-Wakil to Nahhas,1 and it was she who was the
1. al-Yusuf p. 192.
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primary cause of his defection* As it turned out, because of Nahhas'
marriage, the relationship between the two old friends had to change.
Nahhas no longer went out every morning with Makram in the latter's car
to the House of the Nation as they used to do, and come back with him
in the evening.2 Naturally their contacts were fewer than they used
to be, and misunderstandings or disagreements eventually occurred more
often with less time to discuss and settle them. To make matters
worse, jealousy played its role, either from Makram's side for her• *
taking him away from him, or from Mme. Nahhas' side by setting her 
husband against Marram. She complained that Makram's name was 
mentioned more often in the newspapers than Nahhas', the President of 
the Wafd.^ Naturally that had some effect on the latter. Accusing 
Mme. Nahhas of direct corruption was Makram's main reason and major
weapon in his later campaign against his old friend. By refusing to 
accommodate her demands, according to Makram, she was not only set
against him, but naturally had another reason to incite her husband 
against his old friend. Later on she proved to be Nahhas' "Achilles' 
heel", as she turned more conspicuous and he defended her actions, thus 
alienating more people.
Another factor was the role played by other members of the Wafd 
who were annoyed by Makram's monopoly of Nahhas, and who wanted to 
share in some of his powers. The most notable of these was the new 
rising star in the Wafd, Fuad Siraj al-Din, who was keen to expel
Makram while they were in power and the country under martial law. His 
reasons were that matters between Nahhas and Makram had gone too far to 
be repaired, especially after the conflict concerning the exceptional
promotions which Makram alone in the cabinet opposed, and about which
2. al-Shahid p. 31 Ibrahim Faraj, al-Ahrar 12 April 1982.
3. Makram Ebeid, Al-Kitab Al-Aswad n.p. n.d. p. 12.
he published his opinion in the newspapers, thus breaking the custom of 
not publishing cabinet matters, in order to embarrass Nahhas. Siraj 
al-Din was of the opinion that Makram should be dealt with while they 
were in power, lest the latter defect after the Wafd was out of 
government, and it would then be difficult for the Wafd to curb 
Makram's activities against them.^ (That opinion proved to be valid 
since Nahhas as a military governor used his powers to imprison
Makram.) Feelings were mutual. Makram had objected to Siraj al-Din's 
appointment as Deputy of the Interior Ministry in the last cabinet.5 
Sabri Abu 'Alam and Nagib al-Hilali were not also far from widening the
A
gulf between the ' two friends, as was 'Abd al-Wahid el-Wakil, the
Minister of Health.®
Naturally, an unholy alliance was formed among all those in whose
interest it was to expel Makram from the party, especially between
Siraj al-Din and Zeinab al-Wakil. Afraid of losing more members, such
as Mahir and Nokrashi in 1937, for which Makram was to be blamed,
Nahhas tried to balance his relation with Makram and the others by
placing them on equal terms. Naturally that was not to Makram's liking
since it meant a loosening of his hold over N a h h a s .  ^ Yet it was done
by Nahhas, with the effect of sacrificing Makram in order to save the
party from more defections.
The most decisive factor in the break between Nahhas and Makram■ •
was the role played by the Palace, in particular Ahmad Hassanein, who 
devised a scheme to which Makram fell victim. By then Makram was more 
vulnerable. Although isolated inside the Party, he must have
4. Al-Tabi'i p. 269.
5 'Abd al-Fatah al-Tawil informed Siraj al-Din of that fact. 
Hashish interview with Siraj al-Din 6/4/68.
6. Rizq, p. 56.
7. al-Shahid p. 40-41, Rizq Tarikh al-Ahzab p. 63.
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calculated that the Party itself was on the wane after the 4 February 
Palace incident. His political ambition was also inordinate. 
According to one scholar, Makram's keen nationalist zeal was meant to‘ 
assure the Egyptian people, who were predominantly Muslims, of his 
credentials for the Premiership despite his being a Christian (Copt).8 
Nahhas became very suspicious of Hassanein's deliberate overtures to
Makram. He angrily denounced Makram in a private conversation on the 
phone with him for an article Makram published after he had met the 
King. When Makram replied that everybody praised the King daily, 
Nahhas became more furious, saying that Makram's doing so was different 
because it was calculated. After that conversation, Nahhas said to 
Muhammad al-Tabi'i that what Makram wrote was written "by a slave". 
Nahhas then wondered what he would say to the British who brought the 
party to power in February 1942. Was the party a slave of the King 
soon thereafter?^ Nahhas in short, was aware of Hassanein's plot and 
warned Makram about it, although the latter did not tell him of what 
happened between himself and the King.1® Hassanein's ploy succeeded.
When Ahma_d Hamza was appointed Minister of Supply on 14 May 1942, 
Makram took it as a personal insult, as it implied he was not capable 
of handling both the Ministries of Supply and Finance.^1 When Makram 
published his view of the matter of "exceptional promotions", Nahhas 
took it as a declaration of war.^ Thus on 26 May, just three months 
after forming the cabinet, Nahhas submitted a letter of resignation in 
order to enable him to form a new government.^ Being always faithful
8 . Changed from Rrotestanism and cancelled his first name which was
William.
9. al-Tabi'i p. 265.
10. al-d?abi'i p. 287.
11. Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat p. 447.
12. El-Feki p. 166.
13. See Appendix02-
to the tradition of Zaghlul concerning the Christians, and also fearful 
of any support Makram might win based on sectarian religious grounds, 
Nahhas appointed another Copt, Kamil Sidqi, Minister of Commerce and 
Industry in the previous cabinet, in his place.^ Makram retaliated 
by publishing the report of the Financial Committee in Al-Masri on May 
23, 1942.
Things began to move fast, Makram and Raghib Hanna were expelled 
from the Wafd,1® to be followed by nineteen others from the Wafd 
General Command,1® among them Galal al-Din al-Hamamsi and Muhammad 
Farid Zaluk. Makram and al-Hamamsi were to publish and distribute the 
"Black Book"♦ Another two expulsions followed,17 bringing the total
number to twenty-three. Of these, one could distinguish two factions:
one comprising those who owed their personal allegiance to Makram such 
as his brother George Makram Ebeid, and one comprising those who
suspected the integrity and honesty of Nahhas, such as al-Hamamsi and
Z a l u k . T h e  battle between Makram and the Wafd was now transferred* ♦
from inside the cabinet and the Party, to Parliament* On 18 August 
1942, Makram asked the Prime Minister to justify his public statement 
in the Chamber of Deputies on 29 June 1942, based on a letter from the 
British Foreign Secretary to Nahhas which Makram believed to imply the 
acceptance of a protectorate over Egypt when the Senate had rejected a 
similar letter before. To this Nahhas retorted that the term "To
resist attacks against Egyptian territory" in the said letter to which 
Makram objected did not mean protection. Makram also referred to the
14. Rizq p. 451, el-Feki p. 214.
15. Al-Ahram, 7 July 1942.
1®* Al-Ahram 13 July 1942.
17. Al-Ahram, 14 July 1942,
18. Yunan Lubib Rizq, Al-Wafd wa Al-Kitab al-Aswad Al-Ahram Cairo 1982
p . 32.
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steps being taken by the government towards sparing the country the 
consequences of war • Nahhas replied that these matters had been 
discussed and there was nothing to add. As for the continued presence 
of British police officers and officials in the Egyptian police force, 
Nahhas replied that as with previous governments work would be also
found for them dealing specifically with foreigners. The matters
raised by Makram pertained to licenses issued to particular persons for 
the export of raw materials and food stuff, exempting some smugglers 
from prosecution, and enforcing illegal taxes upon the people.
Replying to this, Nahhas went into a lengthy defence of his relatives 
and their honesty, and accused Makram of persecuting them. The final 
issue raised by Makram was that of the domestic policy of the 
government concerning public liberties. To this Nahhas replied that 
Makram was a minister in that cabinet.1®
One could argue that Makram was fighting a losing battle and was 
hoist with his own petard. First, it was he who in earliery days had 
created a personality cult around Nahhas by his oratory among the 
masses. He had even reached the extent of calling Nahhas the "Sacred 
Leader" thus creating an image which was difficult for him to 
attack later. By blocking the way for many Wafdists in the exceptional 
promotions, either for themselves directly or for their relatives and 
associates, after so many long years in the political wilderness, 
surely these had little heart to support him, in fact they wished to
get rid of him.
A proposal to censure Makram in the Chamber of Deputies placed in
doubt his eligibility as a candidate in the last elections. It was
based on the fact that Makram's name was not registered in the
« «
4.
19. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab 18 August 1942, pp. 1455-1475.
20. al-Yusuf p. 118.
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electoral list of the constituency of Heliopolis in Cairo, or Qina, but 
that he had adopted for himself the name of his brother, George Ebeid, 
which was registered in Heliopolis, in order to be elected as 
representative of the Heliopolis district in which he was not
registered.^ 1
Makram's bombshell was soon to follow in the form of a petition he 
presented to the King, which was also printed and widely circulated at 
the end of March 1 9 4 3 .  This petition was titled The Black Book of The 
Black Reign when it was published as a book. In it, Makram described 
some of the circumstances which surrounded his dispute with Nahhas. He 
referred to Nahhas' wife's complaint that Makram's name was mentioned 
more often in the newspapers than Nahhas.22 Then he proceeded to
refute some allegations by the Wafd that seventeen members had resigned 
and were not expelled.23 The subjects of the book were divided 
between two main topics. First, issues concerning actions and
behaviour related to upright government, which by its turn was divided 
into several sub-topics as licenses for export, nepotism, forgery of
facts, etc. It was this part which sparked off a chain of scandals
ranging from promoting a relative of Nahhas to ordering the Ambassador 
in London to buy a fur coat worth £ E 3 , 0 0 0  for Nahhas' w i f e . ^ 4  The
other part dealt mainly with political matters, such as freedom of the 
press, civil liberties, elections, and so on. But because of the
innumerable petty scandals which the book contained, and the fact that
Makram himself was the second in command of the Wafd, the case was much
weakened, and did not produce the hoped for results among the populace.
21. Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab pp. 366-367 1 February 1943.
22. Ebeid, p. 12.
23. Ibid. p. 35.
24. Ibid. p. 232.
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Nevertheless, the importance of these accusations, as Dr. Rizq 
noted, was that they revealed the new class orientation of the 
incumbent leadership of the Wafd, and particularly Nahhas. A 
comparison could be made with the Nahhas of the twenties when faced 
with his involvement in the case of Seif al-Din for which he was
acquitted by the court, and the new allegations.2® This would 
strengthen our hypothesis of the new social milieu in which Nahhas now
t
found himself, either by the fact of becoming a Prime Minister several 
times over the years, or at least by the effect and influence of his 
marriage to that particular lady, Zainab al-Wakil.
In one of the incidents about which Makram wrote in his book, two• «
things of utmost importance can be seen. First the interest of Zainab
A
al-Wakil to acquire land, thus moving her husband socially from urban 
interests to those of a landowner. Secondly, there was the
relationship developing between her and the new rising star in the 
Wafd, Fuad Siraj al-Din, for she was not from a rich family, although 
her father was a Pasha. She inherited from him at the beginning of 
1942, twelve feddans, twenty-one qirat and twenty-two sahm with a debt 
on them of £E76. She bought eighty feddans, seven qirats and fourteen
sahm from Siraj al-Din in June 1942 at the price of £E53 per feddan to
sell them later back to Siraj al-Din in June 1944 for £E120 per 
feddan. This could be considered political bribery. In October 1942, 
she bought seventy-four feddans, eighteen qirat, twenty-two sahm from 
Emile 'Ades for £E9294 and in November 1943 she bought thirty-two 
feddans, twenty-six^qirat, sixteen sahm from the Agricultural Land Bank 
for £E2487. In June 1944 she bought 129 feddans, twenty-three qirat, 
five sahm from Subhi al-Shurbaqi for £E21,529. Her two brothers, Ahmad 
and 'Abd?- al-Hamid al-Wakil, bought 657 feddans for £E157,000 from the
25. Rizq, al-Kitab al-Aswad pp. 17, 18.
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Property Union C o m p a n y . 26
The other incident was that of a sale contract extracted from land 
registry records of the Mixed Court of Munsoura. In it, Zainab 
al-Wakil bought from Fuad Siraj al-Din eighty feddans, seven qirats and 
fourteen sahm in the area of Dimdash, centre of Sherbin, in the State 
Domain administration of Bihas for £E4283 and 519 millims, or at £E53 
per feddan. It had also been stated in the contract that £E1427 and 
840 millims of the total price of the land were paid on signing the 
contract and the balance of £E2855 and 679 millims was to be paid by 
the buyer directly to the treasury of the State Domaine by annual 
subscription, the last of which would be in the year 1955. Each 
subscription would be in the range of £E200 to £E250. Ahmad al-Wakil 
and another person witnessed the contract.27 What is interesting 
here, is Nahhas' silence regarding his wife's financial dealings as if 
it had nothing to do with him. Although he would defend his wife ,in 
his public speeches, yet he was able to distance himself from her 
concerning his own financial situation, for despite the fortune his 
wife was alleged to have gathered, he died without any property. In 
the same way he would distance himself from Amin Osman and Siraj 
al-Din, as if he left the "dirty work" to them and they got the blame 
while he got the glory. There is nothing to indicate that he objected 
to his wife's activities, and surely he was not the last to know about 
them. Thus if he was unaware of her financial dealings, then one could 
at least conclude that he consented. Some would argue as Dr. Salah 
al-Din did, that Nahhas' nature needed always someone to dominate him, 
and that was Maljram, later it became his wife.28 But Nahhas who was so
26. 'Asim Dessouki Kubar Mulak al-Ard al-Dhir'aya Wa Domuhum fi 
ul-Mujtam'a al-Misri 1914-1957 Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida Cairo 
1976, p. 49. Quoting Mahkamit al-Thaurat, Jalsit Mahkamit 
Z}Lnab-al Wakil 1,2 March 1954 Maslahit al-Istalamat.
27. Ebeid, pp. 44, 45.
28. al-Tabi'i p. 266.
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sensitive to any contact between Makram and the King, was well aware of 
its consequences and was firm in his decision to eliminate Makram from 
the Wafd, as with Mahir and Nokrashi before him, one could not but ask 
how is it he was not aware of the path along which his wife and Siraj 
al Din were leading him. But where they succeeded and the others had 
failed was that they did not threaten his position directly. Mahir 
wanted to depose Nahhas, and Makram's ambition of replacing Nahhas as 
prime minister surely was not hidden from the sensitive mind of
Nahhas. Thus Zainab and Siraj could do what they wanted, could
flourish, so long as Siraj's eye was not on Nahhas' chair, and Zainab's 
dealings did not contradict basically with his holding on to power. On 
the contrary, now he was over 63 years old, he had been several times 
Prime Minister, some even rumoured that he was aspiring to be treated 
as a prince. In 1935 he had told Fatma al-Yusuf that he was tired of 
being in opposition, so one could imagine his feelings in 1942.
Nahhas showed great political shrewdness in dealing with Makram's 
smear campaign. He refused to take him to court on the pretext that
that might take years, during which time the government would be under
public suspicion, and would be prevented from publishing ministerial 
statements or parliamentary discussions as that might influence the 
course of justice. Instead, he preferred to discuss the matter in 
Parliament.2® Makram's petition (the Black Book) was read in a secret 
session of Parliament when making a statement about the military 
situation. On 12 July 1943, Makram was expelled from the Chamber of 
Deputies by 208 votes to 17,80 and was later arrested by an order of 
the Military Governor, Nahhas himself, under the provision of the 
prevailing Martial Law. Siraj al-Din was moved from the Ministry of
29. Colombe p. 145.
30. Rizq, al-Kitab al-Aswad p. 136,
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Agriculture to the more important one of Interior. Earlier on 2 June 
1943, only ten days after the consideration of the Black Book, Amin 
Osman was brought into the cabinet. This was a gesture of gratitude to 
the British for their support during the Nahhas-Makram crisis.31
B. Relations with the Palace and the British
Nahhas was both preaching and implementing the alliance of 
co-operation with the British. On 22 February 1942, 'Abd al-Rahman 
'Azzam, President of the Territorial Army, was dismissed from his 
position. On 8 April 1942, 'Ali Mahir was arrested after he had been 
asked to refrain from any political activity, and was confined to his 
house. At the same time Nahhas vehemently rejected the rumours that 
Britain had asked the government to help it militarily. Instead, he 
emphasized the pledge he had made before coming to power that he would 
not offer one single Egyptian soldier whatever the situation. He then 
added that he had fulfilled his promise to implement the Treaty of 
Friendship in its letter and spirit, and that he would not allow any 
person to disrupt the terms of this treaty which should reassure 
Egypt's ally completely at a time when he was fighting for the defence 
of liberty and democracy. He also denounced the fifth column which was 
working for the disruption of the country, and he tightened up security 
measures. The Royal Automobile Club, whose members were suspected of 
harbouring Axis sympathies, was closed. Prince 'Abbas Halim and the 
President of the Egyptian Sports Union were arrested. The army was 
ordered to co-operate with the police in keeping law and order, while 
some other suspects were detained.32
Nahhas was not simply implementing Britain's orders in detaining
31. Ibid. pp. 132-136.
32. Colombe pp. 140-141.
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'Ali Mahir or 'Abbas Halim, he was also taking advantage of the 
convergence of Anglo-Wafd interests to punish his opponents. 
Otherwise, he remained faithful to his objective of complete 
independence. In the speech from the throne, he expressed his firm 
support for Britain and the implementation of the letter and spirit of 
the 1936 treaty* He also reiterated his belief in the policy of
"Sparing Egypt the Ravages of War". This was tantamount to neutrality, 
since it did not encourage Egyptian participation in the war.33 On 
another occasion, Lampson wrote that, in a meeting between Sir Stafford 
Cripps and Nahhas, the latter said that when the war was over there 
would be enough time to talk of Egyptian aspirations for complete 
independence. As Lampson noted, that was the first time that Nahhas 
hinted at a revision of the treaty.3^
Maybe Nahhas' mistake was his dependence on the goodwill of 
Britain. He thought that if he helped them in their hour of need, the 
British would show their gratitude after the war by fulfilling Egypt's 
aspiration, for complete independence. The lesson of World War I was 
forgotten, and Nahhas was only too happy to come back to power, 
forgetting for the moment how politics was played. He thought that the 
British, by restoring him to power, were conceding his argument that he 
represented Egypt, and that they were remedying the mistake of not 
backing him in 1937. By bringing him back, with a free hand to curtail 
the powers of the Palace, arresting 'All Mahir and the other Italians 
working in the Palace, he was adjusting the situation to normality. It 
was as if he had not been dismissed in 1937. Now that that was 
accomplished, coming back to power, a return to their main objective 
should follow, which was the national question. what Nahhas had
- \
33. Madabit Mafllis al-Nivjffip 19 November 1942, pp. 13, 14.
34. FO 371-31570 J1852/38/16 Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office (No.
1105) 15 April 1942.
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forgotten or miscalculated, was to press the British for a statement on 
that matter, as a condition of assuming the premiership on 4 February. 
Fuad Siraj al-Din retorted that it was immoral to press a friend and an 
ally in such a situation. Or was it a fear of a repetition of 1914: 
the Declaration of martial law and a new Protectorate? Most probably 
it was the latter reason, and as long as the Wafd was in power, they
felt the 1936 deal was honoured and independence was partially 
fulfilled. Thus Nahhas1 talk of a revision of the treaty, although 
sincere, was futile as later events had shown, for the time of 
bargaining had already passed.
Nahhas summarized the situation as he saw it in his annual speech 
on 13 November by stating that he shouldered the responsibility in 
answering the King's call, depending on God, on the support he got from 
the King, and the love and faith of the people. He added that his 
first task was to purify the atmosphere from whatever was poisoning it 
and safeguard the dignity of the country. He did not proceed to form 
the government without first exchanging the known letters with the 
British Ambassador. This way he had restored to Egypt its rights, 
safeguarded its dignity, and stressed its sovereignty and 
independence. Now that nine months had passed since the formation of 
his government it was his pleasure, he went on, to see the relation 
with the ally as best as it could be, and see the respect the ally had 
for our rights. Among other things, he. mentioned such actions by the 
government as the buying of the cotton crop, or the compulsory use of 
the Arabic language in commercial companies. He also referred to a 
welfare project sponsored by his wife and defended it.3®
This was the first time Nahhas publicly defended his wife, but not 
the last* Since then, his wife's actions would be a liability which he
35. al-Masri 14 November 1942, p. 2.
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had to bear. He no longer had to defend himself against charges of 
corruption as in the case of Seif al-Din in 1928.8® All charges now 
were against his wife who was becoming a target for the opposition. 
Nahhas did not restrain her, nor did he convince an increasing number 
of people, of the falsehood of the charges against her. On the 
contrary he flatly defended her as if she was a source of pride and not 
an embarrassment. Many people attributed that to the fact that she was 
younger than him by twenty-five years and the daughter of a Pasha, 
emphasizing his social inferiority complex and old age. His opponents 
portrayed her as his Marie Antoinette.
Nahhas1 policy of appeasing the British was bearing fruit when he 
declared in Parliament that, while his government was paying attention 
to the interests of the nation and its fate during the war, it was also 
concerned with its interests after the war when peace negotiations were 
due to start. He had raised the matter with the British Ambassador as 
early as last June, and ascertained that Egypt would be represented in 
the peace negotiations on an equal basis with other participants. 
Although she had not yet entered the war, she nevertheless suffered 
from its consequences, and provided every assistance within its 
capability according to the terms of the Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance with Britain. It was his pleasure to announce that he had 
received the following statement from the British Ambassador on 15 
November: that he (Ambassador) had reported to his government the
verbal demands which were presented to him on 11 June concerning the 
participation of Egypt in the peace negotiations, and that he was now 
authorized to inform him that his government would do its utmost to 
fulfil Egypt's demand in participating equally in all peace 
negotiations which dealt with her interests directly. Furthermore, the
36. See Chapter Two, p. 8^?H
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British government would not enter into any discussions concerning the 
direct interests of Egypt during these negotiations without first 
consulting the Egyptian government.87
Nahhas, who was keen ever since 1936 on winning the favour of the 
army, was well aware that the 4 February incident had set the younger 
army officers against him. Many of the" officers after the 1952 
military take over had revealed that Nahhas was never forgiven for his 
role that day. On 5 September 1942, he secured the release of ’Aziz 
al-Masri from detention and took the credit for it.88
As for Nahhas* policy towards the King, it was not very cordial. 
With the full backing of the British and the recovery from five years 
in the political wilderness, he had no reason to be lenient or 
forgiving. But being the political animal that he was, he underplayed 
his role. On the King's birthday, 11 February 1943, he gave an 
official reception at the Z'afran Palace and made a complimentary 
speech in the King's honour.3® Yet on 15 March, the anniversary of 
the Constitution, matters were different. Nahhas broadcast from his 
house a review of the progress and setbacks of the Constitution. The 
reference to King Fuad and his son Faruk were clear, as he blamed 
non-Wafdist governments for undermining the Constitution.^®
On the Palace side, every opportunity was taken to try to dismiss 
Nahhas. After the publication of Makram's Black Book, Hassanein 
tendered his resignation, protesting at the continuing presence of the 
Wafd in government after the scandals which had been revealed, which 
» *
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were ultimately to cause the revolt of the people against Nahhas or the 
British, thus making his position impossible. Hassanein hoped that his 
resignation, together with the impact of Makram's Black Book, would 
give the King the excuse to dismiss Nahhas. Lampson reacted vehemently 
by warning the King of any imprudent action. Once more, British 
support proved necessary for Nahhas to remain in power, and Amin Osman 
was brought into the cabinet.41
Clashes between the government and the Palace continued as usual 
over several issues. One in September 1942 was about who should 
preside over the Azhar celebrations of one thousand years, Shaikh
al-Maraghi of the Azhar, favoured by the Palace, or the Minister of 
Waqf? the result being an indefinite postponement of the celebrations. 
Another issue was the demand by the Palace to dismiss Hamdi Seif
al-Nasr and Najib al-Hilali during a cabinet reshuffle. This demand 
was ignored. Seif al-Nasr had made statements in front of some army 
officers which were regarded disloyal to the throne? and Al-Hilali 
attacked Hassanein in the Chamber of Deputies. However, when
al-Maraghi tendered his resignation over the policy of the government 
following the strike of the Azharites, Nahhas, contrary to the wishes 
of the Palace, was glad to accept it. A compromise was reached by 
giving him sabbatical leave. The dispute took on a new dimension when 
the Palace insisted that al-Maraghi should pray on Fridays with the 
King during Ramadan of August 1944. No minister could attend such
Friday prayers lest it be interpreted that Maraghi had been 
reinstated* The cold war between the two opponents intensified when 
malaria spread in some provinces of Upper Egypt. The King used his 
visit to these areas to highlight the government's failure to handle
41. Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat pp. 452-453. FO 371/41237 Desp No. 207 
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the situation there. Similar visits by Nahhas angered the Palace, for 
they negated whatever impression the King might have c r e a t e d . ^2
Nahhas' problems came not only from the Palace, but also from 
other emerging political ideologies and issues which he had to deal 
with. Signing the treaty with Britain did not give Nahhas a free hand 
as he had hoped. It was time that the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was
settled, but other supra-national ideologies would soon attempt to
replace Egyptian nationalism by a far wider nationalism, whether 
Islamic or Arab. The former found its expression in the Muslim
Brotherhood, which was gradually transferring its activities from the 
purely religious field to the political arena. That came when Hassan 
al-Banna, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood stood as parliamentary 
candidate for Ism'ailiya in the elections of 1942 conducted under 
Nahhas' government. It was said that Nahhas did not even know of the 
political objectives of the Brotherhood, and did not take any notice of 
Banna's candidature. It was Muhamma_d 'Afifi Shahin, editor of the 
al-Hawadith, a Wafd newspaper at the time, who brought the matter to 
Nahhas' attention. Shahin gave him full details about the 
ramifications of the Brotherhood all over Egypt with all the names of 
the staff employed by al-Banna and his branch organizations. It was at 
that point that Nahhas became alert. He knew quite well the 
consequences of introducing religious issues into politics. It was not 
long before Nahhas summoned al-Banna and, after a long conversation
with some threatening language being used by Nahhas, al-Banna agreed to 
withdraw his candidature. Al-Banna, who had given Nahhas a brief 
account of the history of his group and the reforms he wanted, was able 
to bargain his candidature withdrawal for some demands, mainly the 
restriction on the sale of alcohol and the banning of prostitution.
42. Ibid., pp. 454-455.
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Nahhas for his part, argued that this was a political matter, and that 
he would implement al-Banna's demands. After that Nahhas, as a 
military governor of Egypt, instructed that the sale and consumption of 
liquor in all establishments during certain hours of the day and during 
the period of Ramadan, as well as certain other days as the birth of 
the Prophet, should be banned. Also prostitution was made i l l e g a l . 43
Another version of the episode, which does not contradict the 
previous one, was that Nahhas asked al-Banna to withdraw his 
candidature in exchange for giving him (al-Banna) a free hand in 
preaching for his group but on religious matters o n l y . a 
pro-Brotherhood account of the same episode says that only after the 
British Ambassador had advised Nahhas, did the latter summon al-Banna 
and threatened him that if he did not withdraw his candidature, then he 
would order the closure of the society's branches. Actually, fifty 
were closed, but members of the society rebelled and tried to enter 
their branches by force and reopen them. Nahhas was forced to back 
down from his position and reopen them. Fuad Siraj al-Din and 'Abd 
al-Hamid 'Abd al-Khaliq joined the society as honorary m e m b e r s . 45
Another issue which transcended Egyptian nationalism was the 
problem of Palestine and Arab nationalism. It had been argued for a 
long time that the Wafd was not interested in Arab affairs, due to some 
remarks made by Zaghlul when he was approached in 1919 to co-ordinate 
in the Paris Peace Conference with other Arab leaders. It was reported 
at the time that he asserted that the Egyptian cause was not an Arab 
one. There is also Zaghlul's famous comment on the same issue "If you
43. J. Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, 
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add zero to zero what will be the r e s u l t ? "46 one could argue that the 
intellectual heritage of the Wafd was for an Egyptian territorial 
identity more linked to the West, since in terms of civilization 
Egypt's Pharaonic and Hellenistic periods were an integral part of the 
Mediterranean world. Thus Alexandria was a vital centre of that 
classical heritage. The choice of Zaghlul's tomb in mixed Pharaonic 
style and modern European style were two models to be looked to, one 
for heritage, another as an example of government to be emulated. It 
is interesting to note, for example, how men of the liberal parties, 
all descended from the Umma Party and the school of thought of Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid, would be described by the British as friendly to 
Britain, although political disagreements existed, while the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Young Egypt were considered to be "anti-Western".
What made matters worse, was that liberal tendencies had to 
compete with pan-Islamism or Arabism, especially when the Palace chose 
to support these tendencies in order to enhance its autocratic power 
against those of the Western-trained - particularly French - liberal 
lawyers and intellectuals. It was not strange therefore that 
Egyptianism would be associated with European liberalism and a 
dependence on Britain, and Pan-Islamism or Arabism would acquire strong 
anti-liberal tendencies especially since it was used by the Palace* 
Thus we find a situation in which anti-British feelings turn into 
anti-liberal feelings, especially when events had shown how the 
interests of both "Egyptian Liberalism" coincided with those of 
"British colonialism", as in February 1942.
Thus for the Wafd and Nahhas, Palestine and Arabism were viewed 
from the perspective of their struggle with the Palace and their 
relationship with the British. While the Palace, Young Egypt and the
46. Anis Sa’igh, Al-Fikrat al-'Arabiya fi Misr Beirut 1959, p. 142.
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Muslim Brotherhood were increasingly using Palestine as an issue 
against the Wafd, Nahhas had sooner or later to change the Wafd's stand 
and outbid his rivals. The chance presented itself to Nahhas when 
talks for Arab unity started in 1943, and he seized it for a multitude 
of reasons.
This was not the first time that Nahhas would deal with the issue 
of Arab unity; in 1936 he had refused an offer by Nuri Pasha al Said 
and later Hikmat Sulaiman of Iraq of an Egyptian-Iraqi alliance on the 
grounds that he did not wish to get involved in general complications 
and wished first to consolidate Egypt's position.47 Although the
unity of Arabs was referred to by him in his speeches of 13 November 
1938, 1939, as well as a demand for a just solution for the Palestine 
issue (13 November 1937), his idea of Arab unity was the promotion of 
economic and cultural inter-Arab relations. And if this could be 
achieved then steps aimed at political co-operation could be initiated 
"with each country retaining its political identity in accordance with 
its special circumstances and needs",48 This view of Nahhas which was 
considered a tremendous advance over that of Zaghlul, was combined with 
his desire as the leader of the wealthiest and most populous Arab 
country to be the sole arbiter and mediator among the Arab states.
That would have greatly enhanced his own prestige vis-a-vis the
opposition minority parties and the Palace elements within Egypt.49
Pan-Arabism received a great push when Anthony Eden in his
Guildhall speech in November 1941 referred to Arab aspirations for
unity and expressed his support for any scheme that commanded general
47. Ahmad M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States,
Wartime. Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics 1941-1945 Longman, 1977 
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approval. Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, presented a
memorandum to Sir Richard Casey, British Minister in the Middle East,
proposing a unity of Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan into one state in a
federation with Iraq, which other Arab states could join. That was not
considered to be in the best interests of Egypt, since it challenged
its leadership in the Arab World. Moreover, both the Hashemite
monarchies in Iraq and Jordan were regarded as British puppets. The
project did not live long and died due to the efforts of Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, whose monarch was afraid of Hashemite hegemony.50
In March 1943, Hurl tried once more by proposing to Nahhas the
holding of an Arab conference. Being suspicious of a Palace-Nuri
connection, Nahhas refused the idea of an unofficial conference as
suggested by the l a t t e r . B u t  Nuri recognised Nahhas' desire to make
up for the Palace antagonism and his (Nahhas) difficulties following
the Black Book incident, by posing as the leader of the Arab world.
Nuri also recognized the strong streak of vanity in Nahhas' character,
and, by playing on this weakness, he hoped to win him over. Meanwhile
Nahhas was under increasing public pressure from the opposition and the
Palace elements concerning his Arab policy. In reply to a question put
forward by Dr. Haykal, Nahhas made a statement in the Senate on 30
March 1943 indicating his long interest in Arab affairs and outlining
his plan for future Arab relations. By defining his role as that of
exploiting different views and of reconciling them, he conceived of
himself as the arbiter in the Arab arena.
The fact that it was he rather than any other Arab leader,
who was wooed by Nuri al-Said, gave him the leading role he
had aspired for. This did not leave much room for the
anti-Wafd elements to criticize him on that account and it
justified his plan to deal with the whole issue in his own 
52way. ^
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Nahhas started his negotiations with each Arab state separately in 
order to reach a loose organization of Arab unity, by which Egypt's 
position could be retained and Iraq's attempt to forge a union under 
its leadership be foiled. Thus Nahhas in his talks with the Syrian 
delegate in Alexandria on 26 October 1943 raised doubts as to the 
possibility of the realization of the Greater Syria project on the 
basis of complete fusion, since each of the component states had its 
identity, distinct national development and regime. He also referred 
to the difficulties presented by the Maronites in Lebanon and the Jews 
in Palestine. He then explained the suggestion put forward by the 
Prime Minister of Transjordan about the initial unity of his country 
with Syria to be followed by a federation with Palestine and Lebanon. 
This, added Nahhas, raised the difficult issue of the different forms 
of government in existence in both Syria and Transjordan.^ Nahhas 
was to reach his objective, thanks to the Saudis, Syrians and Lebanese, 
whose interests fell in line with those of Egypt, and the Arab League 
was formed and its Protocol was signed on 7 October 1944, just one day 
before Nahhas was dismissed from office.
The end of the Nahhas government came when the British ceased to
support the government over its dispute with the King. On Friday, 15 
September 1944, when the King was on his way to prayer, he ordered 
Ghazali Bey, Head of Public Security, to remove some placards ^ fitJ:.ep 
on it^J'Long live the King and Nahhas”. In the evening Fuad Siraj 
al-Din, as Minister of the Interior, ordered the suspension of Ghazali
from duty, and that was published in the following morning's
newspapers. Naturally, the King insisted that Ghazali should remain in 
his posr. Lampson was absent in holiday, and the British decided not to 
interfere. The Palace took it as an encouraging sign, a green light,
53. Gomaa, pp. 179-180 FO 371/3462 Sir Harold Machichael to C.O. 16
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so to s p e a k . ^4 Nahhas, according to Hassanein, planned to summon a 
cabinet meeting at 7 pm on 8 October 1944, in order to submit his 
resignation that evening as a protest against British intervention in 
the Ghazali question, and to publish the letters exchanged between 
himself and the Embassy concerning the Ghazali a f f a i r . ^5 The King 
pre-empted Nahhas1 action by dismissing him. Why did Nahhas act so 
weakly, as a British report asked? Was it perhaps because Nahhas 
considered his Presidency of the Arab Unity Conference (which had 
concluded its work in a blaze of glory the day before the dismissal) 
would deter the King from action. Or did the frank interview with the 
Ambassador on 6 September 1944, which dashed any hopes of implementing 
a popular policy of treaty revision, make him realize that the Wafd 
would be stronger in opposition than in power?
C. Back to the Political Wilderness
Although the Nahhas cabinet had lost quite a substantial amount of 
support in office, the mere fact of dismissing it on unconstitutional 
grounds portrayed Nahhas and the Wafd as defenders of the Constitution 
and enemies of absolute rule. Thus Nahhas became once more a martyr in 
the eyes of the public and regained whatever popularity he had lost.^ 
Ahma_d Mahir's government started an investigation into the accusations 
raised by Makram against Nahhas and his colleagues in the Black Book, 
threatening to undermine the position of Nahhas and the Wafd. A 
ministerial committee headed by the Minister of Finance was set up to
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investigate the financial dealings of the previous government. Its 
first action was to ask Nahhas and Siraj a 1-Din, as ex-Minister of 
Social Affairs, to return the sum of £E170,000 which was gathered as 
donations for the victims of malaria, and which was allegedly deposited 
in the Prime Minister's personal account rather than in the Egyptian 
National Bank.^ The attempts by the government to blacken the name 
of Nahhas and his rule, especially with the charge of corruption, did 
not produce the necessary results, and the investigations in the 
charges presented against Nahhas resulted in nothing at all; they died 
out quietly.
But the most serious challenge did not come from the post 1919 
politicians like Mahir and Nokrashi and the others, i.e., the
traditional elite, who still believed and worked through the methods of 
the twenties and thirties. These were mainly peaceful and legal
methods, of charges and counter-charges of corruption, or the 
mishandling of public affairs and abuse of personal power for nepotism 
and exceptional promotions. These were charges which were held in any 
elections, or in press campaigns with eyes fixed on forthcoming 
elections. Any action did not amount to more than litigation in the 
courts, or a counter-press campaign. As at the end of World War One 
the rise of new social forces led to social and political turmoil with 
a sharp rise in political violence. With the revolutionaries of 1919 
becoming the traditional ruling elite of post-war Egypt after the 
Second World War, the same process was repeated now with new social
forces on the rise and an escalation of political violence. This time
it was the traditional politicians who were its victims, as were the 
politicians of the previous political order in 1919. Butrus Ghali and 
Yusuf Wahba- were now replaced by Mahir and Nahhas. The bullets of the
58. Colombe, p. 263.
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new assassins did not differentiate between one party or the other, for 
most of them did not belong to parties and were against most, if not 
-all, parties.
These new social forces were almost the same as in 1919, a small 
working class and an urban professional middle class. They were 
distinguished from their predecessors by two factors. First, the 
previous generation were not the only rising social force; a powerful 
landowner class was already in the making and was demanding its full 
share in political power. Thus political parties were formed whose 
political outlook, policies and alliances could be traced back to their 
social roots, urban or rural. The new urban middle class was not
hindered by the landowners as was the case after World War I. This 
time they allied themselves with the working class, and provided much 
of their leadership. Several factors led to that situation. First, 
while in the pre-1914 situation, the landowners who were first allied 
to the urban professionals, were to discover that their interests did 
not complement each other but were diametrically opposed, and therefore 
allied themselves with the Palace. Thus the whole political situation 
was paralyzed in a battle between these two forces which took the form
of the struggle for the Constitution, while the working class, because
of their small size, played a marginal role.
After World War II, a new urban middle class was emerging, with a 
complete monopoly over new social-political movements with no 
competition from any other rising social class. There were no rising 
landowners. The working class remained almost as small as ever and did 
not present a major threat in terms of a social base for competing
leadership or ideology, as did the landowners before and after World 
War I. The second feature of this post-World War II middle class which 
differentiated it from the old one, was that the new one was more petit 
bourgeois than the old middle-class one. Thus while the old ones rose
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up the social ladder with Nahhas, they were transferred to the 
upper-middle class. Due to the increase of population and the number 
of educated Egyptians, the developments of new professions such as 
journalism, the lawyer of 1919 became more a part of the establishment, 
while the journalist, army officer, teacher and also some lawyers, 
constituted a new brand of middle-class, the lower-middle class or 
petite bourgeoisie.
The urban capitalists, contrary to some arguments, played a very 
minor role because they hardly existed. The few who did were hampered 
by the rural landowners who comprised most of the traditional ruling 
elite with their interests well defended, and who refused legislation 
in parliament which they controlled that levied taxes on land or that 
favoured land reform which some of the new capitalists were demanding 
to accelerate the capitalist development of Egypt. The Capitulations 
and foreign competition also played a role in diminishing the role and 
power of the new Capitalists or Entrepreneurs. Although the Treaty of 
Montreux in 1937 put an end to the Capitulations system, it was not 
until 1949 that this system was completely abolished. Besides, most 
native capitalists had to link themselves to foreign capital as 
happened to Misr Bank, so that the "National Bourgeoise" were not quite 
native.59
The third main difference between the "old" urban middle class and 
"new lower" middle class or "petite bourgeoise" was ideological. The 
former had experienced the failure of the Urabi revolt of 1882, and the 
collapse of the Watani Party's "No Negotiations except after 
Evacuation" policy.^ The ideas of the Umma Party, which reflected 
the rural large landowners prevailed among the political elite of both 
&
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social groups, were those of democratic institutions and of the 
peaceful, legal resolution of domestic and national issues. Thus one 
could say that a whole social force adopted the ideas of another social 
group. This general^ new was to dominate that social group in the 
future. Nahhas' example could not be better illustrated. But with the 
failure of this approach, a small number started to doubt and question 
its efficacy. Al-Khaskoul for example*^ and several new groups 
renounced this "false" ideology which they felt did not quite express 
their views, and a search for a new ideology was pursued. Of these new 
political groups, were "Young Egypt" and the "Muslim Brotherhood". 2^ 
They were the "true" expression of the new urban middle class and a 
continuation of the intransigent or extreme strand of the pre-World War 
I Watani Party. With the failure of constitutional institutions to 
preserve themselves - the Constitution was suspended twice and 
completely changed once, besides the rigging elections - faith in 
liberal democracy was being eroded. The 1936 Treaty and the 1942 
Palace incident showed the limits of the power and path of the Wafd, 
and to what extent their nationalism depended on how much British 
support they could get to attain power. With the ideological decline 
of the Wafd, other groups were gradually replacing them, at a time of 
the expansion of the urban middle class and the rise of new elements of 
the petite bourgeoisie. Thus Young Egypt (Islamic National Party, 
later the Socialist Party), the Muslim Brotherhood and a variety of 
Marxist groups expanded rapidly after World War II with new recruits, 
politicized activists disillusioned with the traditional politicians, 
including Nahhas and his Wafd party.
The traditional ruling elite, in other words, responded to the
61 . See Chapter Two, p.35" •
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failure of their methods by adopting a negative approach, that is, by 
abstaining from acting the way they had, and moving from negotiation to 
non-negotiation. They also kept holding firmly to the political 
framework they were functioning in. New solutions were to be sought 
within the framework of parliamentary democracy, and the peaceful legal 
resolution of conflict. But for the new social and political groups, 
the whole experience was rejected; parliamentary democracy and peaceful 
legal methods were rejected outright. As a result the Wafd underwent
an experience similar to that of the pre-1919 elite during the
inter-war period, that is, that of a conservative ruling elite coming 
under increasing pressure from new forces. These new pressures 
manifested themselves in the same way, namely political violence and 
assassination attempts.
Although the first victim in this post-war terror campaign was the 
Saadist Prime Minister, Ahmad Mahir, the Wafd found itself a target of
these rebellious young men. A bomb was thrown at the car of Nahhas
with the intention to assassinate him on 6 December 1945, but he 
escaped injury.^ One of the assailants was a dissatisfied young army 
officer by the name of Anwar al-Sadat.54 >jhe same group was to 
attempt a more successful assault on Amin Osman less than a month 
later. In his confessions, Hussein Tewfiq maintained that his group 
took the responsibility of eliminating both Nahhas and Osman as the 
persons primarily responsible for the incident of 4 February 1942. 
Besides Tewfiq and Sadat, Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil (a future Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 1978-79) was also implicated.55 There is no doubt 
that the Palace was pleased, and that it supported the vigorous
63. Anwar al-'Amrusi Al-Gara'im al-Siyassiya fi Misr Matba'ait 
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campaign by the press to condemn Nahhas for his role in February 1942. 
Whether the Palace was directly or indirectly responsible for these 
violent acts is beside the point, for these incidents revealed two 
things: first, that these press campaigns did not fall on deaf ears,
but were well received by young educated, resentful youth who had lost
faith in parliamentary democracy and its principal advocate, the Wafd
Party. Second, they highlighted the increasing rift between the Wafd, 
as the representative of the urban middle class and the post-war urban 
petit bourgeois class.
Naturally, with the increase of the size of the urban population, 
the number of workers, students, government officials and members of 
the professions increased, so that the number of people interested and 
involved in politics also i n c r e a s e d . 6 6  Also, the greater availability 
of public education during the inter-war period, inflated the student 
population especially from the lower middle class. A university at 
Cairo was opened in 1925, and another in Alexandria in the 1942s. The
result was that members of these new groups entered the military
profession and journalism, changing the social composition of these two 
professional groups.57
These social changes were reflected in the articles written by a 
young Wafdist in a newly established Wafdist organ, A1 Wafd al-Masri. 
In a report to the Ministry of the Interior during the Sidqi government 
of 1946, the newspaper was accused of adopting a bias towards the left 
and socialism. Its continued publication was considered a threat to 
the security of the country and a danger to its social system which was 
protected by Article 15 of the Constitution. Investigations by the 
security authorities revealed that Dr. Muhammad Mandur who contributed
66. Vatikiotis, p. 270.
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regularly to the newspaper was politically active against the basic 
principles of the Constitution and the social basis of the community. 
Finally the report recommended the suppression of the newspaper.58
The Wafd was not completely alien to this new generation, large 
segments of which joined its ranks. The party was not yet denuded of 
all credibility and still had some of its glamorous popular attraction 
as the defender of constitutional rights and the leading force in the 
national struggle. There were, however, already voices raised to 
curtail the power of the large landowners, as suggested by two members
of the Senate.59
At the same time King Farouk’s pictures were stamped upon by the 
students on his birthday in a clear defiance of the monarchy, 
suggesting that the new trend was moving against both the large 
landowning class and its most obvious symbol, the monarchy. While the 
general mood was against the landowners, the Wafd was moving in the
opposite direction when its leadership was being infiltrated by more 
landowners. The apparent symbol of the landowners in the Wafd was none 
other than Fuad Siraj al-Din, a Liberal Constitutionalist who had 
joined the Wafd in 1936,^1 and became a member of its High Command in
1944. A notable with a large fortune, he was ready to accommodate 
non-Wafdists and appease the monarchy, the latter tendency being
79attributed by some to his non-Wafdist origins.'^
It was not surprising that the pre-Second World War political
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groups which were on the fringe of the political arena should gain 
ground at the expense of the Wafd and attract those who used to form 
its traditional social base. The Muslim Brethren, as noticed by one 
scholar, was based on the urban, not rural, society. Since the 1940s a 
half-agricultural and half-artisan "proletariat", which was disoriented 
by the "city lights", found refuge in the Brotherhood. Small
businessmen and artisans who were pressed by the economic hardship of 
the war also joined the movement. Students at the university in Cairo 
who were actual members or sympathizers, counted for about 30 per cent 
of the total membership of the Brotherhood, with the strongest presence 
at the Faculty of Law. The leadership consisted mainly of lawyers, 
magistrates, and lecturers, some of them French-trained. The society's 
upper stratum resembled that of the Wafd, though of an inferior
q u a l i t y . A  British report supported the notion of the increasing 
shifting loyalty of the urban middle classes to the side of the Moslem 
Brethren, and the Egyptian headmaster of a large Egyptian secondary 
school was quoted as saying that the Wafd was now in a minority in the 
schools and universities? that the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were by far the 
strongest, and the "Front of Egypt" i.e., 'All Mahir's organisation, 
was also quite strong? that he was astonished to hear in his school one 
day during some demonstrations cries of "Down with Nahhas", and that 
students were fed up with the old refrains of the Wafd such as
"National Government" and "Free Elections"
D . The Years of Upheaval and Social Change 1946-1949
What is interesting is that Nahhas1 approach to different
political and national issues did not change; it continued along the
%
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same line adopted since the Wafd was formed. When Ibrahim 'Abd 
al-Hadi, Vice President of the Saadist Party, was appointed Head of the 
Royal Cabinet, Nahhas protested by not signing his name in the King's
visitors' book on the King's birthday. That was a breach on the part
of the King to a tradition of appointing only non-party senior 
statesmen, and it was rumoured that the Wafd would demand that the 
position be occupied by a Wafdist on returning to power.75 That was
not to happen, as the King grew more and more autocratic and careless,
which led some scholars to believe that, with the sudden death of 
Hassanein, the only restraint over the King was removed. Feelings also 
grew against the King, as seen during his birthday the following 
year.7^ There were also some rumours that his life was in danger, 
which forced him to cancel his visit to the university.77
While political and social changes were taking place in society at 
large, the traditional parties and politicians were pursuing their 
usual course of party squabblings and house-tidying. Sidqi, appointed 
Prime Minister in 1946, embarked on the mission to resolve the national 
issue. Once more, the issue of who should negotiate with the British, 
resurfaced. Sidqi, through 'All al-Shamsi, offered to include Nahhas in 
the negotiating team. Sidqi was to be the president of the delegation, 
and elections would be held after the negotiations. Nahhas insisted 
that a declaration be obtained from the British that they agreed to 
free negotiations on the basis of evacuation and the unity of the Nile 
Valley. He also asked for a neutral government to be formed and fresh 
elections to be held at once. Later Nahhas agreed to the postponement 
of elections until after the negotiations, whether these were
75. FO 371/45917 J773 Sir R. Campbell Cairo (No. 409) 15 February
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successful or not. He also agreed to the maintenance of the present 
government provided he was the head of the negotiating delegation.7®
Naturally Sidqi refused Nahhas* terms, and the Wafd reverted to 
its old custom of attacking the former on the grounds that he was 
unsupported in his national cause by yielding to British demands. At 
the same time, as a British report noted, the Wafd was attacking Sidqi 
more than the British, and that these tactics were possibly due to the 
desire of the Wafd not to burn all the bridges between itself and the 
British for the time when a change of government was thought to be
possible.7®
In his memoirs, Sidqi explained the reasons for the failure of his 
negotiations as having been due to the notion of an alliance with 
Britain that was rejected by a section of public opinion for whom the 
alliance was always portrayed as a constraint on Egypt's independence. 
That section believed that with some pressure and firmness Egypt could 
free itself from the Treaty and its obligations, and from the Defence 
Committee. It could also force the British to evacuate Egypt and 
abandon the Sudan and acknowledge Egypt's rights t h e r e . T h e  
statement published by the Wafd objecting to any new treaty with
Q-l
Britain fell on the deaf ears of a bored public. 1 Negotiators
changed opinion under the pressure of public o p i n i o n , which Sic^ qi
attributed to the efforts of a major communist state in convincing a 
section of the public opinion that the national issue would only be
78. FO 371 J992 Lord Killearn (No. 401) 4 March 1946. FO 371/53330
J1064/59/16 Mr. Bowker to Mr Bevin Weekly Political Report 9 March
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resolved through the United Nations Security Council, where Britain 
could not isolate Egypt.®5
On the one hand, national consciousness in Egypt was moving 
towards accepting the futility of . any further negotiations with 
Britain. The alternative to that was the traditional one of playing on 
the contradiction of the international scene. That had been tried 
before by Mustafa Kamil with the French and Saad Zaghlul with the 
Americans. In both unsuccessful cases, the opposing power was another 
Western liberal democracy whose system did not cause any fears to the 
Egyptian leadership. This time the situation was entirely new. The 
Western democracies were confronted with a communist challenge in what 
was rapidly developing into a "cold war". That forced the Western 
democracies to close ranks and eventually eliminate any risk of a 
struggling liberal nationalist movement such as the Wafd in Egypt and 
its counterparts, Saadists or Sidqi, to manipulate the differences or 
contradictions which existed inside their camp. What made matters 
worse, was that the Western powers in their new bid for power, in their 
ensuing struggle against the Soviet Union, linked their overall global 
strategy with the defence and security of their spheres of influence, 
such as Egypt. Thus Egypt's defence was not only related to Britain as 
was the case in the Treaty of 1936, but Egypt was part of a Middle 
Eastern policy incorporated in a more general Western alliance. Thus 
Nahhas' main objection to the proposed treaty of Sidqi-Bevin was that 
this time Egypt had to defend not only its borders, but any threat to 
the Middle East, which would make the British presence permanent.84 
So in his annual speech on 13 November, he demanded the termination of 
the 1936 Treaty as the United Nations had now the full responsibility
83. Ibid p . 126 .
84. Al-Masri, 14 November 1946, p. 5.
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of preserving peace, and its Charter announced the termination of any
treaty whose provisions contradicted those of the Charter.®5
Since the Wafd had confined itself from the start to settling the
Egyptian-British dispute through peaceful negotiations, it really had
no alternative, if these negotiations did not produce the satisfactory
results, but to stop negotiating in the hope that, with some pressure
from inside Egypt, the British would yield to Egyptian demands when the
next round of negotiations began. If pressure from inside Egypt was
not enough, pressure on Britain from other countries was foreseen, as
Zaghlul tried to do in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. This was
available in the framework of the United Nations, including the
diplomatic support of the Soviet Union.®® Nothing would have been
more disturbing to the Wafd or any other traditional rival politician
than being accused of making contacts with the communist republics of
the Soviet Union.
In these circumstance, Nahhas signed his name in the King’s book
on the occasion of Bair am in 1946, for the first time since he was
dismissed. Another gesture of moderation was the holding back of a
Wafdist manifesto and the adoption of a more moderate tone towards the
British. The Wafd was further encouraged by the fact that important
members of Sidqi's negotiating team were known to be in favour of Wafd
87participation in the government and the delegation. Although
disappointed by the reinstatement of Nol^rashi as Prime Minister later 
in the year, Nahhas and other prominent Wafdists nevertheless called at 
the Palace to inscribe their names in the Royal Book on the return of 
the King to Alexandria on 17 September 1946.®®
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E. 1947: The Beginnings of Change
While Nahhas was manoeuvring with the Palace and other political 
parties in his old-fashioned way, the year 1946 saw two major 
developments which had far reaching consequences for the Wafd in 
particular, and Egyptian political life in general. The first was the 
change which occurred in the leadership of the Party due to the death 
of Sabri Abu 'Alam, in April 1947, the Secretary General of the Party, 
and one of the "Old Guard". A struggle for power ensued between the 
remnants of the "Old Guard" which belonged to the professional urban 
middle class, such as 'Abd al-Fatah al-Tawil, who believed he had every 
right to inherit the leadership of the party on one side, and the new 
elements from the large landowners who joined the party after the year 
1936 and especially during the years of World War II, on the other, and 
best represented by Siraj al-Din, al-Badrawi 'Ashur (relatives of the 
former) and al-Wakil (relatives of Madame Nahhas).®® It was reported 
that Nahhas* candidate for the post was 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa (a 
lawyer from Tanta and colleague of Nahhas during the 1919 revolution), 
who was not himself keen on the post, but wanted instead the post of 
Vice-President of the Wafd so that in time he could succeed Nahhas. 
The other name mentioned was 'Abd al-Fatah al-Tawil (of similar 
background). Nahhas was apparently reluctant to appoint Siraj al-Din 
for fear of displeasing the old guard because of his comparative 
youth. He also suspected Siraj al-Din of being too conciliatory 
towards the Palace.®0 Eventually 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa (Deputy 
since 1924) was appointed Secretary-General of the Wafd. In May 1947 
Mahmud Sulaiman Ghannam (member of the student's committee in 1919, 
lawyer, and Deputy since 1930) became Assistant Secretary-General, and
89. Anis Al—1 Usui al-Tarikhiyya pp. 151-152.
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'All Zaki al-Urabi (BA Law in 1903, subsequently professor of law) 
became leader of the Wafdist opposition in the Senate. A British 
source commented that although junior elements (most probably new, not 
junior, elements) of the Wafd were disappointed that Siraj al-Din was 
not appointed as Secretary General, it would appear that the unity of 
the Wafd had not been affected by the above appointments.®1
Thus it appeared that the old guard, the traditional middle class, 
was able to preserve its position in the Wafd leadership, but that was 
only short lived. In fact, the old guard was already in eclipse. 
Another element however came to challenge them. It came from the same 
grass roots from which the "Old Guard" had derived their legitimacy. 
These were the young men who joined the Wafd but could not reach its 
upper echelons which were monopolized by the "Old Guard" and the large 
landowners. As a result most members of the second and third layers of 
the party were occupied by these new elements. They were to be found 
in the youth committees and the Parliamentary Committee,®5 More 
significantly they formed the Wafdist Vanguard in March 1947. Thus one 
could argue that thanks to Nahhas1 policy of recruitment, the Wafd was 
divided into three factions. The "Old Guard" and the landowners who 
divided the leadership among them, and the Wafd Vanguard who were 
strongly present outside the leadership. While Nahhas himself was 
originally from the same group of the "Old Guard", yet by encouraging 
elements of the landowners into the leadership, and without including 
any from the Vanguard he was strongly weakening the "Old Guard".
Press reports of an estrangement between Nahhas and Na^ib 
al-Hilali were confirmed by Embassy sources. Hilali had refused to 
defend Madame Nahhas1 brother, A^mad al-Wakil, who appeared before the
91. FO 371-63020 J2147/79/16 Sir R. Campbell (No. 1097) Cairo 10 May 
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court on a charge of violating the regulations governing the issue of 
import and export licences.®5 It was Nahhas this time, through his 
wife, who was causing dismay among his lieutenants, as in 1942 with 
Makram. Hilali was to defect later in 1950, thus weakening even more 
the lawyers' faction inside the Wafd.
The year 1947 witnessed another development on the Egyptian 
political scene. This concerned the handling of the Egyptian national 
issue. For the first half of the year, political life continued as it 
did before: the Wafd went on with its traditional policy of rallying
the people against the British, while at the same time sending discreet 
signals to the British that no settlement with Egypt could be concluded 
without their full approval. And on 15 July 1947, the Wafd issued a 
manifesto attacking the government and demanding the termination of the 
treaties of 1936 and 1899. Siraj al-Din passed the word to the Embassy 
that he wished them to know that declarations made by the Wafdist press 
against Anglo-Egyptian alliance were not to be taken seriously, and 
that if the Wafd came to power they would be quite prepared to 
negotiate on the basis of an alliance.®^
On the other hand, a proposal by Haykal (Liberal Constitutionals) 
for national front was refused by the Wafd on the grounds that it was 
useless since it was not supported by the King.®5 Nahhas was reported 
to have said to the press that only the King was in a position to make 
an appeal for union and then all would obey him. This was regarded as 
an adroit manoeuvre by Nahhas to put the King in the position of
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opposing the union if he did not act on this suggestion.®5 That was 
followed by negotiations between the Palace and the Wafd for the Wafd's 
entry into the government and joining the delegation for treaty 
negotiation. The Palace insisted on Nokrashi as Prime Minister and 
said elections must be held after settling the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
issue. The Wafd insisted on a neutral prime minister and elections to 
be held at the end of the autumn recess. That was expected since it 
was unreasonable to expect the Wafd, especially Nahhas, to serve under 
Nokrashi with a parliament in which there was no Wafd representation, 
with the possibility that after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty issue had 
been settled the Wafdists might be discarded.®7 Another manifesto on 
20 September, with a letter to the British Ambassador and to Nokrashi 
on the subject of Egypt's national claims, were published with the 
object of impressing local public opinion by a show of firmness towards 
Britain.®® That was followed by a message of greetings to Muslims in 
Egypt and elsewhere on the occasion of Qurban Bairam on 1 November. It 
contained a veiled attack on the government and omitted the normal 
conventional reference to the King.®®
The second half of the year, saw a development in the Egyptian
national question which proved to have far reaching consequences. With
a stalemate in Egyptian-British relations, the idea of 
internationalizing the Egyptian question was once more given 
prominence. Since Saad's failure to internationalize the Egyptian
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question in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the dispute between 
both countries had been dealt with on a bilateral basis. With the 
failure of this course of action to reach a stage beyond the 1936 
treaty, hopes were once more raised about the capability of the United 
Nations as an international forum to voice Egypt's demands as they did 
before in 1919. But the same old story was repeated, when Nahhas 
refused to support Nokrashi as did Saad with 'Adli on the basis that 
only the true representatives of the nation should speak in its name.
In August Nokrashi presented Egypt's case to the Security Council
which decided that both the Egyptians and British should resume 
negotiations. Nokrashi refused to accept the decision because it meant 
that the Egyptian issue was a matter between Egypt and Britain alone, 
and not an international issue which should be resolved by the Security 
Council as Egyptian public opinion demanded and the majority of the 
Egyptian delegation believed. Thus the Security Council decided to 
suspend the matter.100
This failure to resolve the national issue through the 
international organization had a tremendous impact on the national 
movement. For some, the failure was due to Nokrashi and not to the 
method. That was expressed by Nahhas in his annual speech on 13 
November when he said he warned the other parties and individuals 
outside the Wafd that they - and especially Nokrashi - were the least 
qualified of all to present the Egyptian cause in international 
organizations, since they had become linked with the Sidqi-Bevin 
project, and all the world knew that they do not represent Egypt, and 
thus they failed.101 Actually the Wafd had played a role in weakening 
Nokrashi's position by writing to the United Nations that he was not
100. Haykal Vol. 3 pp. 82-83.
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representative of Egypt,105 For some other sections of public 
opinion, it meant that the old formula of peaceful legal methods to
resolve the national issue was no longer working. It was another three 
years before another formula emerged.
The regime was facing a serious crisis, politically and socially, 
which clearly manifested itself in the strike of the police to be 
followed by the nurses of Qasr al-'Aini Hospital and the two bombs 
thrown in the garden of Nahhas' house in one week during April 
1948.105 Nahhas was convinced that this incident was plotted by
certain officials in the Ministry of the Interior and the Palace.10^ 
A more serious attempt was made to blow up his house by means of a car 
bomb which was parked in the road outside his house on the morning of 
25 April. Nahhas was unhurt, but his wife was slightly injured and
considerable damage was done to the house. Nahhas was convinced that 
the attempt on his life was instigated by the Palace.105 It is 
interesting how the masses reacted to the incident and explains what 
happened in terms of Nahhas being one of the "Saints of God" (Wall min 
'Awliy'a Allah).10® While Nahhas blamed the Palace indirectly for the 
incidents by accusing Nokrashi and ’Abd al-Hadi and their staffs, his 
wife did not conceal her belief of the direct responsibility of the 
King himself, which had the effect of worsening whatever tense relation 
already existed between the monarch and Nahhas.107 One might have
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expected such attempts, especially during and after the trial of the
assassins of Amin Osman and the press campaign which accompanied it, to
capitalize on the role of Nahhas in 4 February 1942.
In June 1948, it was announced that 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa had
resigned from his position as Secretary General of the Wafd and that
Fuad Siraj al-Din had taken his place* A British report stated that
change had become imperative owing to dissatisfaction among the Wafd
youth elements with the comparative inertia of Gomaa and their
insistence on a more energetic conduct of the Party's affairs. It may
therefore be presumed, the report continued, that Gomaa was prevailed
upon to resign in order to avoid a further weakening of the Wafd by the
succession of discontented youth elements, but his resignation was
officially explained as due to personal reasons.108 Thus the balance
between the "Old Guard" and the large landowners was turned in favour
of the latter once more* Another attempt on the life of Nahhas
resulted in the death of two local policemen and the wounding of two
others when fifty bullets were fired in front of his house while he was
about to leave the car of Fuad Siraj al-Din.109 A few days later
Nahhas in his annual speech on November 13 demanded the termination of
the 1898, 1899 and 1936 treaties. He also attacked the alliance with
the East or the West, and advocated a non-alignment policy in foreign 
1 1 0affairs. These developments were accompanied by disturbances in
the University of Cairo and a sharp rise in political violence. On 4 
December 1948, students and police exchanged fire, and in the Faculty 
of Medicine, Selim Zaki, Commander of the Cairo police was killed by a 
hand grenade.111 The government held the Muslim Brethren responsible
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for this rise in political violence, and Prime Minister Nokrashi
decreed a military order to dissolve the society on 9 December. He was 
later assassinated on 29 December 1948,115 The defeat of the Egyptian 
army in the war in Palestine in May 1948 had left many people 
frustrated, and with weapons freely available, the situation was 
extremely dangerous. It was not only a direct confrontation between a 
government - which had failed on every national level from the United 
Nations to Palestine - and the new political groups of whom the Muslim 
Brethren were the strongest, but also a time of deep crisis for the
regime, with the country on the verge of chaos.
A few weeks after the installation of 'Abd al-Hadi's government, 
the King sent Lieutenant-General Haidar to Siraj al-Din to ask the Wafd 
to return to power, which Nahhas flatly refused.115 It was said that 
Nahhas summoned the Wafd members to a meeting at which he presented the 
King's letter and others, and they supported his stand in rejecting 
it. The reason given by Ghannam was the unconstitutional behaviour of 
the King and his policy of pitting political parties against one 
another.114 Most probably though it was because the idea of a 
coalition government had surfaced once more after the assassination of 
Nokrashi and the Wafd had accepted it on the condition that it would
not be under the premiership of any party.115
It is interesting here to recall how Muhammad Mahmud contacted 
Fathallah Barakat. A British report at the time talked of "the 
apparent flexibility of a group of moderate Wafdists headed by Siraj 
a l - D i n " . 1 1 6 That moderate group headed by Siraj al-Din was soon to
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declare its policy of a rapprochement with the King when Siraj al-Din 
in a meeting at the Saadist club in 10 February 1949, spoke of the 
necessity to prepare themselves for the next elections, and to be ready 
to start a movement from Cairo to Aswan to declare their loyalty to the 
King so that he knows that the Wafdist youth were ready to sacrifice 
their lives for his sake. That was to be followed by a meeting of some 
students with Mustafa Musa of the Wafdist Vanguard to discuss whether 
Nahhas should go to the Palace and celebrate the King's birthday or 
not. After several speakers had spoken of the unconstitutional
behaviour of the King, they decided to send a petition to Nahhas asking 
him not to go for the sake of the Party and its unity.117
A change in the policy of the Wafd occurred when a coalition 
government was formed. This was attributed to the pressure of the
moderate faction inside the Wafd118 and to a change of heart by Nahhas 
and his siding with Siraj al-Din. Nahhas was at first considering 
boycotting the elections if they were held under 'Abd al-Hadi's
government, but then he changed his mind, according to some opinions, 
because of pressure from the majority.119 In Ramadan he warned in a 
speech at Alexandria that blood might flow like rivers if the
i
government conducted elections. At the same time in a clear signal to 
the King he suggested that it was for the King to decide what should be 
done.150 Nahhas' change of heart from accusing the King indirectly of 
the attempt on his life to the more moderate stand of Siraj al-Din was 
accomplished when his message to the people on Bairam included loyal
references to the King, and he signed the Royal Book for that
117. 'Abdin Archives, File 4925 Ministry of Interior.
118. FO 371 3 189 Sir R. Campbell (No. 2) 7 January 1949.
119. FO 371-73459 J3929/1013/16 Sir R. Campbell (No. 87) 7 May 1949.
120. FO 371-73460 J5658/1013/16 Sir R. Campbell (No. 111), 8 July 1949.
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o c c a s i o n . 1 21 Nahhas even took great pains in a declaration to the 
notables of__Buhera province to deny strongly any allegations that it 
was the Wafd's policy to amend the Constitution, and declared that any 
such thing would be a sacrilege and a bad precedent.155 Later the 
Wafd would justify this course under the pretext that they had to 
eliminate any fears by the King so that they could concentrate on the 
national issue. In his annual speech in 13 November that year, there 
was no mention by Nahhas of the British or the Sudan as usual, but much 
praise for the King for his Arab policy and the neutral government.128 
This change of heart by the Wafd was encouraged by the Palace and some 
contacts were established through Mahmud Ghazali Pasha between Mr. 
Chapman-Andrews, Acting Ambassador, and Hassan Yusuf, Deputy Royal 
Chamberlain, and Hussein Sirri on one side, and Dr. Muhammad Nasr, the 
private physician of Nahhas, on the other to form a neutral cabinet 
with the intention of conducting free elections.124 Direct contacts 
were made between Siraj al-Din and Chapman Andrews and Hassan Yusuf 
too. Thus all were agreed on. the return of the Wafd. Actually there 
were already some rumours of a deal to that effect, backed by the 
British to guarantee the Wafd's return to power.125
With a moderate faction inside the Wafd ready to co-operate, and 
considering the crisis the system was in, a coalition government was 
formed with the blessing of the British who were convinced after the 
experience of 1942 that the Wafd was more reliable and stronger than
121. FO 371-73460 J62081/1013/16 Chapman Andrews (No. 122) 30 July 
1949.
122. FO 371-73460 J6466/1013/16 Mr. Chapman Andrews (No. 128) 7 August 
1949.
123. al-Masri 13 November 1949.
2.
124. al-Shahid p. 56.
125. Kamal al-Din Rif'at, Mudhakkirat Kamal al-Din Rif'at Cairo 1975 
p . 63.
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any other p a r t y * 1 2 8  'Abd al-Hadi's government resigned on 25 July
1949, to be followed by a coalition government headed by Hussein 
Sirri127 to prepare for elections* Disagreements on the formation of 
the constituencies led to the resignation of the cabinet and the 
formation of a neutral one after three months, which was the Wafd's 
desire in the first place.128
Many explanations were given for the unexpected vast majority with 
which the party won the elections. Of these explanations two are worth 
considering. One was that the existence of a neutral government was, 
in itself, an indication to government officials that the days of the 
Saadists had gone, and those of the Wafd were coming, and this had its 
effect on the men who were conducting the elections, especially the 
police, who found opportunity to avenge their strike which the Saadists 
had crushed.129 Newspapers published an investigation with one of the 
Saadist Ministers implying a condemnation of the whole party?180 a
minister went to various constituencies and spoke loudly in favour of 
the Wafd; and Sirri himself made it known that he voted for a 
Wafdist.121 But the most important factor was that of the Muslim
Brethren. With their eyes set on elections, there was an understanding 
between the Wafd and Sirri on freeing those of the Brethren under
arrest, to which the Saadists and Liberal Constitutionalists 
objected.122 At the same time, the Wafdist organ Sawt al-Umma122
126. Haykal V.2 p. 349.
127. Al-Rafi'i p. 132.
128. al-Rafi'i p. 139.
129. Akbar al-Yum.
130. al-Rafi'i Vol. 3 p. 290.
131. Haykal Vol. 2 p. 350.
132. al-Shahid p. 53.
133. A daily which replace al-Wafd al-Masri in 1946. Hamza, p. 157.
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published the memoirs of the late Hassan al-Banna concerning the 
disbanding of the society. This was taken by the Brethren as a clear 
signal that their society would be legitimized once more if the Wafd 
were elected,1 ^  While the Palace expected only 30 per cent of the 
votes to go to the Wafd, thus implementing its dream of a coalition 
government under Siraj al-D£n and getting rid of Nahhas, the outcome 
was an outstanding victory for the W a f d . 1 ^ 5  The King made a last
^  A
effort to convince Nahhas to give his position to Siraj al- Din, but 
Sirri stood firm in his position of abiding by the results of the 
elections.1^6 It seems that the idea of Nahhas giving way to avoid a 
confrontation with the Palace, reminiscent of the Ahmad Mahir incident 
in 1937, was also shared by Dr, Salah al-Din.1"^
134. ’Abdin Archives, File 4925. Kamal al-Din Rifat, Mudhakkirat Kamal 
al-Din Rifat Cairo 1975 p. 63.
135. Akb'ar al-Yum, 7 January 1950.
136. Hashish p. 265 Interview with Sira$ al-Din 9/4/1968,
137. Ibid. Interview with Salah al Din and Farag 20/5/68.
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Nahhas Last Chapter
A. The Hero's Last Stand
Not only was the majority which brought back the Wafd to power an
illusory one, in the sense that the Wafd got only 50 percent of the
votes which was only 50 percent of those entitled to vote1, only 15
percent of the Cairo electorate cast their v o t e s , 2 in other words 25
percent of the votes only, but also the support did not come from only 
the Wafdists as in the old days, but from the Muslim Brethren and other 
opposition groups who had to make a choice between a Wafdist candidate, 
a Saadist or a Liberal Constitutionalist. There is no doubt that the 
Wafd being in opposition during the previous five years made every 
effort to capitalize on the mistakes of those in power. Furthermore 
the general tendency of the Egyptian people was to sympathize with 
those who are out of power and favour.
But the Wafd in the early 1950s was not that of the early 1920s, 
and nothing better than the following incident could illustrate the 
change which took place, Sayyid Mari'i, who was a Saadist deputy, was 
contacted by Siraj al-Din through his brother-in-law, Morsi Farahat, 
(Minister of Supply in the last Wafdist government), suggesting he 
contest the elections as a Wafdist without paying the dues to the 
party. Instead, he suggested that Mari'i contribute about £E5,Q00 to 
the party coffers in exchange for the party's support and that he meet 
Nahhas to discuss the matter with him. Mari'i was surprised when Siraj 
al-Din introduced him to Nahhas by saying that Mari'i had accepted
1. al-Rafi'i, Vol. 3, p. 292.
2. Anthony Eden The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle Vol. 3 
Cassel London 1960, p.ziS .
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entry in the elections as an Independent and not a Saadist or Wafdist, 
to which Nahhas agreed.® This incident showed how Nahhas1 grip on the 
Wafd was slackening, while Siraj al-Din was more and more in control of 
the daily affairs of the party; how the new members of the party were 
recruited, by whom, and from where. This declining authority of Nahhas 
was evident when the new cabinet was formed* Nahhas was in favour of a 
cabinet which would be composed of those who formed the 1942 cabinet, 
while Siraj al-Din wished to bring in new faces, and his opinion
prevailed in the end. Thus Dr. Taha Hussein, Morsi Farahat, and Zaki
'Abd al-Mitaal were included, even though they were not Wafdists,^ 
though Zaki 'Abd al-Mutaal declared later in the Senate that he had 
been a Wafdist.®
Although Nahhas insisted on the nomination of Dr. Taha Hussein 
against the opposition of the Palace for the latter's alleged leftist 
views, he did not show the same spirit when it came to the issue of who 
presides over the army. The Palace had suggested that
Lieutenant-General Muhammad Haidar be appointed Minister of War, but 
Nahhas refused on the grounds that he was not a Wafdist.® Most
probably Nahhas suspected that Haidar would be the King's eyes inside 
the cabinet. But later the King appointed Haidar as the General 
Commander of the Army, thus depriving the Wafdist Minister of War of 
any effective control over the army.^ Another Palace candidate, 'Abd 
al-Fatah Hassan, was later to be included in the cabinet.® Nahhas
3. Sayyid Mari'i, Awraq Siyasiyah al-Maktab al-Masri al-Hadith Cairo, 
1978, Vol. 1, pp. 153-154.
4. Hashish, pp. 266-7.
5. al-Masri 19/11/1950 p. 4.
6 . Anis, al-Ahram 6/2/1967, p. 3.
7. 'Abd al-Qadir, p. 178.
8 . Ibid., p. 188.
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accepted both appointments without any objection.
But that is not the end of the story. Three decades after the 
"People's Government" of Saad Zaghlul in 1924, in which the effendi 
class entered a cabinet for the first time, the 1950 cabinet seemed to 
run on opposite parallels. For the "Peoples Government" was composed 
of members of the old Turkish aristocracy and the rising middle-class 
professionals which reflected the balance of social forces at the 
time. This time the old generation of administrators were not from the 
Turkish aristocracy, but the Wafd's professional middle class of the 
twenties and thirties, while the new elements were those who heavily 
represented vested interests such as large landownership or capital.
Of the old guard there were Osman Muharam, Zaki al-Urabi, 'Abd 
al-Fatah al-Tawil and Mahmud Sulaiman Ghannam, who had some wealth. 
The last two were known for their hostility towards Siraj al-Din. Of 
the new elements were Ibrahim Faraj and Dr, Muhammad Salah al-Din, who 
could be considered to be from the old guard since they were "new" only 
in terms of becoming ministers for the first time. All the previous 
five were long-time Wafdists and could be regarded as one faction, 
though some would argue that Dr. Salah al-Din stood alone. On the 
other side there was Fuad Siraj al-Din, the leader of the moderates who 
was opposed to the Wafd until he joined it in 1936, and who owned four 
thousand feddans of land. Muhammad al-Wakil was a millionaire and was 
instrumental in bringing the Wafd into the coalition government of 
Hussein Sirri. Ahma_d Hamza was the owner of the largest ice factory in 
Cairo, and Muhammaci 'Abd al-Latif was a fierce opponent of Nahhas until 
1942 and was believed to be loyal to Siraj al-Din. Others, such as
Mustafa Nasrat, though not a supporter of Siraj al-Din, was a
capitalist and about to enter a joint venture with Abud. Dr. Ahmad 
Hussein, who also stood alone, was a nephew of Osman Muharam, and his
brother was married to Abud's daughter. Dr. Taha Hussein was an
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opponent of the Wafd as well as of Yassin Ahmad since they were Liberal 
Constitutionalists (compare with the early members of the Wafd who were 
from the Watani Party such as Nahhas, now it is from the Liberal 
Constitutionalists- as Siraj al-Din). Morsi Farahat was not a Wafdist 
(he was the head of the office of Sabri Abu ’Alem), while Zaki 'Abd 
al-Mitaal and Hamid Zaki formed one bloc.® Thus, not only was the 
cabinet divided among two main factions, but each faction had its own 
internal division. Another scholar has described the 1950 cabinet as 
being composed of six experts never known to be Wafdists, two young 
Wafdists, six Senators, six with a doctorate degree, three university 
rectors, fourteen lawyers, two engineers, and six who were not members 
of Parliament. They were divided into three groups, the Purist young 
Wafdists, the pro-Palace, and the compromising commercialists.1®
The balance between the two factions was soon to tip in favour of 
the new moderates when it became known that Nahhas was looking to Siraj 
al-Din as his successor for the Party's leadership. Twice Nahhas 
overruled Osman Muharam in favour of Siraj al-Din when the former 
should have taken Nahhas1 place. The first time was when Nahhas wanted 
the palace to agree to the appointment of Siraj al-Din as Deputy Prime 
Minister, instead of Osman Muharam, the longest serving minister, but 
the palace refused.11 The second was when Nahhas returned from Europe 
to Alexandria and rode in an open car with Siraj al-Din instead of 
Osman Muharam, the Deputy Prime Minister.12
In the speech from the throne Nahhas declared that his government 
regarded the 1936 Treaty as an unsatisfactory basis for
9. Musa Sabri, Qissat Malik wa A'rba Wizarat Dar al-Qalam Cairo 1964
p. 15 .
10. Riz'q Tarikhal-Wizarat pp. 503-505.
11 . Ibid., p. 158.
12. Al-Shahid, p. 132.
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Egyptian-British relationship, and that there was no choice but to 
abolish it, and arrive at a new understanding based on the complete
evacuation of British forces from Egypt and the unity of Egypt and the
Sudan under the Egyptian throne. The termination of the 1936 Treaty, 
he added, would be in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, not to mention the changed circumstances which had led to the 
Treaty in the first place, as well as that of the 1899 Condomium over 
the Sudan.1®
By committing himself to abrogating the treaty, Nahhas embarked on 
a course of action which proved to be both his greatest act and at the 
same time his own destruction. Public opinion was pressing for the 
abrogation, and Nahhas knew that in order to keep his place in society, 
he must bow to their demands. But he also knew quite well that 
abrogating the treaty alone without any general policy to accompany it 
would be an absurd act. He had to bend to public pressure and at the 
same time try to reach a satisfactory settlement with the British as 
far as possible. To a man of his mentality, and taking the present 
social composition of the Wafd leadership into consideration, peaceful 
legal methods were more attractive than violent mass struggle. Because 
Nahhas and the Wafd could not foresee an action outside the offices of 
their government buildings, their relationship with the Palace had to 
be assessed. They were not a party struggling in the streets of Cairo, 
but a government which had to abide by and cooperate with the 
constitutional institutions, especially the Palace. Thus it was not
strange that Nahhas, for the first time, chose to placate the Palace in
order to extend his tenure of office. If Nahhas had complained in 19 35 
that he was tired of being out of office for five years, then the 
Nahhas of 1950 with the Wafd dominated by Siraj al-Din would be more 
exhausted and ready to compromise than in 1935*
13. al-Masri 17 November 1950 p. 6.
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It was said that at his first meeting with the King after forming 
the government, Nahhas bowed and kissed the King's hand and declared 
that the monarchy was the source of all authority. In another 
incident, when Faruk went to Kabry, Nahhas said "that the qibla [the 
direction of prayer] of the Egyptians had moved to Kabry because our 
beloved King is there".1^ This new relationship between Nahhas and 
Farouk was strengthened by a new alliance which was being forged 
between some elements inside both the Wafd and the Palace, for the 
Palace had undergone an almost similar development to the Wafd, with a 
new wing of financial interests as contrasted to the old guard, The 
latter were such as 'Ali Mahir and Ahmad Hassanein who were very much 
at odds with the Wafd. With the absence of the former and the death of 
the latter, their policy was gradually replaced by new elements such as
A  js
Karim Thabit (press adviser) and Ilias Andrawes (Economic Adviser of 
the Royal Estate) who favoured a more conciliatory policy towards the 
Wafd based on the grounds that a Wafdist government would absorb public 
tension, and they were instrumental in endorsing the return of the Wafd 
to power.1® We can now see why Nahhas insisted on appointing 'Abud 
and Karim Thabit to the board of the Suez Canal Company instead of 'All 
al-Shamsi and Wassif Ghali whom the Company had nominated to represent 
Egypt on the Board. When Nahhas' nominees were rejected by the 
company, he nominated Ilias Andrawes.1® Abud was also to prove useful 
not only in his capacity as an unofficial channel with the British, but 
also with the Americans, whose Ambassador used to meet Siraj al-Din in 
Abud's house.17
14. Mari'i, Vol. 1, p. 181.
15. Rizq, Tarikh al-Wizarat pp. 492-498.
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16. Haykal, Vol. 3, pp. 210-211.
17. Sabri, p. 13.
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One could then argue that Nahhas1 policy of accommodating the 
Palace was due not only to his desire to concentrate on the Treaty 
issue, but it also reflected the vested interests of such people as 
Siraj al-Din, Abud and Ilias Andrawes whose social status rendered it 
impossible for them to opt for any other policy.
While Nahhas and the Wafd were pursuing a policy of accommodation 
with the King, events later proved that they were in fact moving in the 
opposite direction of political events which were soon to follow. The 
first came in May 1950, when the Independent Senator, Mustafa Mari'i, 
presented an interpellation to the Senate calling for an inquiry into 
what was later known as the arms scandal and a corruption charge 
against Karim Thabit. The interpellation was the beginning of a series 
of charges against the Palace for corruption, and especially in dealing 
with the Palestine War for which the defeat was attributed to Palace 
corruption. This anti-Palace feeling which had begun in 1946 was to 
take a more serious direction when it was joined by the traditional 
politicians. Nahhas was to make the fatal mistake of taking the wrong 
decision at the wrong time, and this was to defend the monarchy at a 
time when it seemed he was standing alone against a tide of 
anti-monarchy feelings. Thus Siraj al-Din came to the defence of Karim 
Thabit in the Senate, and a month later Dr. Haykal, Speaker of the 
Senate, was replaced by Zaki al-Urabi, Wafd Minister of 
Communications. Most Opposition figures in the Senate were replaced by 
Wafdists or Independents in a clear move to punish the Opposition for 
supporting Marie's interpellation. The irony was that these Opposition 
figures were no less responsible for the corruption of the Palace which 
they now attacked than the Wafd. They were, perhaps, even more 
responsible. But in the game of party politics which Egypt was now 
witnessing, it was because of the new alliance between the new elements 
in both the Palace and the Wafd that the non-Wafdist Opposition figures
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of the traditional parties fuelled anti-monarchy feelings and became 
champions of an anti-corruption campaign. It was the fate of Nahhas 
that he had to defend the monarchy at that moment while still pursuing 
his policy of settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Thus, when the
opposition parties presented a petition to the King on 17 October 1950, 
accusing the regime of corruption and warning of a forthcoming 
revolution, Nahhas described it as redundant, devoid of truth, and 
unwor thy of reply.18
The Wafd itself was undergoing a similar tension as Egyptian 
society, caught between the new elements and the traditional ones, 
between those who supported a pro-monarchy policy and those who 
supported the traditional policy of the Wafd.
Another factor was to complicate the situation further, and this 
was the matter of Palestine. Nahhas had rejected the 1947 decision by 
the United Nations for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and
Jews. In doing so, Nahhas was following the mainstream of Egyptian
public opinion in its hostile attitude towards the newly created state 
of Israel. As prime minister he continued his predecessor’s policy of 
non-recognition of Israel. That was to prove a hindrance to any
British-Egyptian settlement, for the former maintained that because of 
the hostilities existing between Egypt and Israel, it was difficult for 
Britain to abide by its commitment made to Sidqi in 1946 to evacuate in
three years' time. It was even rumoured that Britain had refused to
open negotiations with Egypt until the latter had reached a peaceful
settlement with Israel.18 Nahhas was not to yield to that kind of
pressure, although Ismail Sidqi did. He was to publish a statement
18. Barry St. Clair McBride, Farouk in Egypt A Biography The Trinity
Press London 1967, p. 171.
19. Office of Military Attache Embassy of India Report No. 14, 15 May
1950, p. 3 Oxford papers.
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saying that by maintaining the present policy, Egypt was merely 
provoking America, placing Britain in a difficult position, delaying 
the settlement of her own question and losing economically and 
politically without gaining anything.20 It was said that inside the 
Wafd, Hamid Zaki held similar views.21 Even when the negotiations 
between Egypt and Britain did open, Britain held the view that it could 
not move its forces to Gaza as Nahhas had suggested. The British 
Ambassador asked Dr, Salah al-Din if he was aware of the political 
matters concerning this proposal which also included making peace with 
Israel. To this Salah al-Din answered that a truce existed which did
i
not allow for the aggression by either party. But the Ambassador was 
not convinced and argued that the truce was not enough and a final 
settlement with Israel must be reached with an agreement that Israel 
would allow British troops to cross its territory, since Britain could 
not enter Israel to meet any enemy without permission.22
Events followed rapidly. Hamid Zaki accused Dr. Ahmad Hussein of 
communism because he demanded progressive taxes and minimum wages. 
With the help of Ahmad Hassein, Akhbar al-Yum published a report on the 
scandal of the distribution of government landed property among the 
al-Wakil family. Later there was a spate of resignations and 
reappointments, of which the most notable was that of 'Abd al-Fatah 
Hassan who was accused of being a Palace nominee.2® Then, when the 
government tried to pass in Parliament the law concerning the coverage 
of Palace news, the Wafdist deputy 'Aziz Murham led a campaign against 
it since it forbade publishing anything related to the Palace without
20. Ibid.
21 . Ibid., p . 4 .
22. al-Qadiyat al-Misraya Mahadir Muhadathat bain Salah al-Din wa al
Safir al-Brltdni 17 August 1950, p. 644.
23. 'Abd al-Qadir, p. 188.
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its prior approval.2^
Matter_s were riot to stop there, but would deteriorate further when 
a Wafdist Deputy, Istafan Basil!, presented to the Chamber of Deputies 
a new law for the press. It was rumoured that the law was ordered by 
the King and that Nahhas was of the view that the government should 
stay at any cost.2® This led to a campaign of protest led by Ahmad 
Abu al-Fath, editor of Al-Masri, the main Wafdist organ, and Dr. 'Aziz 
Fahmi, the son of 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa. Hamid Zaki exchanged 
attacks and accusations with Dr. Salah al-Din when the former said that 
these laws should be passed as a "white" government could not govern a 
"red" people.2® Dr. Salah al-Din also firmly opposed the cabinet's 
intention to dissolve the Council of State, and threatened to resign, 
thus causing the proposal to be shelved.2"^
At the same time opposition from the rising new middle class found 
expression in Ahmad Hussein's newly modified version of his "Young 
Egypt's Society", the Socialist Party. The Muslim Brethren were lying 
dormant for the moment after the assassination of their leader Hassan 
al-Banna in February 1949 and the subsequent crackdown on their 
organization after the assassination of Nokrashi. Consequently, the 
distribution of the Al-Ishtirakiyya, the Socialist Party's organ, 
reached a peak, especially after publishing photos of beggars sleeping 
in the streets under the title of "These are your subjects your 
Majesty".28 Attacks on the monarchy were more direct and aggressive, 
and the government of Nahhas was put in an awkward position since its 
policy was that of avoiding any provocation of the monarchy, not to
24. Sabri, p. 15.
25. Ahmad Baha'al-Din, Faruk Malikun Dar Rose al-Yusuf Cairo 1965
p. *111.
26. Ibid., p. 112.
27. Ibid., pp. 105-109.
28. Sabri, p. 19.
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speak of the new lifestyle which characterized both the new elements of 
the Wafd and Nahhas himself. Much was made of the fact that Siraj 
al-Din was a close relative of the Badrawy family, and the consequent 
show of wealth by Nahhas and, especially, his wife. Nahhas came to 
personify a way of life of the upper class and was denounced for his 
trips to Europe, his alleged friendships with "dancing girls", his 
gambling and frequenting of night clubs.29 It was not altogether
surprising that when the King ordered the closure of the newspaper, the 
cabinet met the following day and decided that since the newspaper of 
the Socialist Party and its owner Ahmad Hussein were apparently trying 
to incite the country to revolution and endeavouring to change its 
social system, it should be closed down.30 The Wafd was using the
same language of Sidqi in 1946, and the once opposition party to the 
established political elite and social order, was now identified with 
it and became its defender. In the same year, another member of the 
old guard, Nagib al-Hilali, was dismissed.31 He had joined the Wafd
in 1938 and was known not to be on good terms with Siraj al-Din and had
refused to join the cabinet.32
Nahhas1 Last Showdown; The Termination of the Treaty
While Nahhas was continuing with his policy of accommodation with 
the monarchy, negotiations with the British opened but in a very 
different atmosphere from that of the earlier days of Nahhas. There is 
no doubt that public opinion left no alternative for Nahhas, and for
29. James P. Jankouski, Egypt's Young Rebels Hoover Institute Press,
Stanford 1979, p. 95.
30. Qadiyat al-. Tahrid 'Ala Hargi Madinat al-Qahira wa Mukaddimat
Thaurat 23 Yulyu 1952 al-Matba'at al 'Alamaya Cairo 1957,
pp.* 60-61 •
31 * Al-Masri, 8/11/51 p. 2.
3 2, Anis, al-Usul al-Tarikhiya p. 181.
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the first time during his negotiations with the British he played on
the fact that the opposition might not accept what he offered. Gone
were the days when the Wafd was synonymous with Egypt? now there was
opposition to be reckoned with.
To understand my position, one has to appreciate the 
principle of evacuation. I want to reach a solution by which 
I can convince the government, people, and opposition. It 
cannot be denied that the opposition has its eyes opened and 
focussed on us.33
And you know that there is communist propaganda and that 
there is an opposition in Egypt to which we should pay 
attention in such a delicate matter.34
Salah al-Din was to warn the British that public opinion had
accepted the resumption of negotiations only because they were
conducted by the Wafd whom they trusted, and that if these negotiations
failed, as a means to reach national aspirations, they would totally be
rejected in the future by the people, with serious consequences for
both of them. He also said that Nahhas had to give an account to the
Egyptian Parliament in his speech from the throne next November on the
results of the negotiations.3^
Some scholars argue that Nahhas' decision to abrogate the treaty
was a political act. Al-Rafi'i maintained that it was an attempt to
cover up the internal situation, which was both corrupt and
inefficient.3^ Another writer believes that Karim Thabit had informed
Siraj al-Din of the King's intention to dismiss the government. Hence
it was a political move on the part of Nahhas to force the King to
33• al-Kitab al-Abyad al - Misri al-Qadiyat al-Misriyya 1882-1954 
al-Mutbaa al-Amiriyya Cairo 1955. From a meeting between Nahhas 
and Field Marshall Sir William Sliem on 5 June 1950, p. 598.
34. Ibid. Meeting between Dr. Salah al-Din and British Ambassador Sir 
Ralf Stevens 10 August 1950, p. 630,
35. Ibid. Salah al-Din and British Ambassador 24 August 1950, 
pp. 647, 648.
36. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Muqaddimat Thaurat 23 Yulyu Sanat 1952 
Maktabat al-Nahdah Cairo 1964 pp. 26-27.
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abandon his decision, for the moment at least.37 it seems that there 
was some serious talk of forming a new government by al-Hilali which 
would abrogate the treaty, and so outbid the Wafd in the national 
cause. A meeting was held on 19 September 1951, between Dr. Ahmad 
Hussein, 'Abd al-Fatah'Amr (Egyptian Ambassador in London) and Hassan 
Yusuf, but it seems that the idea was abandoned.38 By now, there was 
a real race against time and Nahhas was eager to gain a breathing 
space. The King, who returned from Europe on 14 September, did not 
grant Nahhas an audience until three days later, after which Nahhas 
came out with full praise of the King. Wafdists speculated that Nahhas 
was winning the King over to cover his move for abrogating the treaty, 
which he did on 8 October•39
But the decision was not an easy one, it was rejected by the more 
moderate elements in the Wafd, headed by Siraj al-Din, as it was 
previously rejected by the Palace men. The move was too daring to be 
adopted by the traditional elite. Siraj al-Din regarded it as the 
"madness of Salah al-Din"40 and agreed with Hamid Zaki to give a 
chance to the British as their Ambassador had asked the latter to do, 
and Nahhas agreed to postpone adjournment of parliament for three more 
weeks.41
The British, however, did not present any new proposals and Nahhas 
was left with his pledge made in Parliament a year ago to terminate the 
treaty. It is rather difficult to assess the situation and to describe 
exactly what prompted Nahhas finally to terminate the treaty. The fear
37. al-Bishri, p. 479.
38. Sabri, p. 61 .
39. Ibid., pp. 37-40.
40. Mari'i, Vol. 1, p. 183.
41. Sabri, pp. 56-59.
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of being dismissed by the King was definitely a factor, but some 
sources, though few, speak of another reason - America. It was said 
that when Hamid Zaki returned from Europe before the termination of the 
treaty, he asked Nahhas whether he was prepared for the abrogation of 
the treaty, and Nahhas replied that the United States supported them. 
Then Salah al-Din had called Ibrahim Faraj from Paris and told him 
there was pressure on Britain. But it seems that that was a mere 
illusion on the part of both Salah al-Din and Nahhas, or in other 
words, just wishful thinking. No evidence was found to support such an 
idea.42 As for the King, Siraj al-Din told Nahhas that Faruk would 
not dare to dismiss them after abrogating the treaty.43
It is difficult to know on what Salah al-Din based his conviction 
of American support, although one is inclined to think that he was 
moved more by his own personal convictions of how to deal with the 
British. Salah al-Din was an old Wafdist who had shared in the Wafd's 
struggles from its earliest days and was known to have been on good 
terms with the new young elements of the Wafd, especially in the 
Al-Masri newspaper, which was advocating a policy of neutrality line 
that Egypt should adopt in the East-West cold war. This was a policy 
advocated by him, and he was raising the two popular slogans, 
"Evacuation at all costs", and "Unity of the Nile Valley", in order to 
undermine any moderating influence by Siraj al-Din in the Cabinet.44
One could, of course, argue that Siraj al-Din and Nahhas found it 
opportune to terminate the treaty after they had heard of the King's 
intention to dismiss them and were assured of American support, however
42. Moljammad'Abd al-Wahab who is working on his PhD dissertation on 
American Egyptian relations at that period refuted any such idea. 
See also George McGhee, "Britain and Egypt at the Brink" Envoy to 
the5- Middle East Harper and Row Publishers New York 1983, pp.
365-387.
43* Mari'i. Ibid., Sabri Ibid.
44. Embassy of India Monthly report N18 15 June 1950 Oxford private 
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vague that might be, by Salah al-Din. Nahhas could have also 
calculated that his action would have little practical effect, as a 
British journalist wrote. British troops would remain and the Sudanese 
issue would continue on its chosen path, and Nahhas would have killed 
two birds with one stone: the continual protection of Egypt by the
presence of British troops, which the present writer doubts was Nahhas' 
intention, and the opportunity to say that he had never betrayed the 
people of the Valley by surrendering any of Egypt's sacred rights.4  ^
Thus on 8 October 1951, Nahhas concluded his speech in Parliament by 
saying "It was for Egypt that I signed the treaty, and it is for Egypt 
that I abrogate it" • The choice of the day was not without
significance, precisely six years earlier his cabinet was dismissed.
Instead of capitalizing on that act, what Nahhas did was actually 
to release a force which he could not control. Not only was he giving 
the go-ahead to all anti-British sentiments in the country, but also by 
this act he admitted the futility of his peaceful legal methods. And
soon the alternative which was sought but unrealized became available -
armed struggle. Thus the Wafd had fulfilled its historic mission in 
extracting every possible legal and peaceful method for more than three 
decades, and now the people were totally convinced of the futility of 
that road as Salah al-Din had warned the British. The leadership of 
the Wafd which had become an integral part of the traditional ruling 
elite of the country was not prepared and equipped for that kind of 
struggle and that type of situation, and this time they were lagging
far behind the national movement instead of leading it as they did 
under Saad and Nahhas in the twenties and thirties.
The dilemma of the Wafd and Nahhas of keeping pace with the 
national5- movement while retaining their traditional outlook, cannot be
45, The Times, 27 March 1951.
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better illustrated than by these words■ of Nahhas himself on the
anniversary of Eid al-Jihad on 13 November 1951. Addressing the
workers who left the Canal he said
the programme we have pledged ourselves to is a socialist
programme as you know, and as such not for the benefit of one
group over another. Rather it seeks the happiness of all the 
classes of the people, especially the workers.
Then at the end he concluded by saying
People of the Nile Valley, you who are protected by the
noblest reign, that of al-Faruk al-'Aziz King of Egypt and
the Sudan, before whose birth the national movement was born, 
and during whose youth the shackles of colonialism were 
broken and the sites of the occupier abolished.48
This policy of extending a hand to a restless public opinion and 
another hand to the monarchy was doomed to failure since both camps 
were increasingly uncompromising in their stands and demands. 
Guerrilla activities against the British forces in the canal zone were 
gaining wide support from a population inflamed by Nahhas1 action of 
abrogating the treaty and determined to replace the Wafd's policy of 
peaceful negotiations with that of a people's war. Nahhas and all
other traditional leaders could not but pay homage to those who were
killed in action when huge processions were organized in the streets of 
Cairo especially on 13 November 1951 ,4? But as a responsible 
government which was entrusted to maintain law and order, it issued a 
statement at the end of September stating that it had decided to take 
the responsibility of training the guerrillas under its supervision and 
prohibited the collection of donations for them,48 in other words, 
any independent movement by the people was banned and a crackdown on 
guerrilla camps, especially those of the Socialist Party, followed
46, al-Masri 14/11/1951.
47, Mahmud, p. 196.
48, al-Rafi'i, Muqaddimat Thaurat 23 Yulu 1952, p. 5.
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under the pretext that they were illegal*49 This dual policy was soon 
to lead the Wafdist government into direct confrontation with the 
people when demonstrations were held against the appointment of Hafiz 
'Afifi as the Royal Chamberlain. In an interview with the press 'Afifi 
had expressed pro-British views which were considered to be in direct 
contrast with the national feelings at the time. Nahhas, who was still 
embroiled in interparty squabbling, had consented to 'Afifi's 
appointment rather than 'Ali Mahir or Nagib al-Hilali who were also put 
forward by the Palace. Nahhas' personal feeling at the moment did not 
equal the national sentiments, and serious clashes between the police 
and demonstrations followed especially on 17 January 1952.80 Voices 
were raised demanding the severing of diplomatic relations with 
Britain, and guerilla activities were on the increase, forcing the 
British to send reinforcements.81
The situation was deteriorating so rapidly that on 20 January, 
student demonstrations took on a serious aspect when, for the first
time in some years, police were fired upon by armed demonstrators.
According to some press reports there was something of a battle in one 
secondary school in which two were killed and twelve wounded. The 
government then threatened that schools where serious disorders took 
place would be closed for the rest of the academic year and their 
students suspended. Nahhas appealed to the students, describing the
situation as very serious and warned them against agitators who
attempted to divert their patriotic sentiments into seditious 
channels. All Cairo schools, together with the two universities, were 
closed for one week.82 On 24 January Ahmad Hussein held a press
49* Qadiyat al-Tahrid p. 199.
50* al-Bishri, p. 494.
51. Eden, p.226.
52. FO 371-96870 JE/1018/5 Sir R. Stevenson (No. 120) 21 January 1952.
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conference in Cairo in which he attacked the government in the 
strongest terms. He concluded by saying that "We should not give the 
Wafd government another chance to commit more stupidities, and we must 
do our best to throw it out". The Al-Asas newspaper, which was the 
only one to publish his statement in detail, was confiscated for 
printing it.83
The situation rapidly deteriorated. The King provoked public 
opinion once more by appointing ’Abd al-Fatah 'Amr, the recalled 
Ambassador from London, as his political adviser.84 Feelings against 
the King ‘were running high and anti-monar chi al slogans were common in 
the demonstrations. The atmosphere was very tense with the news of the 
activities of the guerrillas and the counter-measures taken by the 
British inflaming further an already inflamed population. The 
explosion came when Siraj al-Din as Minister of the Interior ordered 
the provisional police in the town of Ismailiya to refuse an ultimatum 
by the British forces to surrender and instead to resist. The ensuing 
battle resulted in about fifty dead and more than a hundred injured. 
The news spread in Cairo and the next day the Capital witnessed a 
series of violent disorders which was later to be called "Black 
Saturday". Eye-witnesses of that day described how a group of 
organized and well-disciplined squads led by young men of the effendi 
class were conducting a campaign of destruction in what appeared as a 
planned programme against selected targets.88 This led many people to 
speculate on a conspiracy theory with the accusation directed against 
the British or the Monarchy or both together. 'Abd al-Fatah Hassan 
wrote in his memoirs how he received a report from the political police
53. FO 371-96870 JE/1018/6 Sir R. Stevenson (No. 163) 26 January 1952.
54. 'Abd al-Qadir, pp. 202-203.
55. See Gamal al-Shargawi Harig al-Qahirah Qarar Ittiham Gadid Dar 
al-Thaqafat al-Jadidah Cairo 1975 especially the Appendix section 
where there is more than one account of what happened.
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that there was a plot afoot to get rid of the Wafdist government and 
replace it by a 'Ali Mahir cabinet.88 There was talk about contacts 
being made between Hafiz ’Afifi, ’Abd al-Fatah ’Amr, All Mahir, and the 
British and American Ambassadors,8  ^ and how the cabinet was going to 
discuss and maybe even declare the expulsion of all British subjects 
from Egypt and sever relations with Britain.88 It is interesting to 
note here that only Salah al-Din accused the Americans of burning 
Cairo. Others, including the present writer, would hesitate to compare 
the term "burning of Cairo" with the famous burning of Rome by Nero. A 
close inspection of the places burned would reveal that they were the 
targets most likely to be attacked by angry people against an 
irresponsible ruling class. At some moments in history, as in the 
revolution of 1919, the public reacts in the same manner without proper 
planning or co-ordination in advance. The anger was general and the 
reaction was similar. That the masses this time were not controlled by 
the Wafd, in fact were against the Wafd, simply meant that the Wafd had 
lost control and legitimacy. As future events would reveal, 26 January 
was to be a watershed in Egyptian politics, the collapse of the 
authority of the traditional powers, be it the Wafd or the monarchy. 
It was not for another six months that the vacuum of power caused by 
the upheaval of 26 January would be finally filled by the most powerful 
and organized sector of the urban lower class, the army. With the 
dismissal of Nahhas, a new era in Egyptian politics started which could 
be best described as the final days of not only Nahhas, but also the 
Wafd, the monarchy, and the whole political order. But it seems that
56. 'Abd al-Fatah Hassan Dhizrayat Siyasiyyah Mua'sasat Dar al-Sh'ab
Cairo 1974 p. 101.
57. Shuhdi 'Attiyah al-Shafai Tatawwar al-Harakat al-Wataniyah
al-Misriyya 1882-1956 Manshurat Salah al-Din Jerusalem n.d.
p. 122.
58. Cab 129-24 Cabinet meeting 28 January 1952 8th Conclusions p. 48.
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none of the actors on the scene at the time were aware of the 
consequences of what happened on 26 January, for they continued
behaving as if nothing had happened.
At 2300 hours Nahhas' broadcast came out with first attacking 
British atrocities in the Canal zone. Then he described the outbreak 
in Cairo as due to traitors who were profiting by the situation to 
undertake criminal acts and sow dissension harmful to the national 
cause. He then announced his own assumption of supreme power under 
conditions of martial law. He appealed to the people to keep calm, and 
said that practical steps would be taken to realise national
aspirations.89 Nahhas, who was persuaded by his ministers to declare 
martial law, was subsequently dismissed for the last time after 
telegrams had reached the Palace that British forces were forty miles 
away from Cairo.80
'Ali Mahir was to succeed Nahhas as prime minister, but he was to 
follow a policy of accommodation with the Wafd which Nahhas warmly 
welcomed. Mahir visited Nahhas in his house the second day of his 
appointment, and Nahhas declared after the visit that Parliament was to 
convene that night to support Mahir's government. It was said that 
Nahhas was told that by doing so he would be the one supporting the 
government, thus restoring his position in the face of the public after 
his dismissal. It was rumoured that the idea was Karim Thabit's, who
had visited Nahhas that morning. In the evening Mahir described Nahhas
as his "great predecessor" among cheers and claps of the Wafdist 
Parliament. In the second meeting Mahir asked Parliament to extend 
martial law another three months, but they refused. That night, Mahir 
issued an updated, open decree dissolving Parliament, to be implemented
v
59. FO 371-96870 JE/1018/13 Sir R. Stevenson (No. 184) 26 January
1952.
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when necessary. When Nahhas knew about it, he called one of Mahir's 
ministers, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Wahab, to ask him to tell Mahir that 
whatever the latter wanted, would pass in Parliament.61 But that 
policy adopted by Mahir towards the Wafd strengthened the Wafd in the 
eyes of the public once more. Nahhas deliberately appeared in photos 
in the newspapers shaking the hands of 'Ali Mahir, which gave the 
impression that it was not long before his return to power.62 
Naturally this policy was not to the liking of the Palace, and only a 
month after Mahir had formed his cabinet he was dismissed, to be 
replaced by an ex-Wafdist and an arch rival of Siraj al-Din, Nagib 
al-Hilali.
Nagib al-Hilali's first action was to suspend Parliament for one 
month.62 One week later, the report of an official inquiry into the 
events of 26 January was published. It accused Fuad Siraj al-Din, who 
was the Wafdist Minister of the Interior at the time, of negligence, 
and he was found to be "administratively responsible".6^ This was to 
be followed by an order from Hilali to both Siraj al-Din and 'Abd 
al-Fatah Hassan to leave Cairo and retire to their country homes.62 
Hilali's campaign against corruption which he had declared on forming 
his cabinet gave the impression that it was conducted solely against 
the Wafd.22 But his government lasted no longer than the beginning of 
July.
Hilali's fall was rumoured to be due to a large bribe paid in 
Swiss francs to Elias Andrawes and Karim Thabit by Ahmad 'Abud. The
61 . Sabri, pp. 49-51 .
62. Ibid., p. 79.
63. The Times, 3 March 1952.
64. The Times, 8 March, 1952.
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latter was said to want to avoid claims by the government for unpaid 
taxes amounting to several millions of Egyptian pounds. It was also 
said that 'Abud and Karim Thabit had had talks with Mr. Caffery, the 
American Ambassador in Cairo, prior to Hilali's fall. This led to some 
speculation of possible American intervention to bring down Hilali and 
hence the return of the Wafd.6  ^ Hilali was to assert later that he
was told through two foreigners in high positions that the Wafd had
contacted the British through 'Abud offering to reach an acceptable 
agreement.6®
A state of confusion lasted for two days after the fall of
Hilali. Bahi al-Din Barakat and Hussein Sirri were both instructed to 
form a cabinet at the same time. The former asked Nahhas to co-operate 
with him, to which Nahhas replied that he would leave the King to act 
as he wished but would not participate in any government, and would 
always demand elections*6® When the choice was finally made and Sirri 
formed the government, Nahhas responded to it favourably saying that it 
was only a transitional arrangement
From the start Sirri's government had to face the army's crises. 
There had been some discontent brewing since the end of the previous 
year. The form of the army's discontent expressed itself in the
elections of the Officers' Club, which were postponed from 18 December 
1951 to 3 January 1952. The King wanted Hussein Sirri 'Amir to be 
elected as President of the Officers' Club, but Muhammad Najib was 
elected instead."^1 Hilali had nominated Brig. Muhammad Najib as
67. Eden, pp. 236-237.
68. Sabri, p. 86.
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70. Ibid., p. 92.
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Minister of War but the King rejected the idea. Sirri repeated the 
nomination to be refused once more. Things got out of hand when 
Haydar, without Sirri's knowledge, dissolved the Officers' Club and 
Najib was transferred to Mankabad.^2 Sirri tendered his resignation, 
and was once more replaced by Hilali as prime minister and Ismail 
Sherin, husband of Princess Fouzaia, sister of Faruk, became Minister 
of W a r . T h i s  appointment, together with the general knowledge that 
the King was planning a clampdown on the army, prompted a secret 
organization of officers, known as "The Free Officers", to decide to 
take military action immediately. That organization had been planning 
some action for 1955, but the incidents of Cairo on 26 January 
convinced its- leader Gamal 'Abd a 1-Nasser, to advance the date to
November 1952. For a second time the date was advanced, this time to
the night of 22-23 July 1952.
Two explanations can be given for both the reason and success of 
the army's move on that night. The first is that the "Free Officers 
Organization" was able to identify its cause within the army with the 
general discontent against the King at the time.^4 The arms scandal 
was easily integrated with the corruption, and the King was accused of 
being its primary cause. The second was that since 26 January, it was 
obvious that the only national institution in Egypt which would be able
to provide law and order, was the army.^2 Furthermore, they were to
represent the spearhead of the urban lower middle class in its conflict 
with the more traditional landowners class and upper middle class who 
had dominated Egyptian politics and society since the revolution of 
1919. As one of these officers later wrote, none of them was a son of
72. Sabri, pp. 13-17.
73. Sabri, p. 1 22.
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a Pasha, nor had his family more than fifty feddans. They were from 
the middle class, with some from the lower strata of this class, sons 
of minor government officials. Their social composition was close to 
the leadership of the Socialist Party, the New Watani Party, the Muslim 
Brethren, and the Marxist organisations, not the Wafd or the Liberal 
Constitutionalists or the Saadists.76 Nasser, of course, was only 
thirty-five years old, whereas Nahhas was seventy-three.77
Nahhas who was spending a holiday in Europe, took the plane for 
the first time in his life to return to Egypt. He arrived on the night 
of 26-27 July, the day King Faruk abdicated his throne to his infant 
son at the "request" of the army, and hurried from the airport to meet 
the new army leadership. He told reporters after the meeting that as 
prime minister he had shown indulgence to traitors only so long as they 
appeared to serve national aims, later he had fought them.78 He 
hailed General Najib, who was chosen by the army to preside over its 
Revolutionary Command Council, as "saviour of the nation".79 Nahhas 
also declared "We have returned to our country after tyranny has been 
exterminated and prestige restored by our great Army and its great 
leader, General Nagib".88
Nothing could illustrate the gulf between Nahhas and the new army 
leaders than the offer by Nahhas to Najib of the title of Pasha, the 
same day titles were abolished.2  ^ For Nahhas, the army had got rid of 
his arch-enemy, ex-King Faruk now, and Parliament should be convened
76. Hamrush Vol. 1, pp. 212-215.
77. Ibid., p. 210.
78. The Times, 29 July 1952.
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once more so that constitutional life could continue with the natural 
result of him resuming the premiership once more. Naturally, once the 
army moved out of its barracks and held absolute power, it was 
difficult to send it back to where it belonged* With the social 
composition of the new leadership, some of whose members had been in 
anti-Wafd parties or organizations, mainly the Muslim Brethren and 
Young Egypt (later the Socialist Party), the collision between the Wafd 
and the young army officers was inevitable.
Parliament was not convened as Nahhas had hoped. This was because 
of some legal interpretation by anti-Wafdist members of the State
Q 9
Council.  ^ The campaign against the Wafd, and especially its leader, 
had begun. On the night of 31 July, Muhamma_d Najib issued a public 
statement urging the parties to purge themselves from corrupt elements 
as the army had done.83
Although 'All Mahir, who was appointed prime minister had declared 
that the government was in agreement with the army on dissolving 
political parties on 10 August, this was denied by Najib the following 
day.8  ^ It was succeeded by hints by Najib to *Abd al-Salam Fahmi 
Gomaa at a meeting between them that Nahhas should resign. To this 
Nahhas replied in a public statement that he would not. Another issue 
of collision between the army and the political parties was the new 
proposed law of land reform. In the same statement Nahhas added that 
the Wafd executive had made it clear that they thought the regime was 
working on the wrong lines.8  ^ A meeting between Siraj al-Dln and some 
of the army officers - Nasser, Gamal Salem, and Salah Salem - to
82. Hamrush Vol. 1, pp. 233-234.
83. Wahid Raft Fujul Min Thaurat 23 Yulyu Dar al-Sharuk Cairo 1978 
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discuss the land reform issue was to be followed by another when 
Mustafa Amin reprinted in the weekly Akhir Lahza that Siraj al-Din had 
said that he had the army officers in his p o c k e t . N a t u r a l l y  the 
second meeting never took place. The conflict between the Wafd and the 
army was escalating when the Wafd's executive declared its opposition 
to the limitation on land ownership for present holders of land and the 
suspension of the purge committee which had been established by the 
Wafd.8  ^ Event followed upon event. On 7 September, sixty-four 
politicians were arrested, including Siraj al-Din, Hafiz ’Afifi, Karim 
Thabit, and Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi.88 'All Mahir himself resigned two 
days later and the land reform law was issued on the same day, 9 
September 1952.88 The same day a new law was passed giving political 
parties one month to reorganize themselves. On 15 September, Siraj
Qf) *
al-Din resigned from the party as General Secretary and Nahhas'
refusal to give up the Party leadership forced the army to set in
motion the purge machine against him. Under the new law of political
parties anyone convicted by the purge tribunals would be disqualified
from holding an official position in the party. Nahhas was thus held
administratively responsible for the £E300,000 given to ex-king Faruk
as a personal loan from the secret fund of the Ministry of the Interior
under Siraj al-Din.^1 But it seems that under continuous pressure
from the army, Nahhas had finally to give up. As The Times reported,
The Wafd Party, reversing its decision of a few days ago, 
to-day decided to drop Mustafa al-Nahhas, its leader for the
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past 25 years, rather than face dissolution of the party.
This decision, which was made at a meeting of the executive
in Mustafa al-Nahhas' house, was not unanimous, and some 
♦ «
members estimated that the Wafd under new leadership would 
retain little more than one-third of its former s t r e n g t h .
Nahhas was given the title of "Honorary President of the Wafd", but
even that was not acceptable to the new regime. On 8 November 1952,
the Minister of the Interior objected to his name and t i t l e . O n  10
December, the 1923 Constitution was abolished, and political parties
were banned completely by 18 January 1953. Three days before the
Corruption Tribunal started its work on 25 May 1953, Nahhas' name was
lifted from the Wafdist newspapers which used to publish news about his
meetings and movements. The Tribunal started its work by bringing to
court Karim Thabit, Dr. Ahmad al-Naqib and other prominent Wafdists,
Osman Muharam and the al-Waktl family. On 18 June 1953 Egypt was
declared a republic. Nahhas expressed his approval of this step to the
Indian leader Nehru who was on a visit to Egypt at the time, but also
his displeasure with the "military regime". By mid-September 1953, the
Revolution's Court was set up with the sole aim of destroying the
Wafd. Fuad Siraj al-Din was tried and convicted, Nahhas, his wife, and
Hafiz 'Afifi were put under house a r r e s t . Nahhas remained under
house arrest until he died on 23 August 1965. His funeral turned into
a mass demonstration attended by more than a hundred thousand
people.8  ^ A last tribute by the Egyptian nation to the man who
presided over the national movement for a quarter of a century.
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CONCLUSION
In order to have a better understanding of the role played by 
Mustafa al-Nahhas in Egyptian politics, this thesis tried to examine 
the framework, whether it be social or ideological, in which Nahhas 
operated* The character of Nahhas, important in itself, is not
sufficient to understand his policies. Nahhas shared some of the
traits of his own social class, education, and generation which would
lead some to say that any other person in Nahhas's position adopt theA
same stand against the British and the Palace. Yet Nahhas was not just 
a mere instrument of history as might be suggested here, for without 
his own personal traits Nahhas would had never become a popular leader 
for such a long time: The leader of the largest Egyptian political
party and for the longest time compared to any other Egyptian leader in
recent history. Nahhas therefore should be seen in the context of what 
he represented in Egyptian political thought in general, inside the
Wafd party, himself.
Contrary to what has been widely accepted, the Liberal 
Constitutional Party was not the sole heir of the old Umma Party. The 
argument that it was went as follows: there were two main parties and
ideologies before World War One, the Umma and Watani. Since most of 
the Umma party members joined the Wafd later, and then defected to form 
the Liberal Constitutional Party, this new party is an extension of the 
old one. Here the argument is based on the similarity of ideologies 
but, more arguably, on the sheer physical existence of the same men in 
the two parties, as for example, Lutfi al-Sayyid "the philosopher of 
the Party". Their rival, the Watanr Party, however, continued as it 
was in ideology and organization, although not with the same members or 
influence. Thus the two parties did exist before World War One, and
after it.
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Although this argument is basically correct, it fails to notice 
that the Wafd Party was an heir of the old Umma Party too. It was the 
ideology of the Umma Party which became the dominant ideology among the 
elite of the politically-minded Egyptians after World War One, and it 
triumphed over the Watani ideology. More significantly, its ideology 
and programme became that of the Wafd Party. The difference between 
the two rival parties - the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalist - 
was one of social background of its members and political awareness of 
the developments which occurred in the Egyptian society as a result of 
the revolution of 1919. Thus their approaches differed in degree but 
not in content. Both parties were for Egyptianness versus Ottomanism, 
a Liberal Constitutional Monarchy versus Republicanism or absolute 
autocracy by the King. Most important was the similarity of approach 
to the solution of the national problem, i.e., by peaceful legal means, 
though negotiation with the British. or illegal methods, and the 
rejection of negotiation, as was the case with the Watani Party. One 
could further argue, that the Liberal Constitutional Party had betrayed 
its principles, while the. Wafd was more faithful to its Umma 
ideological heritage.
Because of the mass support enjoyed by their rivals, the Liberals 
soon abandoned their democratic ideas and institutions, such as the 
constitution and parliament, after failing to get elected as they 
hoped, in favour of a more autocratic notion of government, and became 
closely allied to the autocratic monarch. The reason for the defeat of 
the Liberals was the fact that they were bound by family links and 
wealth, both of which they still used in campaigning as contrasted to 
the more modern and skillful methods used by the urban middle class 
effendis'. It was not long before the rural landowners discovered that 
their main rivals in governing post-independent Egypt were not their 
old enemy, the Palace, but their old allies in the urban middle class.
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This competition between the landowners and the effendi lawyers was to 
dominate Egyptian politics from 1919 to the military coup in 1952, 
Saad or 'Adli, Nahhas or Muhammad Mahmud, only reflected this struggle 
between these two social groups for political primacy* This struggle 
between the Wafd and the Liberals continued after the social structure 
of the Wafd had become similar to that of its old rival. It was 
transferred to the new parties which represented the same social groups 
that the Wafd once did*
The other difference may be inferred from the political power and 
structure of the leadership of the Wafd Party. There were two main
competing wings in the Wafdist leadership, the urban middle class, and 
the rural landowners. The urban middle class, in a sense represented 
the first generation of the urban intelligentsia who were mainly 
professionals and to be more precise, lawyers. Thus a lengthy expose
was given to the reasons by which this segment of the society became
the leaders of the national movement. Its main representatives were 
Saad Zaghlul and the "Gang of Pour" which succeeded him, Nahhas, 
Makram, Mahir and Nokrashi. Although Nokrashi was not a lawyer - not 
all of them were lawyers - he belonged to that school of thought, the 
intellectual background of which was predominantly influenced by
lawyers and government officials • Although they were not the majority 
in numbers, and did not constitute the main bulk of the second or other 
strata of the Wafd, which was their power-base and main source of 
power, yet they had immense power and influence disproportionate to 
their actual numbers and representation, due to the skill of their 
profession, as shown earlier.
The second wing consisted of large and medium landowners. With 
the defection of the large landowners to form the Liberal 
Constitutional Party, their number in the leadership of the Wafd 
declined. A further set-back came with the election of Nahhas as
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successor to Saad and the defeat of Fathallah Barakat. With the 
defections in 1932, the control of the "Gang of Four" was absolute*
Each wing had its own policy which differed from the other, and 
the outcome of the Wafd's general policy reflected the internal balance 
of power between these two wings within the party's leadership. So the 
urbans versus the rurals, as one might put it, was reflected in one 
being more militant than the other. The internal balance between these 
two wings decided their policy against the other two powers, the King 
and the British, and their shifting alliances too. The urban lawyers 
were for a more militant policy in general though with a closer 
relation with Britain at the expense of the power of the King. That 
was evident in 1932 when the two factions argued on whether to accept 
the King's terms, i.e., enter into a coalition government or reject 
them, which resulted in defeat and the defection of the landowners.
Thus from 1932 to the end of the forties, the urban wing dominated the 
leadership, although it had two setbacks. The first was the defection 
of two strong pillars of the old guard, Mahir and Nokrashi, and
secondly, the defection of Makram himself in 1942. Although they were
replaced with men from the same background, as for example, Sabri Abu
'Alam, yet they were not of the same calibre or influence. Thus, this
period was characterized by a very close relationship with the British, 
while sharply hostile to the King. It was not surprising that they 
were the ones who signed the 1936 Treaty with Britain, and came back to 
power on the heels of the 4th February 1942 incident.
The explanation one might give is that after all the King
represented the head of the social pyramid consisting of the
■n .
landowners. Yet however much the landowners differed with the King j 0
over issues of constitutionalism and liberalism, in practice they
shared the basic common social and class base, and their conflict of 
interests was secondary rather than primary. The story was different
with the urban intellectuals for whom a less autocratic system was the 
only way for their social and political advancement in a society which 
was still controlled by those who owned wealth and land of which they 
had none. Thus they were ready to challenge the social system in order 
to have more votes, even by upsetting certain rules and laws. They 
understood that it was the nation, the masses which were the source of 
their power. Saad enshrined this idea in national lore.
Although this thesis did not discuss in detail the social policies 
of the Wafd, it was by comparison the most progressive of all the 
pre-1952 governments in terms of social legislation. Two examples 
which illustrate this were the legalization of the trade or labour 
unions, and the labour laws of 1942, and the introduction of free
education in 1952. There is no doubt that even by the mere fact of
their wide patronage, favouring supporters, they served the interests 
of a larger constituency than any other party. Also they were more 
oriented to the popular decisions which served their party interests, 
and so had to rely on more favourable social policies _ than other 
parties.
The defeat of the urban wing was due to the absence of three of 
its most celebrated leaders, Nokrashi, Mahir and Ebied. Then there was 
the gradual transformation of Nahhas into a member of the establishment
as a result of his marriage, and the rise once more of the big and
medium landowners in the leadership of the Wafd, best exemplified and 
personified by the assumption of the Party’s secretariat of Fuad Siraj 
al-Din, the nephew of one of the largest landowning families, the 
Badrawi. With the decline of the role of the urban middle class in the 
party’s higher echelons, the Wafd became a second edition of the 
Liberal Constitutional Party, with a popular flavour.
On the other hand, the urban middle class expanded rapidly during 
World War Two comprising new social forces that differed from the
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effendi class which existed at the beginning of the century- This time 
they were not only lawyers and government officials, but army officers 
and members of the free professions. The increasing ranks of the 
working class as a new force was closely linked, at least in theory, to 
them adding to the strength of this new middle class of the forties, 
and affecting their way of thinking. Thus a new generation of urban 
middle class emerged and found political expression to a great extent 
in the Muslim Brotherhood, and to a lesser extent in new groups of the 
Marxist Left. The Wafd lost its grip over the middle classes, as a 
result, and increasingly became a party of the big landowners, despite 
its efforts to maintain its popularity by the termination of the Treaty 
in 1951, a self-defeating and in fact, suicidal act.
The landowner-dominated Wafd now had to content with new groups 
that had a different perspective on the national question. In order to 
maintain its property and national appeal, it had to respond - or 
succumb - to the pressure from these new groups whose votes were 
needed. The Wafd was, in effect, abandoning whatever ideology and 
“raison d'etre" it had, and playing into the hands of its rivals when 
it unleashed a force which was not under its control.
It found itself dealing with a situation of armed struggle. Given 
its own structure, its fate was sealed in 1952, for the situation went 
out of their control on 26 January 1952 and the whole system collapsed 
four months later.
The Wafd, for a long time, articulated the aspirations of that 
emergent middle class in the last century. As it was not capable of 
bringing down the old monopoly of power exercised by the Palace, it had 
to share power with the landowners, either inside the party itself or 
outside with the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. The struggle between 
the party and the King was a symbol of the struggle between the new 
urban middle classes and the rural landowners, especially when the
Liberal Constitutionalists allied themselves with the Palace. After 
World War- Two, the urban middle classes strengthened their position in 
society. At the same time, they were alienated from the Wafd which 
ceased to be their representative because of its internal conflicts and 
defections. Thus the urban middle classes were no longer opposing only 
the King but the Wafd, under the banner of the Socialist Party and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, until their absolute triumph came on 23 July 1953 
with the complete defeat and surrender of the landowners by the 
abolition of the monarchy and the agrarian reform laws in the same 
year. One may argue that the Wafd at a certain stage in the social 
development of Egyptian history represented the repeated attempts of 
the rising urban middle class to break the aristocracy's monopoly of 
power, that is of the old Turkish ruling class before and after the 
1919 revolution, and the big rural landowners after the 1919 
revolution. _ the 1924, which saw for the first time elements of the 
effendi class, was the first attempt, to be followed by others in 1928, 
1930, 1936-7, and 1950-2. They were resisted bitterly throughout the 
period, and the Sidqi regime was the absolute and final attempt to try 
to destroy them.
Where does Nahhas fit into all of this? Nahhas as the leader of 
the Wafd and through his own personality (which had enabled him to 
assume the role of leadership in the first place), played a weighty 
role in the ensuing struggle between the two wings of the Wafd Party. 
Nahhas was a typical representative of the urban middle-class wing. 
When his own position moved closer to that of the rural landlords, the 
final defeat of that wing inside the party was not long acoming. One 
could even suggest that he let them down. With the leader of the Wafd 
no longer representing the urban middle class, the whole course of the 
Wafd changed, although his presence still gave the party its popular 
appeal, even when the party's reality had already changed. Nahhas is
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the personification of that development of the party from an urban 
middle-class party to a rural landowner's party. Of course I am not 
arguing for a clear-cut mechanical relationship, or in absolute terms, 
only in general terms* Nahhas' own development is a classical case of 
the impact of a position of power on an ex-revolution a r y ^  Being prime 
minister, or even minister, changes his social status. There is no 
doubt that the case of Seif al-Din was groundless, yet one cannot but 
still see some point in it. If Nahhas was not already a member of the 
establishment, would not the fees have been different? And in seeking 
to be a prince (a debatable point, but one not without interest) his 
life-style had definitely changed. His marriage to Zeinab al-Wakll, 
daughter of a pasha, turned him into a landowner, even though all this 
land may have been acquired by his wife. The elderly Nahhas had little 
in common with the young militant Nahhas of the Watani Party. It was 
not strange, therefore, that he finally sided with Fuad Siraj al-Din 
for his choice as his successor; a choice which clearly indicated his 
new social preferences and leaning.
The rural landowners not only benefited from the defection from 
the party of such strong personalities as Ahmad Mahir, Nokrashi and 
Makram, they also benefited from the personal change in the position of 
the leader of the Wafd himself. His defection from one wing {that of 
the urban middle class) to join the other carried weight and prestige. 
Nahhas began as representative of the urban middle class and ended as 
the representative of the landowners, or at least, the patron and 
protector of their true representative, Fuad Siraj al-Din. He ended 
protecting the very group he once opposed. That was not a change in 
his political position as much as a result of his moving upwards from 
the bottom of the social ladder to its top, via social-political status 
and newly-acquired landownership.
This leads us to another aspect in Nahhas' personality, the role 
played by his co-partners without any effect on him. Two particular
examples are his wife and Amin Osman. cJ^rvv>
As for the latter, his reputation was at least that of a very 
close friend of the British. Some people would even accuse him of 
treason. Yet the astonishing thing is that whatever Amin did, whether 
on his behalf, or on behalf of the Wafd, which meant Nahhas, did not 
raise any doubt about the feelings of Nahhas towards the British. For 
one could argue that it is doubtful whether Amin would have contacted 
the British without the approval of Nahhas, and that Nahhas, who was so 
keen about his anti-British image as a national leader, would have 
allowed anything which would damage his reputation and stand between 
him and the Egyptian people to be continued. Nevertheless, it was Amin 
who was labelled as the friend of the British, and not Nahhas.
Nahhas' wife, Zainab al-Wakil, married him when her financial 
status was modest, in spite of being the daughter of a pasha. What 
happened to her was the focus of attention and criticism of the 
opposition, which, in her case, found a great deal to talk about. 
Nahhas did not say or do anything to restrain her from leading her own 
provocative life-style that differed completely from what was known 
about himself. If Nahhas himself did not get rich, the same could not 
be said about Zainab, but one cannot but note the fact that she was his 
wife. Was he unaware of her activities, and the rumours they fed?
The same could also be said about Fuad Siraj al-Din. It was very 
interesting for the present writer to see how many writers labelled 
Siraj a feudalist reactionary. Although it was Nahhas who promoted, or 
at least encouraged SirajVs rise to be Secretary of the Party, nothing 
was said about that. All three cases have one feature in common. All 
three had close relationships with Nahhas, yet he was not identified or 
associated with any of them. What makes it puzzling is Nahhas1 three 
other close relationships, namely with Mahir, Makram and Nokrashi. As 
was seen in the election of 1927, it was assumed that it was three of
them who got him elected. And to put it more strongly, Nahhas was 
their tool, but what we saw was the fall of the three masterminds one 
after the other, and the survival of what was supposed to have been a 
stooge, for it was repeatedly alleged that Nahhas was a stooge of 
Makram. However, it was Makram who became the outcast and formed a new
* « i
party without any real following.
Three explanations could be offered. Either that being leader of 
the Wafd gave Nahhas such immunity that he was protected in any of the 
previous six relationships, whether as against Makram or Mahir or 
Nokrashi, thus being above suspicion in the cases of Zainab, Amin and 
Siraj, or that he was so cunning and a public relations man of the 
first order, that he saved himself from any connecting accusation. He 
was a politician in the sense of knowing how and when to associate 
himself with others and to do so without getting too closely associated 
with them, that is, he knew how to use people. The third explanation 
is both of them combined, and in my opinion is the most logical: since
his position gave such prestige that Amin, for example, would be 
overshadowed by Nahhas' influence and reputation, and Makram would be 
an outcast for having differed with him.
There is no doubt of the sincerity of Nahhas as a national 
leader. But sincerity does not shine through when it comes to political 
reality and action. Nahhas, as a devout disciple of Zaghlul, inherited 
the latter's fear of another 1882, that is, a British intervention 
under the pretext of protecting the monarch, to secure direct rule over 
Egypt. Nahhas therefore regarded any "revolutionary" method as an 
unnecessary provocation of the British that would lead to disaster. 
The ideology agreed upon was that of peaceful legal means, that of 
negotiations, but also that of curtailing the powers of the monarch, 
and bringing the Palace into the mainstream of the national movement, 
which practically meant under their control. In the case of the Wafd
and Nahhas, however, it presented them with a dilemma. On one side, 
the main aim of the Wafd was to demand national independence, but 
independence could not be achieved in the presence of what they 
considered to be a "fifth column". This "fifth column" was not only 
'Adli and his group, but also in a more direct way, the Monarch. For 
Saad and his successor the main battle was to get rid of these first, 
and independence would follow naturally. In domestic politics, 'Adli 
and his group, although not identified with the monarch at the start, 
none the less became so due to popular pressure exerted on them by the 
Wafd, leaving them no power-base of support except the monarch. In the 
ensuing struggle between the Wafd and its rivals, it fell upon Nahhas 
to spend most of his career doing nothing but that. This conflict 
between the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalists and the King was 
two-fold. In the first place, it concerned who would conduct the 
negotiations with Britain. In the second place, it entailed the 
question of who would inherit the political benefits of independence. 
Naturally the group that conducted successful negotiations, would be 
the one to reap the fruits of independence. It was not, therefore,
just a personal struggle between Saad and Adli (though there is no
doubt that it was an element in the proceedings) as some tend to 
explain the conflict between these two camps. Other social, political 
and cultural (ethnic) elements were some of the underlying causes of 
the conflict which consumed the national struggle for almost thirty 
years. The rising urban professional middle class from an originally 
Egyptian rural background with acquired Western liberal ideas, was 
pitted against an upper-class, rural Turkish aristocracy with a
tendency towards a more feudal and autocratic regime. it was a
struggle1* that served as a prelude to the final struggle for 
independence from the British. The main immediate objective of the 
liberal group was to secure the Constitution, since it was through the
Constitution that an elected government (presumably Wafdist) would soon 
be in office and would conduct the negotiations with the British, The 
fight for the Constitution replaced the fight for independence, as in 
the years between 1930 and 1936. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was 
considered by the Wafd as having secured the struggle for democracy and 
the Constitution, and Wafdist-British co-operation reached its climax 
in 1942. What the Wafd and Nahhas did not realize, was that the early 
ideological formation of the Wafd, and the legal framework in which 
they had locked themselves without any real respect, allowed them no 
choice but to ask for British assistance, leading to the hopeless 
contradiction of being a party primarily established to get rid of the 
British, but at the same time forced to depend completely on them. 
They came to power, that is, in order to negotiate with them. Being 
more representative of the people than the aristocrats and large 
landowners of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, they acquired a mass 
following, which however, concealed the reality until this was exposed 
gradually as of 1936, until it became completely clear in February 
1942. In calculating the balance of power in local politics, the 
British saw the Wafd as serving their interests, especially when the 
latter was in power in 1936 and 1942. They met the Wafd’s demands and 
made their co-operation possible. But when this co-operation did not 
serve the Wafd, a more militant policy would be adopted, as between 
1930 and 1935 and after 1945. The argument used by Nahhas and the Wafd 
regarding the British to the effect that the British had no choice but 
to negotiate with them because they had the support of the masses and 
could sabotage, or wreck, any agreement reached by the British with 
rival groups, was not always a sound argument and did not convince the 
British all the time. In fact, the British became convinced that what
the Wafd really wanted was for them to legitimize the Wafd's request to 
share power in the government. Who needed the other more then? What
made matters worse was that the British, for the sake of their own 
interests, would never have allowed any force to upset the delicate 
balance of power which they had set themselves to allow them to govern 
Egypt with the least possible cost. Nahhas was trying in vain to 
disturb that equilibrium between himself and the King in his own 
favour. The attempt to promote the use of Blue Shirts was one example. 
Now whether Nahhas really believed that the British would let him go on 
with it, car whether he was trying to extract the maximum possible price 
from a stronger bargaining position, that is, just another bluff, is 
only for Nahhas himself to answer. The situation reached a deadlock in 
which Nahhas could achieve nothing more than the 1936 Treaty due to the 
unrestrained or undiminished power of the King and the restraint put on 
him by the British when he tried to dilute these powers. The policy of 
depending on the British to curtail the King in order to check the 
British cam to a standstill and had led the country nowhere after 
twenty-five years of vicious circle in which its major achievement was 
the 1936 Treaty. But that was not enough, especially in post-World War 
Two Egypt. The final collapse of the professional middle-class wing in 
the leadership of the Wafd Party with the turning of Nahhas to the old 
big landowners * wing which he had opposed in the past, also brought 
about the final collapse of the Wafd and its leader. This time 
adopting the policy of rapprochement with the King, which Nahhas had 
rejected through the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, Nahhas put himself into a 
much tighter corner than the previous policy had led him to. With the 
new alliance to a decaying monarchy, Nahhas thereby tied himself to a 
sinking ship. New radical and militant groups on the left and right 
were attracting more and more of the support of the new generation and 
social groups away from the Wafd. With the monarch becoming a target 
of criticism and opposition, Nahhas' alliance or conciliatory tone 
towards the King could not have come at a worse time. Not only was he
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abandoned by the British, whom he vigorously denounced in an
unprecedented way by unilaterally abrogating the 1936 Treaty, he also 
failed to maintain his grip of power over the masses. It was a final 
act of obeisance by a desperate and dying hero. It was a question of 
Samson's "Over me and my enemies", when all the forces was unleashed 
and the situation had got out of control. It was not "peaceful legal 
means, via negotiations", but guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism
which Nahhas could not grasp or follow, even if he wanted to. The
burning of Cairo and the army's intervention were a foregone
conclusion.
Nahhas was not only a mere instrument of history,, or as some might 
suspect, just a representative of a social force in a certain period of 
time. There is no doubt that he shared many values and ideas of a 
larger group, be it a class, or nation. But one could argue that there 
are two levels by which to understand any key personality in history, 
politics or society. One is the social level, which might have been 
overemphasized in this thesis in general and in the conclusion in 
particular? and the other is the personal level. To translate this
into political terms, the strategy adopted by all, and the different
tactics adopted by each person. One could enter into endless 
discussions on where to draw the line between the two levels. For
Nahhas, one would argue that his strategy was that of the Umma Party, 
shared by the rest of his colleagues in the Wafd. But would the Wafd 
have been the same if it was led by Ahmad Mahir or Nokrashi? That is 
where the personal level comes in.
There is no doubt that Nahhas was a charismatic leader, in his own 
right. It is true that being the heir of Zaghlul and President of the 
Wafd were powerful factors in attaining the attributes of national 
leadership. There is no doubt either that Makram played a role by
constructing an image for Nahhas as a "Sacred Leader". But all these 
factors would not have been enough without certain personal
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characteristics which Nahhas alone possessed, and which made him such a 
charismatic leader* One could argue that others may have been better 
educated, more experienced, but it was only Nahhas who bore the 
charisma.
It is sometimes difficult to find out why a person is liked or 
loved, because basically it is a feeling which in most cases is not
\ h  r 'quite rational. Had it to do with his physical appearance, his general rCf.„
attitude and behaviour, ideas and principles, or every one of these +W2..U.O
mixed in a complex formula?
Lacouture wrote that what delighted the Egyptians was to find 
themselves reproduced in Nahhas, his moods, enthusiasm, resentments and 
quirks. He called it a "sounding echo". Nahhas, continued Lacouture, 
gave the Egyptians the feeling that they themselves were exercising 
power, if not, that they were being excluded for personal reasons.^
Another European, Barrie St. Clair McBride, who was the British tutor 
of young King Far*uk for a short time, also wrote that Nahhas1 personal 
honesty and character were never questioned. He was an eloquent 
persuasive speaker in Arabic and French. He also described Nahhas as a 
tall man with a striking face which clearly showed all his emotions 
when he was addressing an audience. He had a cast in his left which
A
gave the unnerving impression from his photographs that he was able to 
watch those at his side as well as those in front. McBride concluded 
that Nahhas was, on the whole, a likeable, attractive man with a sense 
of humour and pride of appearance. Naturally, there were those among 
the non-Egyptians who did not think well of him at all. Although the 
following remarks came from one of Nahhas1 bitterest enemies, 
nevertheless it gives some idea of why he was equally loathed as liked:
Good heart, a very large street value by reason of his form of
oratory, and obstinacy. His defects are boundless. Vanity, a
1• Lacouture p. 93
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deficient third dimension in his reasoning capacity, and a not 
quite immaculate moral courage. The personal elements ranks with 
him too highly, and his talent is for party politics of a rather 
hectic kind, rather than for statesmanship
These not altogether complimentary views were also shared by 
Nahhas' opponents, Egyptian or not. And sometimes it could be argued 
that all these qualities did exist in the man. It was what people 
wanted to see in him, or in other words, each group saw in Nahhas what 
suited it best. There is no contradiction in being both honest and 
egocentric. But some would see one side of the coin rather than both 
sides. Surely for those who loved Nahhas, he was no less a man or 
leader than Zaghlul, even better. Fuad Siraj al-Din told me that 
Nahhas went through all that Zaghlul went through, but while the latter 
came from the establishment, the former did not. And then, on 
comparison, Nahhas was the stronger in character since he would never 
have resigned as Saad did in 1924.
Equally important in the opinion of one Egyptian scholar, Dr. Afaf 
Lutfi al-Sayyid, who give an independent and almost objective opinion 
of Nahhas despite the fact of her apparent leanings towards the Liberal 
Constitutionalists. She argues that Nahhas was not entirely the
irresponsible buffoon that some of the opposition claimed him to be. 
Rather he was an astute politician despite his lack of finesse and 
subtlety. His approach was one based on vested interest, and it served 
him well in garnering votes in the rural areas, since he was not averse 
to promising much that he had no intention of delivering. She then 
describes him when giving a speech by saying that his speeches were 
geared to the man in the street, who appreciated Nahhas' style, and 
that contact with the public gave him a "kick", an excitement which the
more mundane attributed to a touch of hysteria,3 This last sentence
2. Terry p.220 quoting Percy Loraine to P.G. Elgood 25 January 1937
St. Antony's College Oxford.
3. al-Sayyid-Marsot pp. 148-9,
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might be followed by someone else's point of view on Nahhas, although 
from a different angle. Egypt's famous novelist, Najib Mahfuz, told me 
that Nahhas had some of the characteristics of a sheikh of a tariqa 
(religious brotherhood), affecting simple religiousity that appealed to 
those of rural origin, as well as his simplicity and honesty.
Finally, before venturing on a personal assessment of Nahhas, one 
last description of the man is worth noting. It is that of Salah 
al-Shahid, who worked closely with Nahhas in the official circle, 
though not the party. He described Nahhas as a democratic man by
nature, liberal in his thought, a free person by inclination who was 
not biased or prejudiced. He had a judge's mentality, and would let 
everyone speak first, then he would speak. When it came to the
national issues, which did not relate to the day to day government 
work, but to the Wafd, then the Wafd meant the nation, and also the
President of the Wafd, as was the case with Saad. His opinion
prevailed, even when he was in the minority.
This last sentence leads us to one basic component in Nahhas' 
personality. He personified the Wafd, and the Wafd, according to 
Wafdists, was the nation; thus he was the nation. Whether this idea 
was inherited from Saad, or was a basic characteristic of Nahhas, does 
not change the outcome at all. Here we are faced with a basic 
contradiction in Nahhas' perception of democracy since the Wafd 
insisted that the people are the source of all power. This definitely 
suits Nahhas as one of the people, outside the ruling establishment, 
who saw no reason why he should not share in power. In this he was 
absolutely right. Why limit power to only four families merely because 
of their blood relations, whether to the royal family, or to the 
so-called aristocracy? Nahhas was thus expressing the will of a 
general public that was no longer content with the way things had been
run since the times of the absolute rule of the sacred Pharaohs. Thus
Nahhas was correct in h is belief that the 1923 Constitution was the 
Magna Carta of Egypt, and was expressing the changes which was
happening in Egypt. Unfortunately, the constitutional battle coincided 
with the national battle, and as explained by Tariq al-Bishri in 
Chapter One of this thesis, it needed to consolidate all efforts in one 
camp. No dissension was allowed. Unity, or in other words, the 
monopoly over the national as well as the constitutional movement, was 
a basic component of the Wafd's strategy. This led to the unfortunate 
result of while upholding the slogan of "Democracy" against the 
autocracy of the King, no such "Democracy" was allowed in the
democratic camp. It had its reasons, rightly or wrongly, but the fact
that the Wafd was equated with its president, could hardly be based on 
any democratic notions. In the cases of political disagreements a 
basic notion of democracy, which is a majority vote, was never
seriously followed. Although one could support the struggle of Nahhas 
against the monarch as a necessary and evolutionary process in the 
development of Egypt, one would greatly doubt how far these democratic 
forces were democratic compared with •other national and democratic 
groups. Nahhas was shaped by this process into becoming not the 
President of the Wafd, but the Wafd itself. Nor surprisingly this 
resulted in the adoption of certain attitudes and behaviour which led 
many to accuse him of vanity. This can be seen in his relationships 
with most of the characters mentioned in this study. Since he was the 
Wafd, and since the Wafd was Egypt, he fell into the trap of regarding 
whoever differed with him, for any reason, as outcasts and opposed to 
the nationalist movement. Nokrashi, Mahir and Makram were expelled 
from the party. So long as they did not touch his person they were 
allowed to flourish, as was the case with Amin Osman, Zeinab al-Wakil 
and Fuad Siraj al-Din.
Naturally, Nahhas was not judging all the matters according to how
they related to his person. Personal .matters became a major factor 
because he believed he was the people. That belief in being the people 
was what made Nahhas different from other politicians, whether inside 
or outside the Wafd Party, For other politicians the "people" were a 
convenient myth which could be used to further their interests and
ambitions. Whether it was Makram Ebeid or Ismail Sidqi, both saw 
themselves as intellectuals and statesmen, separate and distinct from 
the 'people1. Anyone of them could claim to "serve" or "represent" the 
"people", but still the fact remained that Makram or Sidqi were one 
thing and the 'people' another. It does not follow that their 
interests were the same. For Nahhas, on the other hand, it was
altogether a different matter. He did not distinguish himself from the 
people, but he was united with them in the same way a Sufi or mystic 
would feel one with God. Thus whatever Nahhas saw as benefiting the 
people, surely it meant him also, and vise versa. Hence his
popularity* He was not playing a role, and he did not need to do so. 
As Lacouture rightly observed, Egyptians found themselves reproduced in 
Nahhas.
This leads us to the kind of charismatic leader Nahhas was, as 
compared to Zaghlul. Nahhas was not from the establishment, and even 
when he joined the cabinet, he did not join it as a member of the
establishment, and this influenced his behaviour to the extent that 
even when he was finally integrated into the establishment, he was like 
a nouveau-riche type, or a latecomer. This may explain his lack of 
subtlety and finesse, as Dr. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid observed. But that 
was also what kept him popular. He was not the charming prince, or 
what ordinary ‘people aspired to, a model to imitate, as Zaghlul. He 
was who appealed to the ego of every middle-class Egyptian, not a super 
ego, as Zaghlul. Nahhas aspired to be like Zaghlul, but he never 
achieved his ambition. With his own physical appearance, personal
behaviour, he could not be otherwise. He was not an outstanding hero 
who could capture the imagination fo the people by his bravery or 
intelligence, as Mustafa Kamil or Saad Zaghlul or Hasan al-Banna. He 
was an ordinary man who shared the simple ways of the ordinary fellah. 
He would know when to bow to the storm until it passes, realize quite 
well his weaknesses, try to gain points without every performing 
outstanding acts or portraying great imagination to upset the whole 
balance of power. His steps were cautious, and only when he was sure 
that his opponent was completely, helpless, would he attack. This can 
be seen in his abrogation of the Treaty in 1951, and his actions
concerning the Blue Shirts, or the incident of 4th February in 1942, 
It can also be seen in his fear of provoking the British or the
monarchy to the extent that one could believe that they were sacred
taboos as far as he was concerned. This explains his firm belief in 
the political framework he was operating through without trying to 
change the rule of the game. As he once admitted, he was not a 
revolutionary.
Are we asking too much of the man? Naturally he was the product 
of his environment, his social group, his education, and several other 
influences. It is always easy to criticize other people's actions,
especially if one is not under the same psychological pressure as them. 
And it is, of course, even more easy to criticize with hindsight. All 
in all, Nahhas was definitely genuine, and he served Egypt as best he 
could, and as he saw best.
Appendix 1
Wafd in Paliamentary Elections
Year of 
Elections
Number of 
Votes
Percentage No 
■ in
• of seats 
Parliment
Percentage
1925 31,482 out of 67,342 46,8% 113 out of 222 53.6%
1926 771,737 out of 1,135,264 68% 171 out of 211 81%
1929 610,461 out of 1,002,662 60,9% 216 out of 232 93.1%
1931 boycotted - - - - - - -
1936 794,966 out of 1,281,085 62.1% 190 out of 232 81 .9%
1938 111,106 out of 1,774,038 6.2% 14 out of 264 5.3%
1942 738,657 out of 1,267,004 58.3% 232 out of 264 87.9%
1945 boycotted - - - - - - -
1950 1,357,206 out of 2,488,744 54,5% 226 out of 319 70,8%
Source Quraishi pp. 231-233,
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Ministry of 1924^
1. Saad Zaghlul Pasha (Premier & Internal Affairs)
2. Wasif Butrus Ghali (Foreign Affairs)
3. Muhamma_d Tawfiq Nasim Pasha (Finance)
4. Hassan Hasib Pasha (War)
5. Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli (Justice)
6. Muhammad Said Pasha (Education)
7. Ahmad Mazlum Pasha (Wagfs)
8. Murqus Hanna (Public Works)
9. Muhammad Fathallah Barakat Pasha (Agriculture)
10. Mustafa al-Nahhas (Communications).
Nahhas Coalition Government 1928^
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (Premier & Interior) Wafdist
2. Wasif Butrus-Ghali (Foreign Affairs) Wafdist
3. Muhammad Mahmud (Finance) Liberal Constitutional
4. Ga’ far Wali (War) Liberal Constitutional
5. Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba (Justice) Wafdist
6. 'Ali al-Shamsi (Education) Wafdist
7. Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli (Wagfs) Wafdist
8. Ibrahim Fahmi (Public Works) Liberal Constitutional
9. Muhammad Safwat (Agriculture) Wafdist
10. Makram 'Ebied (Communications) Wafdist
1. Quraishi p. 226
2. Ibid. p. 227
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First Nahhas Government3
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (Premier & Interior)* *
2. Wasif Butrus Ghali (Foreign Affairs)
3. Makram Ebied (Finance)
* •
4. Hassan Hasib (War)
5. Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli (Justice)
6 . Muhammad Bahi al-Dln Barakat (Education)
• — —
7. Mahmud Basyuni (Wagfs)
8 . Uthman Muharam (Public Works)
9. Muhammad Safwat (Agricutlure)
10. Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi (Communications)ft ♦
Nahhas Second Cabinet-^
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (Premier & Interior & Health)
* #
2. Wasif Butrus Ghali (Foreign Affairs)
3. Makram 'Ebied (Finance)
4. 'Ali Fahmi (War)
5. Mahmud Ghalib (Justice)
6.'Ali Zaki al-'Urabi (Education)
7. Muhamma_d Safwat (Wagfs)
8. 'Uthman Muharam (Public Works)
9. Ahmad Hamdi Sayf al-Nasr (Agriculture)
10. Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi (Communications)
• I
11. 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa (Commerce & Industries)
3. Ibid. p. 227.
4. Ibid. pp. 227-228
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Third Nahhas Government 1936^
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (Premier & Interior)
2. Wasif Butrus Ghali (Foreign Affairs)
3. Makram Ebied (Finance)
4* ’All Zaki al-'Urabi (Communications)
5. 'Uthman Muharam (Public Works)
6. Ahmad Hamdi Sayf al-Nasr (War)
7. ’Abd al Salam Fahmi Gomaa (Education, Commerce & Industries)
8. Muhammad Sabri Abu 'Alam (Justice)
9. Mahmud Basyuni (Wagfs) 'Ali Hussein replaced him when the former 
was elected President of the Senate.
10. Muhammad Mahmud Khalil (Agriculture)
11. 'Abd al-Fattah al-Tawil (Public Health).
Nahhas Fourth Cabinet 1942^ ,
s '
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (President, interior, Foreign Affairs)
2. Makram 'Ebied (Finance & Supply) replaced by Kamil Sidqi
3. Ahmad Hamdi Sayf al-Nasr (National Defence)
4. Muhammad Sabri Abu 'Alam (Justice)
• ——
5. Ahmad Nagib al-Hilali (Education)
6. 'Ali Husayn (Wagfs) resigned on health reasons and was replaced 
by Muhammad 'Abd al-Hadi al-Gindi.
7. 'Uthman Muharam (Public Works & Civil Defence)
8. 'Abd Al-Salam Fahmi Gomaa (Agriculture) Fuad Siraj al-Din replaced 
him on March 31, 1942 as the former was elected Speaker of the House 
of Deputies).
9. Zaki al-'Urabi (Communications) 'Abd al-Fattah al-Tawil was 
entrusted of the ministry as the former was elected Speaker of 
Senate.
10. Kamil Sidqi (Commerce & Industries)
11. 'Abd'al-Fattah al-Tawil (Public Health & Social Affairs).
5. Ibid. p. 228 Nagib al-Hilali education in November 1937
6. Ibid. pp. 228-229.
z / t
The cabinet was enlarged due to the war and included also
12. Ahmad Hamza -(Supply)
13. Mustafa Nasrat (Civil Defence)
14. 'Abd al-Hamld 'Abd al-Haqq (Social Affairs)
15. Dr. 'Abd al-Wahld al-Wakil (Health)
Nahhas Fifth Cabinet after the defection of Makram Ebied 1942?
1. Amin Osman (Finance)
2. Fuad Siraj al-Din (Internal Affairs & Social Affairs)
3. Mustafa Nasrat (Agriculture)
4. Fahmi Hanna Wisa (Civil Defence)
5. 'Abd al-Hamld 'Abd al-Haqq (Wagfs).
1950 Cabinet
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (Premier)
2. Fuad Siraj al-Din (Interior)
3. Dr. Muhammad Salah al-Din (Foreign Affairs)
4. Muhammad Zaki 'Abd al-Muta'al (Finance) dismissed in November 1950♦ '  A + A +
and his profolio was given to Fuad Siraj al-Dm.
5. Mustafa Nasrat (War)
6. 'Abd al-Fattah al-Tawil (Justice) replaced by Muhammad al-Gundi.
7. Dr. Taha Hussein (Education)
8. Yasln Ahmad (Wagfs) resigned & replaced by Ismail Ramzi
9. 'Uthman Muharam (Public Works)
10. Ahmad Hamza (Agriculture) was appointed the Chief Justice of 
Alexandria High Court in November 1950 and his porfolio was given 
to 'Abd al-Latif Mahmud
August 1951
7. Ibid. pp. 229-230.
A / o
11. ’All Zaki al-Urabi (Communications)
12. Mahmud Sulaiman Ghannam (Commerce & Industries)
13. 'Abd al-Latif Mahmud (Health) replaced by ’Abd al 'Awwad Hussein 
when the former was transfered to Agriculture.
14. Dr. Ahma_d Hussein (Social Affairs) resigned in August 1951, Abd 
al-Fattah Hassan replaced him.
15. Mursi Farahat (Supplies) resigned November 1950 his portfolio 
was transferred to Ahmad Hamza.
16. Muhammad Muhammad al-Wakil (National Economy) resigned in 
September 1951 and replaced by ’Abd al-Magid 'Abd al-Haqq, the 
portfolio was transferred to Hamid Zaki.
17. Ibrahim Faraj (Municipal & Rural Affairs)
18. Dr. Hamid Zaki (Minister of State)
279
Appendix 3
The High Command was formed on September 23, 1927 after the death of 
Saad Zaghlul.1
1927
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (President)
2. Makram Ebied (Secretary General)* •
3. Sinut Hanna
4. George Khayyat
5. Wasif Butrus Ghali
6. Wisa Wasif
7. Muhammad Fathallah Barakat
8. Muhamma_d 'Alwi al-Gazzar
9. Murad al-Sharii
10. Murqus Hanna
11. 'Ali al-Shamsi
12. Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli
13. Fakhri 'Abd al-Nur
14. Salama Mikhail
15. Raghib Iskandar
16. Hassan Hasib
17. Hussein Hisib
18. Mustafa Bakir
19. 'Ata Afifi
20. Dr. Ahmad Mahir
21. Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi
22. Hamd al-Basil
1. Quraishi p. 223-4
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1932 9 members with predominately land-owning interests defected over
the issue of coalition government, George Khayat left on health 
grounds. 12 new members joined.2
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (President)
e n
2. Makram Ebied (General Secretary)
*
3. Sinut Hanna
4. Wasif Butrus Ghali
5. Wisa Wasif
6. Murqus Hanna
7. Hassan Hasib
8. Hussein Hasib
9. Mustafa Bakir* •
10. 'Ata 'Afifi
11* Dr. Ahmad Mahir
12. Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi
« *
13. Mahmud Basyuni
14. Muhammad Zaghlul 'Ali Salim
15. 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Goma'a
16. Mahmud al-Atribi
17. Ibrahim Sayyid Ahmad
18. Muhammad al-Shinnawi
19. Dr. Hamid Mahmud
20. Ahmad Hamdi Sayf al-Nasr
21. Muhammad 'Azz al 'Arb
22. Kamil Sidqi
23. Muhammad Yusuf
2. Ibid. p. 224.
High Command in 1935-3
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (President)
2. Makram Ebied (Secretary)
* *
3. Mahmud Basyuni
4. 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gom'aa
5. Ahmad Hamdi Sayf al-Nasr
6. Mahmud al-Atribi
7. Muhammad Yusuf
* —
8. Muhammad Muhammad al-Shinnawi
9. Dr. Ahmad Mahir
10. Mahmud Fahmi al-Nokrashi
« i
High Command 1937^
1. Mustafa al-Nahhas (President)
2. Makram Ebied (Secretary)
3. Mahmud Basyuni
4. 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gom'aa
5. Ahmad Hamdi Sayf al-Nasr
% ——
6. Mahmud al-Atribi
7. Muhammad Yusuf
8. Muhammad Muhammad al-Shinnawi
9. Muhammad Sabri Abu 'Alam
10. 'Abd al Fattah al-Tawil
11. Yusuf al-Gindi
12. Muhammad Sulaiman al-Wakil
% —
13. Muhamma_d a 1 -Ma gha z i
14.'Abd Rabbuh
3. Ibid. pp. 224-5.
4. Ibid. pp. 225-6.
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15. Bushri Hanna
16. Muhammad Hifni al-Tarazi
9 —
17. Kamal 'Alma
18. Ahmad Mustafa 'Amr
k —  * *
19. Fahmi Wisa
20. Sayyid Bihnas
21. 'Uthman Muharam
22.'All Zaki al-Urabi
23. 'All Hussein Fahmi
24. Ahmad Nagib al-Hilali
25. Muhammad Mahmud Khalil
In 1942 Sabri Abu 'Alam assumed Party Secretaryship also Amin 
Osman was taken as a member in the High Command. In 1946 the former 
died and was replaced by 'Abd al-Salam Fahmi Gom'aa (and latter 
resigned). The two vacancies were filled by Fuad Siraj al-Din and 
Muhammad Muhammad al-Wakil in June 1948 Gom'aa relinquished his post to 
Siraj al-Din.
Appendix 4
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[This telegram is of particular secrecy., aid should he • 
retained by the authorised recipient and riot passed-on].
[CYPHZR] NAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.
FROM: EGYPT.
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE,
Sir M. Lampson. D. 10.50 a.m., 3rd February, 1942.
ho. 453. “
2nd February, 1942. R. 11.50 a.m., 3rd February, 1942,
5 3 3
13.1.3DI ATE.
Unfortunately your telegram No. 572 and the immediately 
preceding telegram reached me too late: the latter only
after midnight. As already reported events had led the 
Prime Minister to throw in his hand this morning instead 
of to-morrow, hence my insistence on an audience with nuht/A 
King Farouk at 1 p.m. to-day (my telegram No. 449). J 
It is thus no longer possible to act on that part -of your 
instructions.
2. The only subsequent development up to to-night is 
that, late this evening, I got a message to Hassanein by 
Mr. Shone that I trusted that neither King Farouk: nor he 
were under any misapprehension as to the serious importance 
of summoning Nahas Pasha, before noon to-morrow, as stipulated 
by me this morning. This drew from Hassanein a statement 
late to-night that King Farouk was seeing Nahas Pasha at
5 p.m. to-morrow, the press and other party leaders 
thereafter the same afternoon,
3. As events have developed and as I see things 
to-night I gravely doubt the wisdom of my getting in direct 
touch with Nahas Pasha in advance of his audience: nor do 
I fancy he would be willing to see me at the moment as it 
might embarrass him. It night even deter him from going 
to see the King, if he knew that we were pressing him in 
advance to make terms with us. My inclination therefore 
is to allow things to take their course to-morrow (they 
hardly ever work out as one anticipates) and reserve action 
on the lines you suggest (which I welcome and regard as 
admirable) until the situation clears and I know better 
than I do to-night what I am up against,
4. . Meantime, may I record my grateful thanks for 
the wide discretion you give me? You can rely on me to 
deliver the goods to the best of my ability in a situation 
liable to change almost hourly.
(IMDIV)
v
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be 
retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]*
«
WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION,
From EGYPT.
[Cypher]
From CAIRO to FOREIGN OFFICE.
Sir Mo Lampsen*
No. 461, D. 5.55 p0m. 5rd February, 1942.
Brd^eoYuary, 1942, R. 10,55 p.m, 5rd February, 1942.
BSMMSiL
Your telegram No. 572 and my telegram No. 455.
Very opportunely Amin Osman Pasha asked to see me 
this rorningl I have purposely avoided seeing him during 
the past 5 months to prevent any foundation for rumours of ' 
intrigue with the Embassy, Position is now entirely 
changed ancl he is once more particularly valuable as the 
Ixnxe de Confiance of Nahas,
2, I defined my attitude clearly and took the 
opportunity of making the points in your telegram No. 572.
11 and when Nahas took office I should be making them 
direct with him. Amin fully agreed that they were very 
necessary points and did not anticipate that there should 
be any real difficulty over any of them. He concurred that 
it v;ould have been a mistake to see Nahas before he was 
seeing King Farouk.
5. I sent message through him to Nahas that he should 
turn down the proposal for transition Government but that 
he should offer to do his best to form coalition Government. 
That would greatly strengthen his position both with the 
Egyptian public and with us. Coalition under Nahas was 
ideal. In reply to question from Amin I advised Nahas 
strongly against making a condition of fresh election - that 
would necessarily follow if he too1'- office, seeing that he 
has '-'ly some dozen seats in the Chamber. Actually fresh 
elections just now were most undesirable and when it caone 
to the point Nahas should revive his idea of allocating 
seats to other parties which could no doubt be duly legalised. 
He could tell Nahas that provided he played his hand 
reasonably well I was behind him. But I was sure that Nahas 
would agree I should for the time being keep in the back­
ground. It would be time lo emerge when my support was 
needed.
4, Amin told me that Nahas was fully determined if he 
came in to clean up the Palace and have no further nonsense 
from King Farouk.
3t I expect to be informed this evening of what passes 
with Nahas at the Palace this afternoon.
.6, To Qomplete the record Sirri Pasha rang me up this 
morning. He is definitely aiamst transition Government; . 
which is Palace trick to gain time for further intrigue 
against us. He believes that the chances of coalition are 
nil, cut from internal political angle it should be played 
for as ^ ideal. He remains convinced that-reform-of Govern­
ment wilj. be the final solution. ly i( i <s-“-
INDIVf _ 5
IMMEDIATE
Hy telegram No.455.
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should he 
retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on?]
[ Cyphe r] gAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
FROM: EGYPT 
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Wor462 LampSon §• ,^‘on p*m* February, 1942.
5rd' February, 1942. P*m' 3rd Fe*™*y. 19*2.
-------------------
[][][][]
J
jsyn//6 j " “ i
! , . * - 
I ' * ;
Amin has just returned from Nahas Pasha with the 
following message:- “*
when he sees King Farouk will definitely 
refuse coalition: he was formerly in favour of neutral rS-Jvo
A b a t e r .  n°¥ agaiDSt that also* owinS to thfillnlS^f
m s Nahff J*asha me to know his reasons for
refusing coalition. The state of the country was now verv 
had. Even under Hussein Sirri (who had every family adrontaffe^  
Palace _ intrigue was rife. Some members of any coalition were 
bound to be King s men and Nahas Pasha wouldbe "unable to 
deliver the goods" to us. w
$
, 4* Af to working whole-heartedly with us he has always
done-so and will always do so, treaty or no treaty. The snirit 
of the treaty was mutual co-operation by both sides "in everv 
sense". If, on this, HusseinSirri was useful to us
wil. ^  mnoh W T e ' 80• Nahas Pasha who loyally with us in peacetime will be "tenfold" no re 
co-operative in time of war. But for that he must havea 
free hand, especially with the Palace. What he wants is real 
demooracy and real co-operation with us to get it. King Farouk 
stands against both. This means that he will have the 
opposition of the King: if we back him up he will see it
l f S ^ § b n / ^ v +?ashai,doesJn?t wis& &  ^  vindictive to King Farouk and doubtless he and I can hold each other back 
from tunc to time.
the above Nahas Pasha cannot accent 
coalition and be fair both to himself and to us. He would
if^  to have coalition^lemlntsin some consultative body but he alone must govern. He would 
accept a neutral [sic] government if I wished, but it would 
not work he was sure. Reverting to the dangers of coalition, 
compare the incident of AssuanHydro Electrical scheme where 
the cabinet was wrecked by three Ministers: compare the Briggs 
case.
2,
6. Amin asked whether I wished to insist on coalition? 
Or, as alternative, on consultative hody"cbiftaining elements 
of the other parties. I implied that it must primarily
he a matter for Nahas Pasha to judge.* For myself, I 
should nave thought that a serious attempt to foim a 
coalition vrould have strengthened Nahas Pasha's hand with 
the country. But he must decide. Amin said that Nahas 
Pasha left to his own judgment, would not agree to 
coalition.
7. Finally. I agreed that the following should he 
put to Nahas Pasha as the hest line to take with King 
Farouk. ■ Nahas Pasha to tell His Majesty that the position 
is so had and he has so very little faith in the loyal 
co-operation of the other parties, and such fear of
possible intrigues, that he would suggest, as'the only 
remedy, a purely ffardist Government when lie will assume all 
responsibility and feel that he can do so. That he is ready 
(1) to allocate certain seats in the [group undec.] to 
other parties and (2) that he is ready to consider also later 
on the advisability as a symbol of coalition, of forming a 
consultative body selected from other parties.,
8. In reply to a query from Amin, I repeated that I 
would back Nahas Pasha over this: and see him through.
9. Hardly had I drafted the above when I had a 
telephone call that Nahas Pasha (who has no sense of time) 
had been so late that he had missed him and that he had 
presumably gone straight down to the Palace. I send it 
none the less as each move may later have:* its importance.
INDIV
f
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